#401

roseweird posted:

cars posted:

fape posted:

Speaking of mensheviks, there's a lot of "socialists" these days that are looking to figures like Elon Musk to bring about socialism through technological obsoletion of wage labor, lol

what elon musk is funding is writing on catastrophic risk, one of the leading ways that nazi lies about the thread topic get spread in post-Cold War media. it gets broadcast on cable TV channels all night long, it's inconsequential because capitalism deals with long-term crisis planning through movies about the walking dead, it's also where all the oldest weirdest anti-communism goes. there is not a reader on the topic of catastrophic risk that does not rely on the material getting wrecked above.

wait so what does catastrophic risk have to do with nazi lies and anticommunism though. i didn't even know what 'catastrophic risk' referred to until i looked it up just now so pls walk me through this one if u can. and isn't elon musk also contracting with nasa to build rockets and not just funding think tanks. im not following u???



catastrophic risk is the wrecked capitalist cargo-cult way to talk about large problems capitalism can't plan to address. it involves a bunch of weirdos, only some of whom are idiots, talking about how to define and discuss risks that could KO a nation or a planet, and then doing nothing because no one cares about them except the press. their general conclusion is that we should upload our brains into the matrix to solve the problem. they discuss the topic of the thread in terms lifted from nazi propaganda as detailed itt. this is a handy way to inject the idea into low-budget cable TV programming that stalin is a lovecraft space god to be discussed alongside nanorobots eating everything and, le zombies.

#402


he is going to save us from the Terminator.
#403
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#404
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#405
to the financial organizations behind the growth of artificial intelligence start-ups over the last few years, elon musk's richard donner rocket projects are chump change, a sideshow of the most obvious and blatant sort. the main idea for "a.i." defined widely is that it will be used to replace the remaining human customer service workers and a lot of very rich people are betting big on that.
#406
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#407
the point i was making generally is that if there was a lie repeated about the soviet union anywhere in western "Discourse" over the course of the cold war, it has found its way in some distilled-fart-like way into a reader on catastrophic risk, the catastrophic risk of communism "happening again"
#408
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#409
if you want to look at how this plays out in practice, continuing the popular cold war line about the dire straits of the poor beleagured soviet peoples and communism as a purported natural disaster, look at how people speak and write about ecuador and venezuela in the u.s. news now, well known government puppets like glenn garvin, reportedly not just a defective clone of glenn greenwald, or the washington free beacon, look at israeli exports like "homeland" about venezuela as some sort of mad max bartertown, the prospect of left governments of any sort within smashing distance of the u.s. fist has been defined as a category of natural disaster that should be averted at high cost to the world like communism is the end boss of a video game. magically there's a lot more money to spend to mitigate that risk than there is to stop the other ones.
#410
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#411

roseweird posted:

An oppressive government may gain power over a substantial part of the world. Technological progress could worsen this risk by improving the tools of such a government to wage war and monitor and control citizens




we'd better look out for that one, it sounds like a baaaaad sceeeeeeene

#412

roseweird posted:

this nerd: http://blog.givewell.org/2013/05/23/possible-global-catastrophic-risks/ posted:

An oppressive government may gain power over a substantial part of the world. Technological progress could worsen this risk by improving the tools of such a government to wage war and monitor and control citizens;



think this one already happened

#413
fukkin damn 9 seconts 2 slow heh
#414
Been working my way through this very educational thread the last couple of days. Thanks for your efforts swamp!

Interestingly Ukraine just won Eurovision with a song titled "1944" about the deportation of the Crimean Tatars. You can't make this shit up!

#415
Chapter 9. Snyder's Fact-Claims in Bloodlands Chapters 5 and 6 Examined

Snyder's fifth chapter deals with the period immediately before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. There is little new here. Many of the fact-claims he makes about the Soviet Union, Stalin, etc., in this chapter are repeated from other chapters.

Bloodlands Chapter 5:

The Oft-Repeated Lie: "German-Soviet Alliance"


Snyder frequently repeats the falsehood that there was an "alliance" between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

...in the second, during the German-Soviet alliance (1939-1941), the killing was balanced. (155)

How could the Soviets make an alliance with the Nazis? (155)

What was it about the Nazi and Soviet systems that permitted mutually advantageous cooperation, between 1939 and 1941, but also the most destructive war in human history between 1941 and 1945? (156)

After this ideological compromise ("socialism in one country"), Stalin's alliance with Hitler was a detail. (157)

Here Snyder assumes that Leon Trotsky was correct in claiming that "socialism in one country" was in opposition to Lenin's ideas. He does not even allude to the well-known debate over this question. Evidently Snyder is eager to seize upon any argument that is "anti-Stalin."

The allied Soviet Union had rejected Germany's proposal to import two million Jews. (160-161)

We have discussed this falsehood in the preceding chapter. In addition, we should note that all the Western capitalist countries had "mutually advantageous cooperation" with Nazi Germany. What else was the Munich Accord, or the trade agreements between the U.K. and Germany?

The Lie that the USSR Wanted to "Destroy the Polish Upper Classes"

Thus it was legitimate to destroy the Polish upper classes (Stalinism)... (156)

Snyder cites no evidence whatsoever that the Soviets wanted to "destroy the Polish upper classes" - because, of course, they did not. Nothing of the kind occurred. Polish "settlers" (osadnicy) and the Polish imperialist officials were not "detroyed" - they were deported from the lands they had occupied, Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine.

Snyder Equates Nazi Imperialism with Soviet Anti-Imperialism

Hitler wanted the Germans to become an imperial people; Stalin wanted the Soviets to endure the imperial stage of history, however long it lasted. The contradiction here was less of principle than of territory. (157)

If this convoluted statement means anything at all it suggests that genocidal and imperialist Nazism and Soviet anti-imperialism are basically the same. If you want to "endure the imperial stage of history" - that is, to survive it - you are somehow similar to those who want to impose it! True nonsense.

In reality, Nazi imperialism was fundamentally similar to the imperialism of Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, and Japan. The difference was that Hitler wanted an empire in Europe - specifically, Eastern Europe and the USSR - while the Western imperialists had imposed their imperial rule on other continents. The worldwide communist movement was the single most significant force opposing all of these imperialisms.

Hitler's Garden of Eden, the pure past to be found in the near future, was Stalin's Promised Land, a territory mastered at great cost, about which a canonical history had already been written (Stalin's Short Course of 1938). (157)

If this means anything, it is that the racist and genocidal Nazi Aryan empire, in which all except ethnic Germans would be killed off or reduced to slavery, was the same as the Soviet ideal of a multiracial state free of exploitation - a breathtakingly cynical statement.

Snyder is also wrong on elementary facts. Stalin's Short Course was a history of the Bolshevik Party, not a history of the USSR. Its title is History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). Short Course. Either Snyder is deliberately misleading his readers, or he has never read the book and does not know what he is talking about.

Was Collectivization of Agriculture a Form of Colonialism?

The secret of collectivization (as Stalin had noted long before) was that it was an alternative to expansive colonization, which is to say a form of internal colonization. (159)

This is not only nonsense - it is yet another dishonest attempt to equate the USSR with Nazi Germany. There is no such thing as "internal colonization." And where did Stalin "note" that collectivization was "an alternative to colonization"? Snyder does not even attempt to document this claim, which is no more than name-calling. Basically, Snyder assumes, without evidence, that the purpose and function of collectivization was exploitation. This is false, as Tauger has argued. (Tauger 2006)

Collectivization had brought starvation to Soviet Ukraine, first as an unintended result of inefficiencies and unrealistic grain targets, and then as an intended consequence of the vengeful extractions of late 1932 and early 1933. (162)

Snyder is relating two distinct falsehoods here. First, collectivization did not cause the famine. Snyder does not even attempt to prove that it did; he simply asserts it. In reality, as we have seen, collectivization put an end to the age-old cycle of famines caused by Russia's and Ukraine's extreme vulnerability to natural disasters and the primitive - actually, medieval - methods of traditional Russian and Ukrainian peasant agriculture. Second, there was no "intended" famine or "vengeful extraction." We have examined this question in Chapter One.

Stalin himself received more than a hundred such indications {that Hitler would invade the USSR in 1941}, but chose to ignore them. (165)

This is false. Everybody makes mistakes of judgment; Stalin unquestionably made them as well. As, of course, did the British and French, who were caught totally unprepared when Hitler sent his army against them in May 1940, even though they had officially been at war for more than eight months.

But Stalin did not make this specific error. We now have a great deal of evidence that Stalin and the Soviet leadership were expecting a German attack around June 21, 1941. I have collected many of them in Khrushchev Lied. We also have American sources, such as the following:

In Moscow on June 20, Steinhardt received a cable from Washington that advised him to evacuate all American citizens from Russia. On June 21 a United States diplomatic official traveling east to Vladisvostok observed between 200 and 220 westbound trains, of twenty-five cars each, partially loaded with troops and army supplies. The same day, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Ukrainian Communist Party leader, lifted the phone in his Kiev office to hear Stalin alert him that the Nazis might begin military operations against Russia the next day, June 22.
Robert H. Jones. The Roads to Russia: United States Lend Lease To The Soviet Union, Norman, University of Oklahoma, 1969, 31-32.

We now know that the Red Army commanders were instructed to go to battle stations on June 18, 1941, though some failed to do so. This question was the source of an interesting and acrimonious debate in a leading Soviet / Russian military journal 20 years ago. General Dmitrii Pavlov, commander of the Belorussian front, was tried and executed for failing to bring his army to battle readiness. The very partial evidence in his case that has been released suggested that there is some evidence that he was deliberately aiding Hitler.

The Red Army did indeed suffer serious defeat during the early months of the German invasion. This was certainly a mistake - it was not supposed to happen. However, the same is true of the other armies that Hitler's forces had attacked. At the war's outset none of the Allied armies were prepared to deal with the German Blitzkrieg. The entire French army was smashed in less than six weeks and Paris occupied. The British expeditionary force on the continent was routed, barely saving some of its remnants at Dunkirk thanks to bad weather for the Luftwaffe and indecisiveness on the part of the German commander. American forces were badly defeated in their first battle with German forces by German Field Marshal Rommel's Afrika Korps in February 1943 at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.

Eight years before, it had taken a strong Soviet state to starve Soviet Ukraine.... Under his rule, people in Soviet Ukraine (and elsewhere) stooped over their own bulging bellies to harvest a few sheaves of wheat that they were not allowed to eat. (172)

This is a grotesque idea, false in every detail, as we have shown in Chapter One. The image of starving peasants harvesting grain that they could not eat is absurd. Needless to say, Snyder did not document any examples of this. All of the available documentation shows that those who were working in the fields had a priority claim on whatever limited food was available during 1932 and 1933.

It was near Kharkiv that starving peasant children in 1933 had eaten each other alive in a makeshift orphanage. (172)

There was a serious famine, so of course terrible things occurred. But Snyder gave no evidence for this statement in his chapter on the famine and cites none here.

During the Great Terror, Stalin had made sure that Finns were targeted for one of the deadliest of the national actions, believing that Finland might one day lay claim to Leningrad. (172)

Not only does Snyder state as a fact that Stalin "targeted" Soviet Finns but also claims that he knows the reason Stalin supposedly did so. Yet he gives not a single citation to any evidence, or any document of any kind, to substantiate his claims. There is no evidence that Stalin even knew at the time about Ezhov's murder of thousands of ethnic Finns.

During the interrogations in 1939 Ezhov admitted that he deceived the Soviet government concerning these national actions:

The government, understandably, had no conception of our conspiratorial plans and in the present case proceeded solely on the basis of the necessity to prolong the operation without going into the essence of how it was carried out.

In this sense, of course, we were deceiving the government in the most blatant manner.
Nikita Petrov, Marc Jansen. Stalinskii pitomets - Nikolai Ezhov. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008, p. 368. "No. 21. From the transcript of the interrogation of the accused Ezhov Nikolai Ivanovich. August 4, 1939."



Was Stalin's "No Retreat" Order Similar to Nazi-type Racism?

By treating Soviet soldiers horribly, he {Hitler} wished to ensure that German soldiers would fear the same from the Soviets, and so fight desperately to prevent themselves from falling into the hands of the enemy. It seems that he could not bear the idea of soldiers of the master race surrendering to the subhumans of the Red Army. Stalin took much the same view: that Red Army soldiers should not allow themselves to be taken alive. He could not counsel the possibility that Soviet soldiers would retreat and surrender. They were supposed to advance and kill and die. .... This tyranny of the offensive in Soviet planning caused Soviet soldiers to be captured. Soviet commanders were fearful of ordering withdrawals, lest they be personally blamed (purged, and executed). Thus their soldiers held positions for too long, and were encircled and taken prisoner. The policies of Hitler and Stalin conspired to turn Soviet soldiers into prisoners of war and then prisoners of war into non-people. (175. Emphasis added.)

This is false, yet another attempt by Snyder to yoke the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany. Specifically, Snyder is trying to blame Stalin for Hitler's mass murder of Soviet POWs.

In one of his published articles Snyder writes:

Germans took so many Soviet prisoners of war in part because Stalin ordered his generals not to retreat. (2011-1)

Stalin's "No Retreat" Order and Those of the Allies in 1918 Compared

There are more similarities between the policies of Hitler and Great Britain than between those of Hitler and the USSR. Stalin's orders not to retreat recall that given by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, on April 11, 1918, which reads in part:

There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement {= retreat}. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/backstothewall.htm

At the same time Sir Arthur Currie, Commander of the Canadian Corps, issued a similar order:

...I place my trust in the Canadian Corps, knowing that where Canadians are engaged there can be no giving way.

Under the orders of your devoted officers in the coming battle you will advance or fall where you stand facing the enemy.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/lys_currie.htm

Stalin's orders were the same as these Allied commanders in 1918 - no retreat, fight till death. Both Haig and Currie ordered "fight on to the end", "fall where you stand," no retreat.

But there is a big difference between Stalin's orders and those of Haig and Currie. British and Canadian troops were being told to fight to the end, without retreat, simply to hold a given position at a given time. The British and Canadians were fighting on the soil of France. Their homes and families were not at all threatened in the case of a German victory. Even French homes and families were not threatened, any more than were German homes and families when the Allies won the war.

But for Red Army soldiers the situation was far different. They really were fighting for their homes and families. The Germans were bent on mass extermination. Hitler had already murdered millions of Soviet citizens. Even Snyder admits that Hitler planned to murder tens of millions more Soviet people if Germany were victorious. Snyder fails to make this distinction or to even inform his readers about World War I precedents for Stalin's order.

For hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, this was the second political famine in Ukraine in the space of eight years. (181)

And:

As during the Soviet starvation campaign of 1933...

Snyder is just repeating his falsehoods. As we demonstrated in our examination of Chapter One, there was no "political famine in Ukraine" or "Soviet starvation campaign of 1933." Snyder falsifies his "evidence" at every turn. In fact, he has no real evidence to support his contention of "political famine."

At Buchenwald in November 1941, the SS arranged a method of mass murder of Soviet prisoners that strikingly resembled Soviet methods in the Great Terror, though exhibiting greater duplicity and sophistication. Prisoners were led into a room in the middle of a stable, where the surroundings were rather loud. They found themselves in what seemed to be a clinical examination room, surrounded by men in white coats - SS-men, pretending to be doctors. They would have the prisoner stand against the wall at a certain place, supposedly to measure his height. Running though the wall was a vertical slit, which the prisoner's neck would cover. In an adjoining room was another SS-man with a pistol. When he saw the neck through the slit, he would fire. The corpse would then be thrown into a third room, the "examination room," be quickly cleaned, and the next prisoner invited inside. Batches of thirty-five to forty corpses would be taken by truck to a crematorium: a technical advance over Soviet practices. (182-3)

Snyder's sole source (n. 58 p. 483): Streim, Behandlung, 102-106.

The only reference Snyder cites here refers to German murders. Snyder has no evidence whatever to support his statement that "Soviet methods in the Great Terror" resembled those of the Nazis. Evidently this is another cheap attempt to associate the USSR with Nazi Germany.

Moreover, there were no "Soviet methods in the Great Terror" because these were Ezhov's unauthorized mass murders, not those of the Soviet government, for which he and many of his men were tried and executed. But Snyder has no evidence, not even phony evidence, for this spurious claim.

Again the Lie that Stalin Rejected Jews from Germany

By late 1941 the Nazi leadership had already considered, and been forced to abandon, four distinct versions of the Final Solution. THe Lublin plan for a reservation in eastern Poland failed by November 1939 because the General Government was too close and too complicated; the consensual Soviet plan by February 1940 because Stalin was not interested in Jewish emigrations;... (185. Emphasis added).

There was no such plan for Jewish emigration to the USSR. We have examined this falsehood of Snyder's in a previous chapter.

* *
*

Bloodlands Chapter 6

This chapter is mainly about the Germans. It makes very limited reference to the Soviets. However, Snyder continues his attempt to put the Nazis and the Soviets side by side.

...in June 1940, eastern Poland had been annexed by the Soviets nine months before that, in September 1939. Here the Germans found evidence of a social transformation. Industry had been nationalized, some farms had been collectivized, and a native elite had been all but destroyed... (194, Emphasis added, GF)

This statement exposes Snyder's own elitist assumptions. The Soviets did not "destroy" any "native elite." The Poles deported from Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine were not "native" to those lands at all. They were mainly osadnicy, the Polish imperialist "settlers."

The Soviets also had what may be termed a "class-conscious understanding" of what an "elite" was - and it wasn't the same as Snyder's. For the Soviets, the "elite" consisted of leading Party members and advanced workers such as Stakhanovites, as well as intellectuals.

For the pre-war Polish ruling class, and for Snyder, the "elite" was the rich - the landowners, government officials, retired military men, and police commanders, together with the upper level of the intelligentsia. These people were not "destroyed" - killed - at all. They were "demoted" - their property confiscated, and they and their families subject to deportation so that the common people and the Soviets could be rid of them.

The Soviets had deported more than three hundred thousand Polish citizens and shot tens of thousands more. The German invasion prompted the NKVD to shoot some 9,817 imprisoned Polish citizens rather than allow them to fall into German hands. The Germans arrived in the western Soviet Union in summer 1941 to find NKVD prisons full of fresh corpses. These had to be cleared out before the Germans could use them for their own purposes.

Soviet mass murders provided the Germans with an occasion for propaganda. (194)

Sources (n. 16 p. 485):

* "The 9,817 count in Verbrechen is at 93."
* "See also Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta, 371 (11,000-12,000)"
* Hryciuk, "Victims," 183 (9,400).

We have already pointed out that the figure of 300,000 Polish citizens deported is exaggerated by a factor of five to eight.

Böhler, Verbrechen, is not a work of scholarship but a catalog of an exhibition about German army crimes in Poland in September-October 1939. Böhler himself is a specialist on the German war and German crimes in Poland. He has not researched Soviet history.

Hryciuk, "Victims," does state that 9400 persons - not "Polish citizens" - were killed by the Soviets:

* In Western Ukraine, "Of 20,094 prisoners in custody on 10 June 1941 ... more than 8700 were murdered...";
* In Western Belorussia, "Of the 6,375 prisoners in custody as of 10 June 1941... over 700 were murdered (mainly those in prison in Glȩbokie)..."

However, Hryciuk provides no evidence for these figures.

Nazi propaganda claimed that the Soviet NKVD shot many prisoners in L'vov and elsewhere before retreating from the city. Other sources claim that Ukrainian Nationalists killed many communists and Jews when the German army occupied L'vov. There is a controversy about just what happened, with little agreement.
See "The Lviv pogroms controversy" and Alfred De Zayas' account, "The Lviv Massacre." De Zayas is well known as an apologist for the Nazis. Naturally, he is also a strong anticommunist, so other anticommunists continue to rely on his work.

Soviet documentary evidence exists, as does at least one article by the anticommunist "Memorial" association that examines that evidence: "The Evacuation of the Prisons 1941," by Aleksandr Gur'ianov and Aleksandr Kokurin. «Evakuatsiia tiurem 1941.» Both of these authors, like the "Memorial Society" itself, are extremely anti-Soviet and anticommunist. It is impossible that they would underestimate, let alone ignore, Soviet murders or crimes of any type.

According to the evidence cited and examined by Gur'ianov and Kokurin the only prisoners executed were those convicted of or, in some cases, under investigation for, capital crimes. Many or most of those were probably members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), active Nazi collaborators. This article is well documented from Soviet-era records and seems credible, though of course it cannot claim any precision in numbers of persons killed.

Other prisoners were shot while attempting to escape either from prisons under bombardment or from evacuation columns. A great many prisoners were either left in the prisons or set free by their NKVD guards. It is doubtful, therefore, whether Hryciuk's use of the term "murdered" here is legitimate.

We note in passing that Snyder fails to mention the murders of Ukrainian nationalists in Lviv after the Soviets had retreated. A good recent account is that by anticommunist but also anti-nationalist scholar John-Paul Himka: "The Lviv Pogrom of 1941" (2011). Himka concludes:

In sum, the Lviv pogrom was an action undertaken at German initiative, but carried out largely by the Ukrainian militia set up by the Bandera faction of the OUN {Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, allied with the German Nazis} as the policing arm of the newly proclaimed Ukrainian State. Mob participation supplemented the violence. The pogrom took place on 1 July 1941, a day after Lviv was occupied by the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalists declared statehood. The pogrom itself probably took dozens or at most hundreds of lives, but systematic executions during the pogrom and in its aftermath took thousands. In the executions, OUN militia were also active in the round up and beating of Jews, just as they had been during the pogrom preceding them.
Himka, Paper for ASN Convention, April 2011.

Snyder has done no research on these matters and evidently doesn't know anything about them. On the next page (197) he states:

The NKVD, usually discreet, had been revealed as the murderer of prisoners. Germans broke through the levels of mystification, secrecy, and dissimulation that had covered the (far greater) Soviet crimes of 1937-1938 and 1930-1933. The Germans (along with their allies) were the only power ever to penetrate the territory of the Soviet Union in this way, and so the only people in a position to present such direct evidence of Stalinist murder. Because it was the Germans who discovered these crimes, the prison murders were politics before they were history. Fact used as propaganda is all but impossible to disentangle from the politics of its original transmission.

A page after claiming that the Soviets shot roughly 10,000 prisoners, Snyder admits that it is impossible to extract the truth from German - that is Nazi - documents! Snyder has evidently not consulted, is ignorant of, or at least does not cite, the Soviet studies and documents that reveal that the killings were not "murders", as the Germans and Ukrainian Nationalists described them. And, of course, such logic applies to the Katyn Massacres, which were "politics before they were history."

The act of killing Jews as revenge for NKVD executions confirmed the Nazi understanding of the Soviet Union as a Jewish state. ...

Yet this psychic nazification would have been much more difficult without the palpable evidence of Soviet atrocities. The pogroms took place where the Soviets had recently arrived and where Soviet power was recently installed, where for the previous months Soviet organs of coercion had organized arrests, executions, and deportations. They were a joint production, a Nazi edition of a Soviet text. (196)

Here Snyder tries to make the Soviets share the blame for Nazi murders and pogroms! In reality Poles and Ukrainians had carried out antisemitic pogroms long before the Soviets came along.

Snyder's long footnote 21 (on pages 485-6 of Bloodlands) has to be read to be believed. It contains no sources or evidence, only a convulated "theoretical" argument with which Snyder tries to justify blaming the Nazi pogroms and murders on the Soviets. It is too long to reproduce here.

In reality, there is no evidence of "Soviet atrocities." To say this is not denial, or even defensiveness. It is the simple truth: we have no such evidence. The evidence cited by the "Memorial Society" authors above is of executions of prisoners convicted or under investigation for capital crimes, and shootings of prisoners while the NKVD guards suppressed prisons escapes and uprisings or escapes from evacuation convoys. These are not atrocities but acts under conditions of martial law, when normal judicial procedures do not apply.

Soviet atrocities would help German SS-men, policemen, and soldiers justify to themselves the policies to which they were soon summoned: the murder of Jewish women and children. Yet the prison shootings, significant as they were to the local people who suffered Soviet criminality, were for Nazi leaders rather catalyst than cause. (197)

It would be interesting if Snyder had cited some accounts from memoirs, or indeed from any primary source, of German "SS-men, policemen, and soldiers" who actually "justified to themselves" the mass murder of "Jewish women and children" with reference to "Soviet atrocities." Historical honesty should prevent him from making such a statement unless he had evidence to support it. Of course such self-justification would still be Nazi thinking, not sober historical analysis. But this is what Snyder is doing here - engaging in such Nazi thinking - and he is the only one doing it! Once again Snyder is trying to connect Nazi atrocities to the Soviets without even a fig-leaf of evidence.

There was a group whose activities at this time could validly be connected to Nazi atrocities, because they were engaged not only in aiding the Nazis in committing mass murders but were carrying out mass murders of their own. That group is the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. But the OUN is praised as "freedom fighters" and "heroes" in today's Ukraine. It was also the OUN that invented the "Holodomor" fabrication.

Bloodlands is popular among today's Ukrainian Nationalists. Snyder has been honored repeatedly by Ukrainian nationalist groups in Ukraine and elsewhere. It is no wonder, then, that Snyder has virtually nothing to say about their atrocities. Instead, he fabricates Soviet crimes that did not happen.

The Reichskommissar {of the Ukraine}, Erich Koch, was a man known for his brutality. Hitler's advisors called Koch a "second Stalin," and they meant it as a compliment.... (222)

Snyder has evidently invented this falsehood too, as he has so many others. He does not cite any evidence to support it. It is not made in any of the sources Snyder cites in his footnote 70. I have tracked it down in a biography of Erich Koch:

...als „brauner Zar" der Ukraine soll er sich als „zweiter Stalin" geriert haben... (12)

... as "Brown Tsar" of the Ukraine he is said to have boasted of himself as "a second Stalin."
Ralph Meindl, Ostpreußens Gauleiter: Erich Koch - eine politische Biographie. Osnabrück: fibre Verlag, 2007. In his note Meindl cites a report of September 1941 to Alfred Rosenberg.

It is not at all a reference to Koch's brutality - something Hitler's advisors would not object to in any case. Nor was it a "compliment." Rather it was Koch's own arrogant posturing. The Ukraine was once ruled by the Tsar, then by Stalin, and now by "the brown Tsar" and "second Stalin." It means only that Koch saw himself as the successor to the other two.

#416
Checking out this discussion on RevLeft http://www.revleft.com/vb/threads/157009-Mike-Ely-on-Grover-Furr?s=3b59a74ff7c7630e6e0530b9ce26f46f

Someone links here to this quote

The conduct of the trials is attacked no less fiercely than the charge. If they had documents and witnesses, ask the sceptics, why did they keep the documents in the drawer and the witnesses behind the scenes, contenting themselves with incredible confessions?

It is true, the Soviet people reply, that in the main proceedings we have to a certain extent shown only the distillate, the prepared result of the preliminary inquiry. We examined the evidence beforehand and confronted the accused with it. In the main proceedings we contented ourselves with their confessions. Anyone who takes exception to this should bear in mind that the hearing took place before a military court and that it was first and foremost a political action. The purification of the atmosphere of our internal politics was at stake and it was our chief concern that every member of the community from Minsk to Vladivostok should understand what was wrong. Therefore we did everything as simply and as transparently as possible. Details of circumstantial evidence, documents and depositions may interest jurists, criminologists, and historians, but we should only have confused our Soviet citizens had we spun out all kinds of details. The plain confessions were more intelligible to them than any amount of ingeniously assembled circumstantial evidence. We did not carry on this action for the benefit of foreign criminologists; we did it for the benefit of our own people.

Edited by swampman ()

#417
i'm seeing grover furr this weekend, please message me if you have questions you wish to ask him
#418
1. ask him if he still thinks china is fascist
2. ask him what the Bolsheviks Should have done if he still thinks they took the wrong line or wahtever
#419
u could
1. Ask him if he has come to any firm conclusions about the likely murder of Stalin
2. Ask him if he has considered writing a book defending Beria
#420

roseweird posted:

now i get it


also, nerds like mr. slatestar (who are very much in that sphere) do high-level D&D discussions of various societal problems, many of which are obvious and inevitable results of capitalism for which the equally obvious solution is socialism, but although every other conceivable option remains on the table (including Racism Is Real and Nick Land technofascism), socialism is not because they all buy into the Blood Lies. goatstein, of all fucking people, did a good thread on it while you were gone. yes i did say goatstein.

#421
Also, does anhyone have a pdf copy of Hoxhas "the Khrushchevites" they could share?
#422

tears posted:

Also, does anhyone have a pdf copy of Hoxhas "the Khrushchevites" they could share?

i do. what's a good way to get it to you?

#423
actually looks like you can get it here - this is the same version I have https://archive.org/details/TheKhrushchevites
#424
thankyou ^_^
#425
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/US-Tried-to-Impose-Nazi-Leader-on-Ukraine-in-WWII-CIA-Leak--20160523-0003.html
#426

swampman posted:

http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/US-Tried-to-Impose-Nazi-Leader-on-Ukraine-in-WWII-CIA-Leak--20160523-0003.html


Nice. Seems to be a heavily edited recycling of an article from a few months ago, sadly by Wayne Madsen (barf) but the bulk of it is nonetheless plainly-told fact: http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/01/08/cia-undermining-and-nazifying-ukraine-since-1953.html
Haven't picked through this in fine detail but it seems good, apart from the final part about QRDYNAMIC which is not a topic I'm hugely familiar with, but this is where the article gets sloppy and starts throwing around names like George Soros, so, no. Also I could have sworn a list of all the real names of the AECASSOWARY agents was released which would make it weird/lazy that he only refers to the codenames, but I could be misremembering. Otherwise yeah, AERODYNAMIC is one of the most important CIA Nazi cold war operations and has major implications for present day Ukraine. A bunch of the stuff in my KKKonspiracy thread deals with this.

Edited by Flying_horse_in_saudi_arabia ()

#427
Mario Souza's pamphlet - "Lies Concerning the History of the Soviet Union", 1998, is available from the cpgb-ml here (translated by comrade ella rule):
http://www.cpgb-ml.org/download/publications/sousa_liesconcerning.pdf

good introduction to demolishing the usual lies about the USSR including:

An introduction to William Hearst, his capitalist media empire and the US-sponsored propagation of nazi lies about the holodomor
Robert Conquest, originator of anti-communist "historiography" and his british secret service links
A ridiculing of Solzhenitsyn, his lies and support for Franco and fascism in general
The truth found by russian (and other) researchers in the Soviet archives 1990 onwards
The truth about the GULAG system: its nature, how many political prisoners were imprisoned, how many people actually died in labour camps, how long was the average sentence; including comparisons to the USA in 1998
How many people were sentenced to death including in the 1937-38 purges
The specific proveable guilt of those sentenced to death or GULAG and the capitalist assumption of total innocence of: bukharinite-zinovevite-trotskyite counter-revolutionaries and fascist collaborators, kulaks, industrial saboteurs, thieves, corrupt officials, rapists, murderers etc

recomended introductory reading4all
#428
Chapter 10. The "Katyn Massacre"

What Really Happened?

Anticommunists claim that there is an historical consensus about the "Katyn massacre" issue. This is not true. Rather, "Katyn" has become a shibboleth, a marker of historical partisanship. Anti-communists accept without question the version that blames the Soviets for all the shootings and demand that everybody else do so as well - or the anticommunists will call them bad names. Critics of this version often call it the "Goebbels" version since taking this position means assuming that the Nazi report of 1943 tells the precise truth.

It is almost impossible to have a rational discussion about the "Katyn massacre." I use scare quotes - "Katyn massacre" - to remind the reader that the "official version" is certainly incorrect. I would appear even-handed, neutral, and therefore objective if I could honestly lay the blame for this state of affairs equally on both "sides:" those who think the Soviets shot 14,800 to 22,000 Polish POWs, and those who think the Germans did it. But that is not the case. In reality it is the "Soviets-did-it" side that has declared the matter "settled" and demonizes or ridicules anyone who dares to question this position.

This makes political sense: Why acknowledge your opponents and thus bring them to public notice when you have a monopoly on public opinion concerning this issue? But from the historiographical point of view it is irresponsible.

In normal historical discussion it is considered essential to outline the disputes and disagreements among the experts. In the case of Katyn it is just the opposite. Proponents of the "Soviets-did-it" position normally refuse to acknowledge the viewpoint they oppose. This is Snyder's practice. Or, in a few cases, they insult and belittle those who think that the Soviets did not "do it", or call them "communists." This is not scholarship but political propaganda - as though communists cannot be trusted while, by contrast, anti-communists, including the German Nazis, can be. Under such conditions it is already a declaration of partisanship to acknowledge and discuss the controversy at all.

The only objective way to approach the historical dispute about the "Katyn massacre" is to begin by acknowledging that such a dispute actually exists. Anyone who studies the "Katyn massacre" dispute carefully, in detail, and over a long period of time, and tries their best to do so without predetermining their conclusions, will see that there is indeed more than one "side" to the dispute.

The Historical Dispute

There is a very important historical debate concerning the question of the "Katyn massacre." Unfortunately for those who want to know "what really happened" this debate is divided along purely political lines.

The viewpoint that the Soviets shot all the Poles and that the Nazi report of 1943, aside from its anti-Semitic statements, is entirely truthful, is accepted without question by all anticommunists everywhere, including in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has voiced a somewhat different version of this viewpoint. He does not question that the Soviets shot the Poles but has suggested that they may have done so "in revenge for" the tens of thousands of Russian POWs who died or were killed in Polish captivity in 1920-1921. "Putin dopuskaet, chto Katyn mogla byt' mest'iu Stalina za gibel'v Pol'she sovetskikh plennykh." (Putin concedes that Katyn could have been Stalin's revenge for the deaths in Poland of Soviet prisoners). Корреспондент.net 7 апреля 2010 г. The viewpoint that the Germans shot all the Poles and that the Soviet Burdenko report of 1944 is the accurate one is accepted by communists and pro-communists (except for Trotskyists) and by many Russian nationalists.

A few researchers tend toward a more nuanced position something like the following. First the Soviets shot some of the Polish POWs, perhaps because they were found guilty of anti-Soviet or anticommunist crimes. This is the version that Lazar' Kaganovich, a former Politburo member very close to Stalin, reportedly told military historian A.N. Kolesnik in November 1985. See Sergei Styrgin, "L.M. Kaganovich o Katynskom dele" (L.M. Kaganovich on the Katyn affair), "Pravda o Katyne" site. Then the Germans shot the rest of the Poles, obviously for very different reasons. Then in 1943 the Germans staged a "discovery" of bodies - really a propaganda stunt - unearthing corpses of Polish officers they had shot elsewhere (and so the location of which they knew) and bringing them for reburial and "discovery" to "Katyn" (in reality the small area called Koz'i Gory).

In 1990-1992 Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Eltsin claimed that the Stalin-era leadership of the USSR had indeed shot the Poles, confirming virtually all the details of the anticommunist Polish nationalist version. In 1992 Eltsin presented to Polish officials facsimiles of documents from "Closed Packet No. 1" which, if genuine, would put Soviet guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

But beginning in 1995 Russian researchers began to argue that these documents were forgeries. Analysis of these documents mainly by Russian researchers who reject the "official version" of Katyn has continued since, growing ever more detailed and sophisticated. These studies have shown there is at least a prima facie case for suspecting that the documents are forgeries. But long before this positions on both sides had hardened. Among those who believed the Soviets guilty very few changed their opinion on the basis of the new evidence. I count myself among the few since I changed my own view, shifting it from thinking that "the Soviets did it" to an agnostic position.

Recent years have seen two dramatic developments in the Katyn issue. The first was in October 2010, when material evidence came to light that the documents in the famous "Closed Packet Number 1" may be forgeries. Documents were published that appear to be drafts prepared for the final forgery. This had long been suspected by some in Russia. But these revelations represent the first documentary evidence of such a forgery. Thereafter the question became, and remains: Which set of documents is genuine - those from "Closed Packet No. 1" or those disclosed in 2010 - and which set is a forgery? It is also possible that both sets of documents - those from "Closed Packet No. 1" and the "draft forgery" documents and materials disclosed in October 2010, may be forgeries. It is not possible that both sets of documents are genuine. See the more detailed discussion at my web page "The Katyn Forest Whodunnit"

The Ukrainian Excavations

Since 2010 much more important evidence has come to the fore that casts the strongest doubt upon the "official version" of Katyn. In Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy, Ukraine, Polish and Ukrainian archaeologists found evidence that at least two Polish policemen believed to have been shot by the Soviets in April or May 1940 in or near Kalinin (now Tver'), Russia, were in fact murdered by the Germans and their Ukrainian Nationalist allies in the second half of 1941, after the fascist invasion of the USSR. This fact alone dismantles the "official" version of the "Katyn massacre" narrative. Sergei Strygin. "'Volynskaia Katyn' okazalas' delom ruk gitlerovtsev." - Сергей Стрыгин. "Волынская Катынь" оказалась делом рук гитлеровцев. The present writer has endeavored to describe and examine this new evidence and to explain just how it proves that the "official" version has to be false. Grover Furr. "The 'Official' Version of the Katyn Massacre Disproven? Discoveries at a Mass Murder Site in Ukraine." Socialism and Democracy 27 (2) July 2013. 96-129.

These discoveries illustrate how corrupt the history around the "Katyn massacre" has become. The discovery of the badges of the two Polish policemen previously said to have been shot and buried sixteen months or more later and seven hundred miles away is by far the most important find at the Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy excavation. It is the most important development in the Katyn issue since the disclosure of the "forgery evidence" in October 2010. So why has it not received the publicity that it merits? Undoubtedly because powerful political forces in Poland and Ukraine do not want to publicize it - because it casts doubt on Soviet guilt.

Therefore it has been hushed up. The Polish archaeological report mentions only one of the Polish policemen's badges. Even that is buried in a footnote with only the most cryptic reference to Katyn - literally a "coded" reference, understandable only to those who are extremely familiar with the Katyn issue. But at least the Polish report draws the obvious conclusion that the victims in this mass grave were shot by Germans and their Ukrainian nationalist collaborators in 1941. The Ukrainian archaeological report does not mention the discovery of the Polish policemen's badges at all! Moreover, one of the Ukrainian archaeologists explicitly said that this site could "cast doubt" on other shootings of Polish prisoners by Soviets - that is, on the "official version" of the "Katyn massacre." Furr, Official version 127.

The coverup began before this. The October 2010 revelations of the "draft forgery" documents were presented on the floor of the Russian Duma by Duma deputy Viktor Iliukhin. Yet this dramatic story was virtually blacked out of the mainstream Russian media. I was able to find only one article about it, and that was a snide dismissal. The mass media outside Russia has completely ignored the 2010 discovery of the "draft forgery" documents, while the mass media outside Poland and Ukraine has ignored the Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy discoveries. I have been unable to find any articles about either of these discoveries in Western European or American mass media. The left-wing and Internet media did cover it, a fact that makes the absence of coverage in the mainstream news media all the more noteworthy.

Judging from early media reports on this excavation it appears that they believed the victims had been shot by the Soviet NKVD. See, for example, "Volyn's Own Katyn." Ukrainian Week, October 3, 2011; "Poland will finance the excavation of NKVD victims' graves in Volyn." Day (Den', Kyiv, Ukraine); "Mass Graves in Ukraine Hold Polish Victims?" Polish Radio August 4, 2009. It is safe to assume that Poland and Ukraine would never have proceeded with the excavation of the mass graves at Volodymyr-Volyns'skiy if either had thought for a moment that the results would cast doubt upon the "Katyn massacre."

There is good evidence that OUN (Ukrainian Nationalist) forces participated in the mass murders of the victims at Volodymyr-Volyns'skiy. The OUN is honored in Western Ukraine. Volodymyr-Volyns'skiy even has a street named after OUN leader and Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera, whose men participated in the mass murders there. It is marked as route P15 on the Googlemaps map but shown clearly on Ukrainian maps, such as the map at OpenStreetMap.org.

Soviet guilt in the "Katyn massacre" is literally constitutive of post-1990 Polish nationalism. Poland has transformed "Katyn" into an anticommunist and anti-Russian orgy of veneration for its victims. Polish governments have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on hundreds of monuments and memorials to "Katyn." Hundreds of ceremonies, some very large in scope, have been devoted to "Katyn," as have hundreds or thousands of publications and the efforts of dozens of scholars. The "official version" of Katyn is taught in all Polish schools. In addition to the motive of anticommunism "Katyn" is kept alive as a weapon to beat Russia with, for Russia is the heir to the Soviet Union. Poland continues its years-long struggle to have "Katyn" declared "genocide" and make Russia pay reparations to the families of the victims.

Yet now we know that there was no "Katyn" - no single chain of events during which the Soviets shot all the Polish POWs. But Poland, Ukraine, and anticommunists generally do not want to acknowledge this. Much less do they want their own citizens or the world at large to doubt Soviet guilt at Katyn.

The story of "Katyn" is a fascinating historical conundrum. Any similar event in, for example, American history would have long go attracted the attention of scores of researchers, professional and amateur. But in Poland it is "taboo" to question even for a minute the "official", "Soviets-did-it" version of "Katyn." Hence the coverup and the denial.

The "Katyn Massacre": What Really Happened

We don't know what really happened, at least not in any detail. There are a number of reasons for this. First, according to one of the documents from "Closed Packet No. 1", the "Shelepin letter" dated March 3, 1959, thousands of relevant documents have been destroyed. Whether the "Shelepin letter" is genuine or a forgery those documents were certainly destroyed; the only question would be by whom and when.

Second, a great many Soviet-era documents concerning controversial historical matters are still classified in Russia today, inaccessible even to trusted historians. Russian scholar Sergei Strygin claims to have learned of many such documents that disprove the "official version" of Katyn. He enumerates some of them in his now-famous "voluntary confession" of December 6, 2012. "Координатор 'Правды о Катыни' Сергей Стрыгин направил в ФСБ России 'Заявление о явке с повинной'." ("The Manager of 'Truth about Katyn' Sergei Strygin has sent to the Russian FSB a 'Declaration of Voluntary Confession'." Among the most interesting of these: a report of an inter-agency commission that supposedly worked in 1952-53 as a response to the U.S. Congressional Madden Commission on Katyn that held hearings in 1952. According to Strygin the archival materials of this Soviet commission, still kept secret, confirm German guilt in the mass murders at Katyn and the findings of the 1944 Soviet Burdenko commission.

Strygin also claims that more bodies wearing Polish policemen's uniforms were discovered in the Koz'i Gory / Katyn area in March 2000 but the finding was covered up. This claim is echoed in a recent Polish book (which, naturally enough, assumes these are victims of the Soviets). If these documents alleged by Strygin do indeed exist they would definitively prove Soviet innocence.

Our ignorance about "what really happened" is in large part the fault of Polish historians. They continue to pretend that the "official version" of Katyn is seamless, without contradictions, and unquestionable. In short, they "do not want to know" anything that might cast doubt on this foundational myth of right-wing Polish nationalism. If archaeologists at the dig in Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy should uncover evidence of more victims thought to have been shot at one of the three sites where the "official version" of the "Katyn massacre" says they were shot, we will surely never learn about it.

There is no reason to think that only two of the Polish POWs are in these mass graves just because - at least, as far as we know - only two badges have been found. Parts of Polish policemen's uniforms and other Polish military relics, along with many other Polish artifacts, have been found there. For all we know there could be hundreds of "Katyn" victims buried in these same mass graves, shot by German troops and their Ukrainian Nationalist collaborators in late 1941. A thorough excavation of the hundreds or thousands of mass graves in the former Soviet Union would surely turn up more evidence of Polish POWs.

Although the Volodymyr-Volens'kiy discoveries definitively refute the "official" Polish version of Katyn they do not tell us what really happened. The hypothesis that most closely fits the evidence we have today is that the Germans and/or their Ukrainian Nationalist allies shot most of the Polish POWs. It is likely that the Soviets shot some Poles too. Even those Russian researchers who have long argued that the official version of the "Katyn massacre" is false say it is likely that some of them were executed by the Soviets for some crimes or other. But all the evidence we now have suggests that the Germans and Ukrainian Nationalists, not the Soviets, shot the Polish officers whose corpses the Germans exhumed at Katyn in April-June 1943. Strygin, "Volynskaia Katyn" - Сергей Стрыгин. «"Волынская Катынь" оказалась делом рук гитлеровцев». Katyn.ru 06 Январь 2013; Furr, Official Version.

Therefore there was no "Katyn massacre" in the sense of the event known to history by that name. The Polish POWs, officers and others, were killed, but probably in different places where their bodies have never been recovered, as the Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy site was unexcavated until a few years ago.

It is possible that we will never learn any more. Neither Poland nor Ukraine - nor, at this time, Russia - wants to find any evidence that casts doubt upon the "official version" of Katyn.

Meanwhile, where are the 14,800+, or 22,000, or whatever the number of missing Polish POWs? Those exexcuted by the Soviets may well be buried at Mednoe (near Kalinin / Tver') and/or Piatykhatky (near Khar'kov / Kharkiv) as the "official version" claims. But all are under the earth somewhere in the Western part of the former Soviet Union - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. They are among the millions of victims of fascist aggression, both soldiers and civilians, who were slaughtered and whose bodies were never recovered. Indeed, the 22,000 Polish POWs are a very small percentage of all the missing victims of the war in the Soviet Union.
I prefer the term "fascist" rather than "German" invasion, advisedly, for it was not Germany alone that invaded the USSR on or shortly after June 22, 1941. The armies of Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland did as well. Among the fascist forces were units from almost every European country. Ukrainian Nationalist forces were involved in the Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy murders. It is more accurate to say: "Europe invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941."

The Katyn Shell Casings

The Polish officers whose bodies were unearthed at Koz'i Gory, near Katyn, near Smolensk, Russia, by the Germans in April-June 1943, then again by the Russians in October-January 1943-44, were almost certainly shot by German and/or Ukrainian nationalist forces, for German shell casings were found in these mass graves. The official German report contains photographs of the shell casings. In a telling omission, these photographs are side views of these casings. There are no photographs of the "headstamps" or ends where the percussion cap and identifying marks are locatied. Most German bullets of the era had date stamps, just as most of those found at Volodymyr-Volyns'kiy did. If any of those had been stamped 1940 or earlier the Germans would surely have photographed them, since they would have been excellent proof of Soviet guilt. The fact that they did not suggests that the headstamps contained numbers or codes indicating manufacture in 1941. This is consistent with the other circumstantial evidence now available that points strongly to German, not Soviet, guilt.

Snyder's Account of Katyn

It is the duty of an honest historian to explain this important and polarized historical dispute to his readers. Snyder cannot possibly be unaware of it. But he fails to inform his readers about it. Once again, Snyder commits the fallacy of "assuming that which is to be proven" - in this case, that the Soviets shot the Poles in question.

In Mein Kampf Hitler wrote that no one interested in swaying the public should ever tell the truth - only what benefits one's own cause. Those who take the position that the Soviets shot all the Poles tacitly assume that in this one case the Nazis' investigation told the pure truth (except for blaming the Jews). Under any other circumstances to accept a Nazi propaganda report as an honest piece of research would be considered a risky thing to do. But in the case of "Katyn" it is a leap that anticommunists insist that everyone make. World public opinion has followed them, but only because the arguments against it have been excluded from public consciousness.

In the case of the "Vinnitsa massacre", the other large-scale disinterment staged by the Nazis of what they claimed were victims of Soviet mass shootings in which they followed their "Katyn" script very closely, it appears that the Germans insisted upon "gilding the lily" by burying some of the bodies of Soviet citizens they themselves had killed, then later digging them up, putting them with buried corpses of victims of NKVD shootings during the Ezhovshchina of 1937-1938, and blaming the Soviets for everything. But even this is not certain - nothing about these hotly contested events is "certain." See "Erwin Bingel. Eyewitness to Mass Murder at Uman and Vinnitsa in the Ukraine." This is an abbreviated version of the article "The Extermination of Two Ukrainian Jewish Communities. Testimony of a German Officer." Yad Vashem Studies 3 (1959), 303-320.

It is interesting that anticommunist Ukrainian nationalists, who once paid a great deal of attention to the Vinnitsa massacre, just as the anticommunist Poles had always done with Katyn, have not written much about it in recent years. The "Holodomor" has become one of the two cornerstones of right-wing Ukrainian nationalism. Vinnitsa has received much less attention. The other "cornerstone" issue for today's rightwing Ukrainian Nationalists is their claim that the "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" were "freedom fighters" and opposed both the Soviets and the Germans. In reality the UPA was comprised of Ukrainians who worked under the Germans and took a personal oath to Adolf Hitler. There is a huge literature about the UPA. A good, objective article is Per Anders Rudling, "'The Honor They So Clearly Deserve': Legitimizing the Waffen-SS Galizien," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26:1 (2013): 114-137.

Snyder is closely aligned in sympathy with contemporary anticommunist Polish nationalism. He supports the anticommunist myths of the Ukrainian nationalists only when they do not clash with those of the Polish nationalists. This is not the only form of Polish nationalism. Pro-communist Poles had and still have a competing form of pro-socialist nationalism. See the essay by the late Professor Ryszard Nazarewicz, "Kontrowersje Wokół Najnowszej Historii Polski" (ca. 1998). A veteran of the Warsaw Uprising Nazarewicz worked for Polish communist security and then became a noted historian in socialist Poland.

But with the end of the USSR the anticommunist brand of nationalism has become hegemonic in Poland. This ideology bans any overt expression of doubt about the "Katyn massacre." Soviet guilt is literally constitutive of anticommunist Polish national identity. No discussion of Katyn as an historical controversy is tolerated. Questioning Soviet responsibility for Katyn is virtually outlawed in Poland, as well as in anticommunist circles, including academic circles, in the rest of the world. Polish nationalists and anticommunists generally make none but the most derogatory reference to the alternative versions. The present author has created an extensive web page on this controversy: "The Katyn Forest Whodunnit"

The Case of the Two Sets of Siblings: Snyder's Nazi-Soviet Parallel Again

Snyder's main purpose in Bloodlands is to draw as many parallels between the Nazis and the Soviets as possible, in order to suggest that these regimes were more similar than different.

Some of the people going to their deaths in the AB Aktion were thinking of family who had been taken prisoner by the Soviets. Although the Soviets and the Germans did not coordinate their policies against the Polish educated classes, they targeted the same sorts of people. The Soviets acted to remove elements that they regarded as dangerous to their system, on the pretext of fighting a class war. The Germans were also defending their territorial gains, though also acting on their sense that the inferior race had to be kept in its place. In the end, the policies were very similar, with more or less concurrent deportations and more or less concurrent mass shootings. (149, Emphasis added)

This is false. The Nazis AB-Aktion was explicitly aimed at murdering members of the Polish elite. Snyder would like to be able to prove that the Soviets did the same thing, and so were in this way like the Nazis. But there is no evidence of this, so he simply asserts it. There is a Wikipedia page on AB-Aktion in English and in Polish, though not in Russian. Both these pages include the deliberate lie that the Nazis "discussed" these murders "with Soviet officials during a series of secretive Gestapo-NKVD Conferences." In reality there were no such conferences, even though there is a Polish nationalist Wikipedia page about them. See О.В. Вишлёв, «Миф об 'антипольском соглашении'», Накануне 22 июня 1941 года. М.: Наука, 2001, cc. 120-122.

It is true that the Soviets "removed elements that they regarded as dangerous to their system" - but through arrest and deportation, not murder. Nor does a class war have anything in common with murderous racist violence. The Polish government too had "removed dangerous elements", mainly communists, when they took control of Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine after the Treaty of Riga in 1921. Snyder never compares this policy to the Nazis. Indeed, he never mentions it.

Snyder claims that "In the end, the policies {Nazi and Soviet} were very similar." In reality there is no similarity at all between them. If there is any similarity it is between the racism of the Polish nationalists, who refused to consider Jews, Ukrainians, or Belorussians as "Poles" even if they spoke Polish and were citizens of Poland, and Nazi racial doctrines that refused to consider Jews as "Germans" even if they were culturally German and were German citizens. In contrast, all citizens of the Soviet Union regardless of nationality were considered equally part of "the Soviet people."

Snyder then turns to the "case of the two sets of siblings", which we will now briefly investigate.

In at least two cases, the Soviet terror killed one sibling, the German terror the other. (149)


Set #1: The Wnuk Brothers

The Wnuk brothers, who hailed from a region that had once been in east-central Poland but was now quite close to the German-Soviet border, met the same fate. Bolesław, the older brother, was a populist politician who had been elected to the Polish parliament. Jakub, the younger brother, studied pharmacology and designed gas masks. Both married in 1932 and had children. Jakub, along with the other experts from his institute, was arrested by the Soviets and killed at Katyn in April 1940. Bolesław was arrested by the Germans in October 1939, taken to Lublin castle in January, and executed in the AB Aktion on 29 June 1940. He left a farewell note on a handkerchief: "I die for the fatherland with a smile on my lips, but I die innocent.

Source:

n. 75 Zagłada polskich elit, 77.

Snyder took the case of the two sets of siblings directly from this book without informing his readers that this is merely a catalog of an exhibition. It contains a photograph of Bolesław's farewell note. But it offers no evidence about who killed Jakub, about the "Katyn massacre," or about anything.

Jakub Wnuk is number 4121 in the German list, page 272 in the official German report Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn. But the question is not whether he was killed, but rather by whom - the Soviets or the Germans?

He is on the Soviet transit list of prisoners sent on April 2, 1940 from the Polish POW camp at Kozel'sk to the NKVD at Smolensk. Aside from the German - that is, Nazi - report of 1943 there is no evidence that he or any other Polish POWs were shot by the Soviets. Recent archaeological discoveries have proven that the "transit" lists are not lists of Polish POWs being sent to execution, as has long been assumed. As of this writing the evidence is that the Soviet Burdenko Commission report of January 1944 was correct: the Polish POWs disinterred at Katyn were shot by the Germans. See Furr, Official version.

Set #2: The Dowbor Sisters: The Legend of Janina Lewandowska

Snyder writes:

Janina Dowbor was the only female among the Polish officers taken prisoner by the Soviets. An adventurous soul, she had learned as a girl to hang glide and parachute. She was the first woman in Europe to jump from a height of five kilometers or more. She trained as a pilot in 1939, and enlisted in the Polish air force reserve. In September 1939 she was taken prisoner by the Soviets. According to one account, her plane had been shot down by the Germans. Parachuting to safety, she found herself arrested by the Soviets as a Polish second lieutenant. She was taken to Ostashkov, and then to Kozelsk. She had her own accommodations, and spent her time with air force comrades with whom she felt safe. On 21 or 22 April 1940, she was executed at Katyn, and buried there in the pits along with 4,409 men. Her younger sister Agnieszka had remained in the German zone. Along with some friends, she had joined a resistance organization in late 1939. She was arrested in April 1940, at about the time that her sister was executed. She was killed in the Palmiry Forest on 21 June 1940. Both sisters were buried in shallow graves, after sham trials and shots to the head. (149)

Sources:

n. 74 - Dunin-Wąsowicz, "Akcja," 22-25; Bauer, Dowbor, 217, 241; Crime of Katyń, 33; Zagłada polskich elit, 73.

Snyder asserts that Janina Lewandowska was shot at Katyn by the Soviets. This allows him to further assume that her fate parallels that of her sister Agnieszka, shot by the Nazis. For some reason Snyder says that Janina had a "sham trial." Even in the version of Katyn that blames the Soviets for all the shootings there is no talk of any "trials", "sham" or otherwise. Moreover, there is no decent evidence that Janina Lewandowska was shot by the Soviets at all. Snyder may have been thinking of the end of the "Beria letter", which talks about a review of 14,800+ files by an NKVD "troika." This is the main "smoking gun" document from "Closed Packet No. 1." Its bona fides are in serious doubt. For much more detail about this fascinating matter see the account on my "Katyn Forest Whodunnit" page.

The Mystery of Janina Lewandowska, Part 1: Khar'kov

During the period 1990 to 1992 retired Soviet NKVD man Mitrofan Vasil'evich Syromiatnikov gave six interviews to Soviet (1990-1991), Polish (1991), and Ukrainian (1992) investigators, and one to Polish journalist Jerzy Morawski (1991). Syromiatnikov had been a guard at the NKVD prison in Khar'kov where, he testified, he had participated in the execution of Polish officers and policemen in the spring of 1940.

In two of these interviews Syromiatnikov testified that one female was among the prisoners. During his third interrogation, on May 15, 1991, Syromiatnikov referred briefly to the female prisoner:

Pamiętam. ze do budynku więzienia wewnętrznego UNKWD wsród polskich wojskowych była dostarczona jedna kobieta. Teraz nie przypominam sobie dokladnie, kto to był, czy była wojskowym, jednakże dobrze pamiętam, że wsród dostarczonych Polaków była kobieta. Jej dalszw losy nie są mi wiadome, najwidoczniej także zostala rozstrzelana.

I remember that to the building of the internal prison of the NKWD among Polish military men one woman was {also} delivered. I do not remember now exactly who it was, whether she was military, but I remember well that among that Poles brought there was a woman. Her fate thereafter is unknown to me, apparently she was shot.

The Polish editor of this interrogation attached a note to this passage explaining that this must have been Janina Lewandowska, as she was the only female among the Polish prisoners.

Jedyna znana kobieta jeniec wojenny, zamordowana na podstawie decyzji z 5 marca 1940 r., to ppor. Janina Lewandowska z obozu kozielskiego, nr 53 na liście śmierci 040/1 z {20} kwietnia 1940 r. (481)

The only known female military prisoner, murdered according to the decision of March 5, 1940, was second lieutenant Janina Lewandowska from the Kozel'sk camp, number 53 on the death list 040/1 of {20} April 1940.
The list number refers to the Russian transit lists given to the Polish government and published in Jędrzej Tucholski, Mord w Katzniu. Kozielsk, Ostaszków, Starobielsk. Lista ofiar. Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1991. Lewandowska is indeed listed on p. 703, number 53, though the list in Tucholski does not specify April 20. As mentioned above, we now know that these lists were not "death lists" but merely transit lists, lists of what POWs were being sent where, when, and in what convoy (Furr, Official version).

This should have raised a problem for the editors of these confessions. Syromiatnikov was in Khar'kov, where Polish POWs from the Starbelsk camp were sent. Smolensk, where the Kozel'sk prisoners were sent, is about 700 km (= 450 miles) from Khar'kov.

Syromiatnikov gave more detail about the female prisoner in his fourth interview on July 30, 1991. Now he is certain that the woman was shot.

Syromiatnikov: Tak. Była wśród nich kobieta. Ubrana zwyczajnie, w płaszczyku.

Przywieziono ją z Polakami. Ją także rozstrzelano.
...
Trietiecki: Czy jest Pan pewien, że kobieta również została rozstrzelana?

Syromiatnikov: Mogę z całą pewnością powiedzieć, że była rozstrzelana, dlatego że sam ją prowadziłem. Rozumiecie. Uściślam swoje poprzednie zeznania. Wiem, że jej palto zostało rzucone pod wiatą. Podniosłem je, był tam pierścionek miedziany lub złoty. Pokazałem go komendantowi, on powiedział, abym odniósł Karmanowowi magazynierowi.

Translated:

Syromiatnikov: Yes. Among them was a woman. Dressed casually in a coat.

They brought her with the Poles. She was also shot.
...

Trietiecki: Are you sure that the woman also was shot?

Syromiatnikov: I can say with complete certainty that she was shot dead, because I myself accompanied her. Understand. I am refining my previous testimony. I know that her coat was thrown in the carport. I picked it up, there was a copper or gold ring. I showed it to the commander and he told me to bring it to Karmanov the quartermaster.

In his 1991 interview with Polish journalist Jerzy Morawski Syromiatnikov changed his story again. He now claimed that he did not know whether the woman had been shot or not, and said she might have been a Russian, not a Pole.

- Czy pan potwierdza, że wśród polskich jeńców znajdowała się kobieta?
- Kobieta? Tak, widziałem ją, jak przechodziłem przez podwórze. Właśnie ją prowadzili. Tak, tak.
- Co stało się z nią?
- Nie wiem, czy to była Polka czy Rosjanka. Akurat wychodziłem z komendantury, a ją prowadzili.

Translated:

- Can you confirm that among the Polish prisoners was a woman?
- A woman? Yes, I saw it as I walked through the yard. They were just leading her. Yes, yes.
- What happened to her?
- I do not know if it was a Pole or Russian. Just left the headquarters, and they were leading her.

Here Syromiatnikov retracts the most important details of the previous confessions. He says "they were leading her", and he did not know whether she was a Pole or a Russian. There's nothing about execution, and he no longer claims that he himself accompanied her.

There are many such contradictions and inconsistencies in the confessions of the three aged NKVD men. However, instead of carefully studying these confessions and parsing the contradictions in and among them, the Polish and Russian researchers of the "Katyn massacre" have just neglected them entirely. We do not even have the Russian originals of their statements - only Polish translations. This neglect may be due to the Polish attempt to make the "official version" appear seamless and unproblematic.

The Mystery of Janina Lewandowska, Part 2: Katyn

Nevertheless as of 1991 it seemed that the question of Janina Lewandowska's fate was somewhat confused. Supposedly she had been brought to Khar'kov prison where she was then supposedly executed along with an undetermined number of other Polish POWs and buried in the Piatykhatky forest outside Khar'kov.

Sometime in the late 1990s, a new story is created that contradicts this story while leaving the Lewandowska story as mysterious as ever. We are told that Lewandowska was buried at Katyn and her skull identified. We are told that she was shot not at Khar'kov but at Katyn in April 1940. This explanation is confidently stated in Polish sources. But a careful study reveals that there is no evidence for it at all.

Snyder's source, the exhibition catalog-booklet Zagłada polskich elit states that Lewandowska's body was exhumed by the Germans:

Zwłoki Janiny Lewandowskiej odanleźli Niemcy podczasa pierwszej ekshumacji katyńskiej. (73)

Translated:

The Germans discovered the remains of Janina Lewandowska during the first Katyn exhumation.

But there is no evidence at all for this statement. Lewandowska's name does not appear in the German list of names of identified corpses at Katyn. At least Jacob Wnuk's name does appear in this official German propaganda report.

Some Polish accounts offer the explanation that the Germans were confused or embarrassed by finding the body of a single woman and so they never mentioned it. But there is no evidence for this explanation. Nor is it likely. The whole purpose of the German disinterments at Katyn was to embarrass the Soviets and hopefully drive a wedge between the Soviets and the rest of the Allies. Reporting the body of a woman would not have interfered with German propaganda. Indeed, it would probably have made Soviet actions seem even more heinous.

Lewandowska's presence in the Soviet camp for Polish officer POWs at Kozel'sk, near Katyn, was supposedly attested by two Polish officers, Rafał Bniński and Wacław Mucho, who themselves survived this camp. This account was evidently first published in Zbrodnia Katyńska w świetle dokumentów, preface by General Władysław Anders. The first edition was in 1948; I have checked the third, enlarged edition: London: "Gryf", 1962, pp. 30-31. Mucho is identified at the Griazowiec camp (Tucholski 528). Tucholski also mentions Mucho as a doctor at Koziel'sk (19). Rafał Bniński is named at Kozel'sk by Tucholski (77) but is not named in any of the "transit lists." How he got out of Kozel'sk is unclear. Perhaps he was never there in the first place. Evidently Tucholski includes him only because he is said to have been there.

These two men claimed Lewandowska had assumed a false name to hide her identity. But this is not true either. The Soviet "transit list" of prisoners shipped from Kozel'sk to Smolensk, as printed by an official Polish source, lists her by her real first and last names but with a false name for her father and an age 6 years younger than her real age:

53. ЛЕВАНДОВСКОЙ Яниниы Марьяновны 1914 г.р.
Jędrzej Tucholski. Mord w Katyniu. Kozielsk, Ostaszków, Starobielsk. Lista ofiar. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1991, l. 703.

Either Soviet records are in error or Lewandowska tried to conceal her father's identity and, for some reason, her own age. This is a poor means of disguising one's identity! It would only work if there were multiple people with the same first and last names, so that the only way of distinguishing among them was by age or patronymic. That was clearly not the case here. Did she give some false information in a private act of defiance? But wouldn't her military identification papers record accurately her patronymic and, at the very least, her year of birth?

Lewandowska's skull was supposedly one of six skulls from Katyn saved by the German medical chief Dr. Gerhard Buhtz that after his death passed into the hands of a Polish scientist, Dr. Jerzy Popielski. Supposedly Popielski did not reveal the existence of these skulls until 1997, "before he died." We are not told why he waited so long; pro-Soviet Poland had come to an end in 1990. We are told that the skull, or fragments of it, were identified as Lewandowska's by "computer analysis", not by DNA analysis. To our knowledge there is no process that can do this. These details come from a number of sources, mainly the article by Kamila Baranowska, "Jedyna kobieta wśród ofiar Katynia: Janina Lewandowska" Rzeczpospolita April 22, 2008.

The Mystery of Janina Lewandowska, Part 3: The Falsification

Lewandowska could not have been shot at Khar'kov, as Syromiatnikov suggested, but buried at Katyn, near Smolensk. That means that somebody - or everybody - is in error.

There are various possible scenarios:

* Bniński is said to have told Lewandowska's family that she was flying a Polish plane when she was shot down and captured by the Red Army. Zbrodnia Katyńska, 31. However, Polish-American historian Professor Anna Cienciala, a leading expert on Katyn, recently rejected this story:

Please note that the brief information on Lewandowska in the 2007 edition of the Katyn book, is wrong. She was not shot down, but was evacuated to eastern Poland by train and taken prisoner there. This corrected information is in the revised reprint of the book issued in 2009 (see Lewandowska in Index for pages).
Cianciala, post to the H-POLAND list of August 15, 2012.

Cienciala does not state where she has learned this new information. It may come from the booklet Zagłada polskich elit used by Snyder, which says more or less the same thing. However, it directly contradicts what Bniński reportedly told to Lewandowska's family in January 1941. The only way Bniński could have learned that Lewandowska had been shot down was from Lewandowska herself or from others at the Kozel'sk POW camp. If Lewandowska had not been shot down, why would she tell Bniński that she had been?

The Russian record reproduced in Tucholski's book is good evidence that Lewandowska was indeed at Kozel'sk and was shipped to Smolensk, near Katyn. As we have argued elsewhere, recently discovered evidence makes it next to impossible that she was shot by the Soviets. See Furr, Official version.

* But if Syromiatnikov was telling the truth, then Lewandowska was shot at Khar'kov and buried outside the town at Piatykhatky. In that case the story about her being disinterred by the Germans, her skull taken by Buhtz, its rediscovery and identification in Poland, etc., is a fabrication.

* Perhaps Syromiatnikov was mistaken. Then Lewandowska was not shot and buried at Khar'kov. Instead she was taken to Katyn, and shot and buried there - from the evidence we now have, by the Germans.

* Perhaps Syromiatnikov was telling the truth about the "one female" among the prisoners, but the Polish records are wrong - there were at least two female Polish prisoners. The one shot and buried at Khar'kov was not Lewandowska. The problem is that the Soviet transit records of Polish POWs shipped from Starobielsk POW camp to Khar'kov do not record any other female prisoners.

We have no idea what Syromiatnikov was told informally. It is possible that he told the very brief story about the "female prisoner" in order to provide closure to the Polish story about Lewandowska and so to please his interrogators. In 1991 the "skull at Katyn" story had not yet appeared. But it is also possible that he told the truth as he remembered it. He said himself that he had a poor memory of those long-ago events and he contradicted himself on some points, including this one.

With the appearance in the late 1990s of the version that Lewandowska was shot by the Soviets at Katyn, disinterred by the Germans who never mentioned it, and finally identified through a skull that had ended up in the possession of a Polish scientist, Syromiatnikov's confession has been forgotten. None of the historians and writers on the Katyn question mention it or the problem of falsification that it raises. Snyder does not mention it either.

The significance of this is that it casts further doubt upon the confessions of the three NKVD men who, in the early 1990s, were important evidence of Soviet guilt in the Katyn massacre. Russian researchers of the Katyn story have long doubted these confessions. This would be further evidence that they are indeed corrupted, at least partly false, probably an attempt to tell the Polish and Russian interrogators what they wanted to hear.

Why spend all this space on the question of Janina Lewandowska and Katyn, which occupies few pages in Bloodlands? One reason is to show that what we have called the "official version" of the "Katyn massacre", the "Soviets-did-it" story, is not a simple matter. The fascinating complexity of the Janina Lewandowska story highlights the fact that Snyder is uncritically repeating the official Polish nationalist version not only of Lewandowska but of the whole Katyn question without acknowledging - informing his readers - that he is doing so.

The "Janina Lewandowska" story shows that the "official version" - really, the anticommunist and Polish nationalist version - of Katyn is very far from the seamless narrative, devoid of contradictions, that its proponents pretend it is. And it does not even help Snyder's "number's game." Given that his goal is to make the Soviets into mass murderers on almost the Nazi scale, Katyn is scarcely relevant. Even if the Soviets had "done it" - shot all the Polish POWs - that would be 22,000, scarcely a drop in the bucket compared to the millions of mass murder victims he needs in order to make his Soviet-Nazi comparison even remotely credible.

#429
thought people might appreciate that I won #1 'tankie' on the 'shittankiessay' subreddit not close. this is what happens when a normal rhizzone poster ventures out into the FBI wasteland of the rest of the internet. dont delete this forum please.
#430
did they make you one of those beauty pageant winner sashes with #1 Tankie on it
#431
someone on #dom4goons has tagged me with a picture of vlad putin captioned with "GreasyTankieGaming" http://i.imgur.com/A7W1eF0.png
#432
Keep your reddit compulsions out my thread
#433
[account deactivated]
#434
/r/HizzonE
#435
/r/HerzonE
#436
Chaper 11
#437
Oops I mean

Chapter 11. The Partisan War and Related Issues in Bloodlands Chapter 7

This chapter deals principally with the partisan warfare in Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, which the Polish exile government in London and its underground army the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) still considered to be part of Poland.

Snyder's obvious aim throughout is to portray pro-Soviet partisans as murderous, completely insensitive to the safety and needs of civilians, misogynistic, opponents of independence, and illegitimate. By "independent" Snyder means "capitalist", and by "legitimate" he means "obedient to the Polish government-in-exile in London" (e.g. on page 298).

Setting aside the language of propaganda, the London-based Polish government-in-exile was completely dependent upon, thus not at all "independent" of, the U.K. and the Western Allies. Nor was it any more "legitimate" than was the pro-Soviet formation that became the Polish government. In July 1945 the pro-Soviet Polish government was officially recognized by the Allies, thereby making it the only "legitimate" government of Poland.

An honest historian would explain these matters to his readers rather than foist Polish nationalist propaganda onto them through the use of value-laden terms like "legitimate" and "independent" without explanation. In fact much of Snyder's book is anticommunist Polish "nationalist" mythology and moralizing thinly disguised as historiography.

Did Stalin's Speech of November 7, 1941 Favor Russians?

In November 1941 Stalin was thus preparing an ideological as well as a military defense of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was not a state of the Jews, as the Nazis claimed; it was a state of the Soviet peoples, first among whom were the Russians. On 7 November, as the Jews marched through Minsk to their deaths, Stalin reviewed a military parade in Moscow. To raise the spirits of his Soviet peoples and to communicate his confidence to the Germans, he had actually recalled Red Army divisions from their defensive positions west of Moscow, and had them march through its boulevards. In his address that day he called upon the Soviet people to follow the example of their "great ancestors," mentioning six prerevolutionary martial heroes - all of them Russians. At a time of desperation, the Soviet leader appealed to Russian nationalism. (227)

Source (n. 5 p. 489): Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, 118-119.

Properly speaking this is not an anti-Soviet statement. Apparently Snyder included it so he could accuse Stalin of being "pro-Russian" instead of simply "pro-Soviet."

Brandenberger says: "...all of Stalin's examples were defenders of the old regime if not outright counterrevolutionaries." (118) Brandenberger is correct to note the appeals to Russian nationalism in Soviet rhetoric during the war. But this specific statement is nonsense. It is an anachronism and thus an absurdity to call these historical figures of centuries ago "counterrevolutionaries", as though they were living in the 20th century.
Brandenberger does note the establishment in 1943 of the order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, awarded to Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. This caused much dissatisfaction because of the anti-Jewish pogroms carried out by Khmel'nitskii's men in the mid-17th century. Along with his Ukrainian provenance Khmel'nitskii's alliance with the Tsar and organizing the struggle of Ukrainian peasants against Polish exploiters appear to have been the reason for the award.

Stalin's speech on November 7 1941 mentions six traditional Russian military heroes. One might suspect that Stalin referred to Russian heroes because he spoke in Moscow, the historic capital of Russia that in November 1941 was again threatened with capture as it had been in earlier wars. All six leaders were relevant to the situation the USSR found itself in on November 7, 1941: defeating an invader, or fighting successful retreats (Suvorov) as the Red Army had been forced to do since June 22, 1941.

* Alexander Nevsky, who defeated the Teutonic Knights (Germans) and later the Finns
* Dmitry Donskoy, who defeated the Mongols at Kulikovo when they tried to conquer Moscow in 1380.
* Kuz'ma Minin, who raised a volunteer army (opol'chenie) in Nizhnii Novgorod and worked with Pozharsky (see below). During World War 2 the Soviet "home guard" of those unfit for service in the regular Red Army were also called "opol'chenie."
* Dmitry Pozharsky: Minin's army led by Pozharsky cleared the Kremlin of Polish-Lithuanian forces in 1612.
* Alexander Suvorov, who led a great strategic retreat across the Alps in 1799.
* Mikhail Kutuzov, who fought the French army at Borodino and then drove the Grand Army out of Russia in 1812. This war was also referred to as the "Patriotic War" (Otechestvennaia), as the war against the Nazis was already being called.

The Marxist view of history is that the Tsars were indeed imperialist exploiters, but also that the great land empire they had built laid the basis for socialism to seize one-sixth of the world. In the latter task the Tsars' expansion was progressive in both the bourgeois and Marxist senses of the word, as were all the bourgeois imperialist expansions from the 16th century on. Similarly, Ivan IV ("the Terrible") and Henry VII of England were progressive in unifying their kingdoms and suppressing the power of the feudal nobility because by doing so they laid the political basis for the development of capitalism and the capitalist class, precursor to socialism and communism.

The vast majority of Muscovites (as well as of Russians and Soviet citizens generally) were not communists. They had to fight and, in many cases, die for something - not for communism, then, but for their country. For all these reasons an appeal to traditional Russian patriotism at that critical time must have seemed logical.

Snyder continues:

People who had distinguished themselves in the Minsk of the 1930s had been shot by the NKVD at Kuropaty. ...Left to themselves, they would have endured Hitler for fear of Stalin. (231)

His source (n. 13 p. 490): Epstein, Minsk, 130.
Kuropaty (Russian) / Kurapaty (Belarusian) is an area outside Minsk, Belarus, where an unknown number of persons shot by the NKVD, probably in 1937-1938 under Ezhov, plus an unknown number of other victims including, possibly, victims of the Nazis, may have been buried. It has never been thoroughly excavated and studied. Estimates of the total number of persons buried there vary from 7000 to 250,000. The higher numbers are promoted by anticommunist Belarusian nationalists.

This is another fraudulent reference. There is nothing about Kuropaty in Epstein's whole book, let alone on this page. Neither Snyder nor anyone else knows who was "shot by the NKVD at Kuropaty," much less whether the victims buried there were "people who had distinguished themselves in the Minsk of the 1930s." Kuropaty has never been thoroughly studied and there is no list of identified victims. If Snyder had written: "It is a reasonable surmise that some people who had distinguished themselves..." he would have been on firmer ground.

Snyder also fabricated - invented - this "fact":

Left to themselves, they would have endured Hitler for fear of Stalin.

On the very page Snyder cites for this statement Epstein stresses that the Minsk underground did not act out of fear. On the contrary, "they supported the Soviet concept of authority..." (130).

Did Soviet Partisans Cause Nazi Atrocities?

Hitler, who saw partisan warfare as a chance to destroy potential opposition, reacted energetically when Stalin urged local communists to resist the Germans in July. Even before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler had already relieved his soldiers of legal responsibility for actions taken against civilians. Now he wanted soldiers and police to kill anyone who "even looks at us askance." (234)

Source (n. 20 p. 490): "...Quotation: Lück, "Partisanbekämpfung," 228.

Here Snyder tries to blame Soviet partisans, and therefore Stalin, for Hitler's murder of civilians. He implies that Hitler stepped up his killing of civilians because of Stalin's setting up of partisan warfare. Snyder does this repeatedly in the last part of his book.

The citation from Lück is from Martin Bormann's notes of a discussion in Hitler's HQ of July 16, 1941. Bormann quotes Hitler as saying:

Die Russen haben jetzt einan Befehl zum Partisanen-Krieg hinter unserer Front gegeben. Dieser Partisanenkrieg hat auch wieder seinen Vorteil: er gibt uns die Möglichkeit, auszurotten, was sich gegen uns stellt.
Martin Bormanns. Abschrift einer Besprechung im Führerhauptquartier (16 Juli 1941).

Translated:

Now the Russians have given the order for a partisan war behind our front. This partisan war also has an advantage: it gives us the possibility to exterminate anything that opposes us.

However, Lück notes that this was nothing new for Hitler:

...diese "Strategie" hatte die SS ohnehin schon längst angewendet... (Lück 228 n. 17)

Translated:

...this "strategy" had long been used by the SS...

Snyder suggests that Hitler's words should be taken literally: that he needed an "opportunity" to take murderous action against civilians, an "excuse" that Hitler did not have before. That is to say, Snyder is suggesting that if the Soviets had not begun partisan warfare Hitler would not have exterminated so many people! But Lück, Snyder's own source, makes it clear to his readers that in reality Hitler had been exterminating people long before Stalin's order for partisan warfare.

Hitler also made the second statement claimed by Snyder - to "kill anyone 'who even looks at us askance'":

Der Riesenraum müsse natürlich so rasch wie möglich befriedet werden; dies geschehe am besten daduch, daß man Jeden, der nur schief schaue, totschieße. Ibid.

Translated:

Naturally the huge area had to be pacified as quickly as possible and the best way to do this is to shoot dead anybody who looks wrong.

It is not true, as Snyder suggests, that Hitler also made this statement in relation to Soviet declaration of partisan warfare. Rather, Hitler just suggested that shooting as many people as possible on any pretext at all was the best way to "pacify this gigantic area."

By Snyder's logic all the Allies were facilitating Nazi mass murders, for French, Czech, Italian, and other partisans also fought the Nazis. Polish partisans fought the Nazis too, though the Polish underground generally considered Jews and communists just as much their enemies as the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists. But Snyder never raises this issue in connection with them. Snyder's goal is to associate the Soviet Union, but not Poland or the Allies, with Nazi atrocities.

Snyder does the same thing in the following passage:

Partisan operations, effective as they sometimes were, brought inevitable destruction to the Belarusian civilian population, Jewish and gentile alike. When the Soviet partisans prevented peasants from giving food to the Germans, they all but guaranteed that the Germans would kill the peasants. A Soviet gun threatened a peasant, and then a German gun killed him. Once the Germans believed that they had lost control of a given village to the partisans, they would simply torch houses and fields. If they could not reliably get grain, they could keep it from the Soviets by seeing that it was never harvested. When Soviet partisans sabotaged trains, they were in effect ensuring that the population near the site would be exterminated. When Soviet partisans laid mines, they knew that some would detonate under the bodies of Soviet citizens. The Germans swept minds by forcing locals, Belarusians and Jews, to walk hand in hand over minefields. In general, such loss of human life was of little concern to the Soviet leadership. The people who died had been under German occupation, and were therefore suspect and perhaps even more expendable than the average Soviet citizen. German reprisals also ensured that the ranks of the partisans swelled, as survivors often had no home, no livelihood, and no family to which to return. (238-9)

Sources (n. 34 p. 491):

* Musial, Mythos, 189, 202;
* Lück, "Partisanbekämpfung," 238;
* Ingrao, Chasseurs, 131;
* Verbrechen, 495.

Lück, Ingrao, and the volume "Verbrechen der Wehrmacht" do not discuss Soviet partisans at all, much less blame them for German atrocities. Musial, an intensely anticommunist Polish nationalist historian, notes that the communist partisans forced the Belorussian peasants to feed them and "often" robbed them, while the German forces murdered them. But even Musial does not claim that the German murders were due to the Soviet partisans - the claim that Snyder makes here.

Once again Snyder is trying to blame the Soviet partisans, and therefore Stalin and the Soviet leadership, in part for Nazi atrocities against civilians. Again Snyder fails to acknowledge that all the Allies, including the Polish nationalist Home Army, to whom Snyder is sympathetic, supported partisan groups and therefore were, in Snyder's sense, all as "responsible" for Nazi atrocities as were the pro-Soviet partisans.

It must be noted that Soviet partisans could not "take control of a given village" - only pro-German Ukrainians or Polish partisans working with the Germans could do that.

The logic of the Soviet system was always to resist independent initiatives and to value human life very cheaply...

Snyder cites no evidence to support his statement that the Soviets "valued human life very cheaply." There is evidence to the contrary, as witness this exchange between Marshal Vasilevskii and Stalin concerning a military operation to liberate Leningrad:

On January 10 Stalin and Marshal Vasilevsky talked with him {Marshal Meretskov} by direct wire. They expressed the frank opinion that the operation would not be ready even by January 11 and that it would be better to put it off another two or three days. 'There's a Russian proverb,' Stalin said. 'Haste makes waste. It will be the same with you: hurry to the attack and not prepare it and you will waste people'.
Harrison Salisbury. The 900 Days. The Siege of Leningrad. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 559.

The same thing - "valuing human life very cheaply" - was said of American commanders in World War 2 - for example, in the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, where tens of thousands of American soldiers were killed in frontal assaults on islands that could have been bypassed, leaving the Japanese garrisons to starve or surrender. And what about the "over-the-top" tactics of the commanders on all sides of the First World War, when they could think of no better way of dealing with trench warfare than to order suicidal charges against barbed wire and machine guns at the enemies' trenches, often losing thousands of men in a day? Here, as elsewhere, Snyder's judgment is ruined by his strong anticommunist bias.

The Polish Home Army leadership that unleashed the Warsaw Uprising without a hope of victory and led to the deaths of a quarter million Polish civilians at Nazi hands, was far more guilty of "valuing human life very cheaply" than the Soviets. We will discuss the Warsaw Uprising later.

The previous hesitation of local Minsk communists turned out to be justified: their resistance organization was treated as a front of the Gestapo by the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement in Moscow. The people who rescued Minsk Jews and supplied Soviet partisans were labeled a tool of Hitler.

Source: (n. 35, p. 491): Slepyan, Guerillas, 17, 42.

Slepyan, Guerillas, pages 17 and 42, is a phony reference; Slepyan has nothing to say about anything in this passage of Snyder's.

But Barbara Epstein's book, which Snyder recommends elsewhere, does indeed discuss the Soviet authorities' suspicion against the Minsk Ghetto partisans and the persecution of its surviving members. What Epstein writes concerning this tragic and mistaken suspicion is worth quoting:

Why did Ponomarenko and others want to discredit the Minsk underground, and why did they continue their campaign against it for so many years? The simplest answer is that Ponomarenko honestly thought that the Minsk underground was a nest of German spies, and was determined to protect partisan units in the Minsk region from betrayal by its members. Ponomarenko was doubt informed of the mass arrests of underground members that took place in late September and early October 1942. He no doubt heard that all the members of the City Committee had been arrested, that Kovalyov and some others were providing the names of other underground members, and that photographs apparently of Kovalyov giving a speech to factory workers in which he urged them to drop their resistance to the Germans appeared in the Minsker Zeitung, that the City Committee had been created by the Germans to lure Soviet patriots and lead to just such a mass arrest. Certainly the second failure of the Minsk underground could be used to bolster such a view, as could the first failure, which had similar features: leaders of the Military Council, under arrest, had given the Germans names, and a mass arrest of underground members had followed. (244-245. Emphasis added.)
During most of the war Pantaleimon Kondrat'evich Ponomarenko, first secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, was head of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement.

However tragically mistaken he may have been in this case Ponomarenko had reason to suspect a Gestapo connection. Ponomarenko has been called an anti-Semite. However, Epstein's book, the latest and very thorough study of the Minsk partisan movement, gives no evidence that he was one.

Snyder writes:

Since both sides knew that their membership was largely accidental, they would subject new recruits to grotesque tests of loyalty, such as killing friends or family members who had been captured fighting on the other side. (244)

Sources (n. 45 p. 491):

* Szybieka, Historia, 345, 352;
* Mironowicz, Białoruś, 159.

This is a phony citation. Neither Szybieka nor Mironowicz say anything at all about "killing friends or family members" or any such "grotesque tests of loyalty." Szybieka does state that many Belorussians fought in the ranks of Soviet partisans, seeing the USSR as the only way to defeat the Nazis. He also describes battles between Belorussian partisans and the Polish Home Army.

It Was the Polish Home Army Who Massacred the Belorussian "Elite"

Both Mironowicz and Szybieka are virulently anti-Soviet. Their sympathies are with the far-right Belorussian nationalists who paid lip service to "independence for Belorussia" - that is, with the Nazi collaborators. A further problem with both of these books (Szybieka's is a translation from the Belarusian) is that they contain few footnotes or other evidentiary information.

Szybieka - this is the Polish spelling of his Belarussian surname; the proper English transliteration is "Shybeka" - is a Belarusian professor. Mironowicz is a Polish professor who specializes in Belarusian history. He too is strongly anticommunist and respectful of the Nazi collaborators who presented themselves as "nationalists."

However, according to Mironowicz it was not the Soviet partisans but the Polish Home Army that was responsible for massacring Belorussian teachers and other "elites":

Urzędnicy białoruscy w przypadku konfliktu interesów z reguły wydawali decyzje niekorzystne dla Polaków. Chętniej także wysyłali na przymusowe roboty do Niemiec młodzież polską niż białoruską (wcześniej czynili tak urzędnicy polscy wobec młodzieży białoruskiej). Na narastającą dominację białoruską w strukturach władzy okupacyjnej AK odpowiedziała antybiałoruskim terrorem. W okręgu lidzkim konflikt przerodził się w wojnę na wyniszczenie elit. W współdiałanie AK i dominującej w tym okręgu polskiej policji pomocniczej doprowadziło do fizycznej likwidacji znacznej części organizatorów białoruskiego życia narodowego - nauczycieli, urzędników i działaczy Związku Młodzieży Białoruskiej. Współpraca z policją była tak widoczna, że miejscowi Białorusini postrzegali AK jako ugrupowanie militarne realizujące dyrektywy władz niemieckich. Niemiecki historyk pisze, że spółpracujący z AK policjanci polscy zastrzelili kilkuset Białorusinów, w lidzkim komisariacie rejonowym. Komendant nowogródzkiego okręgu AK pisał natomiast, że jego żołnierze w drugiej połowie 1943 r. wykonali ponad 300 wyroków śmierci na Białorusinach, a 80 zadenuncjowali na gestapo jako komunistów. Źródła białoruskie podają liczbę 1200 Białorusinów zabitych w 1943 r. przez polskie podziemie jedynie w rejonie lidzkim. Według historyków białoruskich podczas okupacji z rąk żołnierzy AK miało zginąć około 10 tys. Białorusinów.
Mironowicz, Bialorus, 217-218.

Translated:

Belarusian officials in the event of a conflict of interest as a rule made decisions unfavorable to the Poles. Also they were more likely to send Polish rather than Belarusian youth to forced labor in Germany (previously Polish officials had done the same to Belarusian youth). To the growing Belarusian dominance in the structures of the occupying power the AK responded with an anti-Belarusian terror. In the district of Lida the conflict escalated into a war of the annihilation of elites. In cooperation of the AK with the Polish auxiliary police who were dominant in the sub-district this led to the physical liquidation of a large part of the organizers of Belarusian national life - teachers, officials and activists of the Belarusian Youth Union. Cooperation with the police was so apparent that the Belarusian locals saw the AK as a military group implementing the directives of the German authorities. A German historian writes that the Polish police, in cooperation with the AK, shot and killed hundreds of Belarusians in the Lida police district. The commander of the AK in the Novgorod district, however, wrote that his troops in the second half of 1943 carried out more than 300 death sentences against Belarusians, and denounced 80 to the Gestapo as communists. Belarusian sources cite the number of 1200 Belarusians killed in 1943 by the Polish underground in the region of Lida alone. According to Belarusian historians, during the occupation about ten thousand Belarusians perished at the hands of AK soldiers. (Emphasis added.)

Snyder cites Moronowicz's book elsewhere - but not this passage, in which Mironowicz claims to expose mass murders by the Polish Home Army of Belorussians, including of "elites"! This fact serve to remind us once again that Snyder's book is not historiography, but "propaganda with footnotes."

Snyder Falsifies the Nalibocki Incident

Polish civilians were massacred by Soviet partisans when Polish forces did not subordinate themselves to Moscow. In Naliboki on 8 May 1943, for example, Soviet partisans shot 127 Poles. (247)

Sources (n. 50 p. 492):

* "On the shooting of 127 Poles, see Musial, Mythos, 210."
* "See also Jasiewicz, Zagłada, 264-265."

As in the case of the Katyn Massacres there is a scholarly dispute about Nalibocki. And as in the former case Snyder conceals the dispute from his readers and presents the anti-Soviet version as the only version. Everyone agrees that the Soviet partisans attacked a fortified police outpost in Nalibocki. However, this armed outpost could not have existed without German permission and German-supplied weapons. Snyder does not mention this important fact to his readers. A Russian language source states:

Б отчете советских партизан было указано, что в бою в селе разбит немецкий гарнизон самообороны. Было также установлено, что вооружённой ячейки Армии крайовой действовали под контролем оккупационных властей и сотрудничали с ними. По воспоминаниям узника минского гетто Михаила Окуня, в 1943 году «очень много партизан погибло от рук этих аковцев, и с ними началась война.»
At http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Массовое_убийство_в_Налибоках Accessed on December 1, 2012. Since then the last sentence, quoting Okun, has been removed. This page is highly contested.

Translated:

In the report of the Soviet partisans it was stated that in the battle in the village German self-defense garrison was smashed. It was also found that the self-defense forces in Naliboki, an armed cell of the Armia Krajowa (Polish Home Army) were functioning under the control of the occupying authorities and cooperating with them. According to the memoirs of Minsk ghetto prisoner Mikhail Okun, in 1943, "a lot of guerrillas were killed by these AKers {akovtsev} and we began a war with them."

German historian Bernhard Chiari has documented the collaboration between the Home Army and the German army against their mutual enemy, the Red Army. We will return to Chiari's research later in this book.

Bogdan Musial is an anticommunist Polish nationalist historian. But even one of Musial's books records a different version from Snyder's account. According to this account the Nalibocki attack was

...einen überraschenden Angriff auf die deutsche Garnison der Selbstverteidigung in der Ortschaft Nalibocki {und zerstorten sie}.
Musial, ed. Sowjetische Partisanen in Weißrussland, 116 Doc. 2 - Soviet partisan report.

Translated:

...a sudden attack against the German self-defense garrison in the village of Nalibocki {and destroyed it}.

In a note Musial claims that 128 "unbeteiligte Zivilisten" - "civilians not involved in the fight" - were killed and the village "plundered and burned." However, Musial's only source is interviews with surviving villagers. He made no effort to get the surviving Soviet partisans' accounts, as anyone would who was interested in the truth rather than simply in writing anticommunist propaganda.

The different perspectives on the Nalibocki affair can be illustrated by comparing the pages from different language versions of Wikipedia. For example, on the English Wikipedia page there's no ambiguity - the Soviet partisans broke an agreement with the Polish Home Army and slaughtered the townspeople. But the Russian Wikipedia says that the Soviet partisans attacked a unit of the Home Army that was armed and collaborating with the German army, and quotes Mikhail Okun, a veteran of the Minsk ghetto who states that these Home Army men ("akovtsev") killed many Soviet partisans, so the Soviet partisans fought them.
The source of Okun's account is the excerpt from his memoirs "106-I evreiskii partizanskii..." (106th Jewish Partisan Unit) at the Mark Solonin site.

The English page stresses that the Bielski Jewish partisan group was not involved in the Nalibocki attack. But the Polish Wikipedia page specifically accuses the Bielsky partisans of collaborating with the Soviet partisans in murder the innocent villagers, emphasizing that they were "of Jewish ethnicity" - "osób narodowósci żydowskiej." The reality is that not just the Bielski partisan group, but all Jewish partisan groups, collaborated with the Soviets since Polish partisans consistently murdered Jewish partisans, as well as Jewish civilians, whenever they could do so.

So there is a serious controversy - one with more than a little anti-Semitism by the Polish nationalists - about what happened at Nalibocki and why. Snyder ignores his responsibility as an historian to objectively explore the different versions, or even to inform his readers that they exist.

Jasiewicz, Zagłada, 264-265 claims that the Soviet partisans attacked pro-German Polish farms and killed some Poles, families included. Perhaps some communist partisans did consider pro-German civilians - that is German collaborators - to be fair targets, as French and Italian partisans did. But these allegations are anecdotal, like Musial's account of Nalibocki. Ukrainian insurgents also disguised themselves as Soviets and committed atrocities.

Snyder Claims that Collective Farms Were Similar to Nazi Racism

The collective farm was to be maintained to extract food; Kube proposed to dissolve it and allow Belarusians to farm as they wished. By undoing both Soviet and Nazi policies, Kube was revealing their basic similarity in the countryside. Both Soviet self-colonization and German racial colonization involved purposeful economic exploitation. (249)

The comparison is nonsense. Snyder again tries to force some similarity between Nazi and Soviet policies. If collective farms maintained by the Nazis to feed German troops and by the Soviets to feed the Soviet population had a "basic similarity," as Snyder claims, then so would individual farms, whether under Nazi or Soviet control.

Snyder hates collective farms - that's clear! So he tries to associate collective farms with Nazi genocide whenever he can. But there is no such things as "self-colonization." Collective farmers paid a tax on what they produced so that the rest of society could be fed, the army maintained, industry built. This has nothing in common with deliberately murderous German exploitation. Moreover, Soviet peasants benefitted immensely from collectivization, which put an end to the age-old cycle of deadly famines.

The Jews who became partisans were serving the Soviet regime, and were taking part in a Soviet policy to bring down retributions upon civilians. The partisan war in Belarus was a perversely interactive effort of Hitler and Stalin, who each ignored the laws of war and escalated the conflict behind the front lines. (250)

This is another instance of a lie that Snyder often repeats. The Soviets had no "policy to bring down retribution upon civilians" any more than did all the other Allies, including the London Polish government. Of course Snyder has no evidence to support his contention - and no responsible historian would make such a serious charge without at least some evidence. In addition, Snyder touches here on a point which he tries to avoid throughout: the fact that Jewish partisans always sided with communist partisans because they had no choice. The Home Army, loyal to the Polish government in exile in London, did not accept Jews in its ranks and normally murdered Jews whenever it could do so.

Partisan warfare was also carried on by the Polish Home Army and Ukrainian Nationalists, to say nothing of General De Gaulle's partisan forces in France. Snyder never makes this statement about the Home Army partisans, who also (sometimes) fought the Germans. Why not?

"Ponomarenko's Report" - Another Example of Snyder's Bias

Snyder:

Red Army officers invited Home Army officers to negotiate in summer 1943, and then murdered them on the way to the rendezvous points. The commander of the Soviet partisan movement believed that the way to deal with the Home Army was to denounce its men to the Germans, who would then shoot the Poles. (247)

Sources (n. 51 p. 492):

* Brakel, Unter Rotem Stern, 317;
* Gogun, Stalinskie komandos, 144.

Let's take a look at this interesting question.

Brakel does claim that at a session of the Central Committee on June 24, 1943 Paneleimon Ponomarenko, First Secretary of the Belorussian Party and head of the partisan movement in Belorussia, ordered that as much information as possible concerning Home Army units be collected and passed to the Germans, who would then presumably liquidate the Home Army partisans.

Zwei Tage später konkretisierte er {Ponomarenko} auf einer Sitzung des Büros des ZK KP(b) B seine Anweisungen nochindem er forderte, möglichst viel Informationen über die Einheiten der Heimatarmee zu sammeln und sie (wohl über Mittelmänner) bei den Deutschen zu denunzieren.

- n. 437 Stenogramm der Sitzung des Büros ZK KP(b)B vom 24.6.1943, zit. nach Dokumenty o stosunki, S. 233-245, hier S. 243.

Translated:

Two days later he {Ponomarenko} concretized his instructions at a meeting of the Bureau of the CC CP(b)B by demanding the collection of as much information about the units of the Home Army and the denunciation of these units (probably though intermediaries) to the Germans.

But Brakel has biased his account by significant omission. Here is the fuller context of Ponomarenko's remarks from the document published in the Polish journal from which Brakel took it:

Следовательно, сточки зрения предстояшей борьбы с польскими националистическими организациями и польскими соединениями, а она будет при вступлении на территорию Западной Белоруссии, при чем здесь разумеется очень широка борьба, здесь не исключена возможность, а нужно предвидеть, что польские подпольные боевые организации, для того, чтобы ослабить влияние партизанских отрядов и наших подпольных коммунистических организаций на массы, они обязательно будут ставить под удар немецких оккупантов наши партизанские отряды и партийные организации.

Это нужно предвидеть
и поэтому сейчас нужно уже в своих указаниях, которые мы будем давать в части конспирации наших партийных организаций, в части контактов со стороны партизанских отрядов с различными представителями польскими, которые приходят для переговоров о совместной борьбе и т.д., а поляки очень умеют вести крепко разведывательную работу и умеют конспирировать своюдеятельность, - это нужно иметь в виду. Поэтому параллельна с этой работой нам нужно ориентировать наши партизанские отряды и партийные оргаинзации на то, чтобы все эти польские оргаинзации, польские соединания, которые создаются, их выявлять и всячески ставить под удар немецких оккупантов. Немцы не постесняются расстрелять, если узнают, что это организаторы польских соединеий или других боевых польских организаций.

Но тут нужна организация. Как это сделать? Методами тут не нужно стесняться. На это нужно идти широко, но обставлять нужно таким образом, чтобы это было гладко. Повидимому, прийдется поставить вопрос о разоружении польсних националистических патриотов, разоблачении их, как агентов Сикорского и предателей польского народа.
"Stenogramma zasedaniia biuro TsK KP(b)B of 24 iiunia 1943 goda." In Michal Gnatowski. "Dokumenty o stosunku radzeickiego kierownictwa do polskiej konspiracji niepodległościowej na północno - wschodnich kresach rzechypospolitej w latach 1943-1944." Studia Podlaskie (Białystock) V (1995), p. 243.

Translated:

Accordingly, from the point of view of the coming struggle with the Polish nationalist organizations and Polish units, and there will be one upon the entry {of the Red Army} into the territory of Western Belorussia - and by this we must understand a very broad struggle - here not only is it not impossible but it is necessary to foresee, in order to weaken the influence of our partisan detachments and our underground communist organizations upon the masses, that the Polish underground military organization will expose our partisans and party organizations to the German occupiers.

We need to anticipate this
and so now it is necessary in the instructions that we will give in terms of the conspiratorial work of our Party organizations, in terms of contacts by guerrilla groups with various Polish representatives who arrive for talks concerning fighting together, etc., and the Poles are very skilled in the conduct of intelligence work and are able to keep their activities secret - you need to keep this in mind in mind. Therefore, in parallel with this work, we need to focus our partisan units and party organizations to ensure that all of these Polish organizations and Polish units that are being created should be discovered and exposed in every way to the blows of the German occupiers. The Germans will not hesitate to shoot them if they find that these are the organizers of the Polish units or other Polish fighting organizations.

But here organization is necessary. How to do it? We must not restrict ourselves in the way of method. We must take this on broadly, but we must arrange things so that they go smoothly. Evidently we will have to raise the question of disarming the Polish nationalist patriots, of exposing them as agents of Sikorski and traitors to the Polish people. (Emphasis added)

Brakel is quoting a document in a Belarusian archive published by a Polish journal. Several issues with this document should excite our suspicions about it. In the notes immediately before this one Brakel cites another document by Ponomarenko dated June 22, 1943, from a Russian archival source. Evidently he could not locate the June 24, 1943 report in question in a Russian archive or the June 22 document in a Belarusian archive.

Another account of this same June 24 meeting records it differently:

24 июня 1943 года состоялось заседание бюро Центрального Комитета Компартии Белоруссии. Обсуждался один вопрос - «О разрушении железнодорожных коммуникаций». С небольшим докладом выступил П. К. Пономаренко.

- Задача состоит в том, чтобы за короткий период подорвать как можно больше железнодорожных путей, - подчеркнул он. - Противник вынужден будет проводить огромные трудоемкие работы по замене рельсов. Потребуется колоссальное количество стали, проката, которых у немцев теперь не так уж много...

В принятом постановлении отмечалось, что железные дороги в Беиоруссии почти на всем протяжении находятся под контролем партизан, а это имеет огромное значение для срыва оперативных и стратегических замыслов противника.
Petr Zakhkarovich Kalinin. Partizanskaia respublika. M.: Voenizdat, 1964. Part 3: "Partizanskaia razvedka", p. 292.

Translated:

On June 24, 1943 there took place a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. One question was discussed: "Concerning the destruction of rail communications." P. K. Ponomarenko made a short report.

- The task is to blow up as many railroad lines as possible in a short period of time. - he stressed. The enemy will be forced to carry out huge time-consuming works to replace the rails. That will require an enormous amount of steel and rolling stock, of which the Germans do not now have very much...

It was noted in the adopted resolution that the railways in Belorussia throughout most of their length are controlled by the guerillas, and that fact is of great importance for the disruption of the operational and strategic plans of the enemy.

The assertion that there was only one topic discussed at this meeting - the question "Concerning the destruction of rail communications" - is repeated in Vladimir P. Ilin, Partizany ne zdaiutsia! (Moscow: Eksmo, 2007) Chapter 3, p. 375.

Brakel's source is a Polish collection of supposedly Soviet documents. A more detailed account of this same meeting is widely cited with all citations coming back to the book by Bogdan Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen in Weißrussland (Munich, 2004), p. 223. Musial cites a Russian archive but also cites the same Polish source as Brakel.
An article by Musial translated into Russian from the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine includes what is supposed to be a quotation from Ponomarenko's directive to pass information about the AK on to the Germans:

В выборе средств можете не стесняться. Операцию нужно провести это широко и гладко.

Translated:

We must not restrict ourselves in the way of method. We must take this on broadly, but we must arrange things so that they go smoothly.

These two sentences, but no more of Ponomarenko's directive, are widely reproduced on the Internet. They do not correspond to the text of the document we cite above. Evidently they are a re-translation back into Russian of the German-language passage quoted by Musial himself in Sowjetische Partisanen:

Bei der Wahl der Mittel dürft ihr keine Skrupel haben. Dies muß breit angelegt werden und so, dag es glatt vor sich geht. (223)

Like Brakel Musial does not quote the actual document, much less the context of the quotation.

Musial has been described as an anti-Semitic writer who strives in his research to blame all Polish anti-Semitism on the fact that Jews were "pro-Soviet" - essentially the Nazi "Judaeo-Bolshevism" argument. Joanna B. Michlic. "Anti-Polish and Pro-Soviet? 1939-1941 and the Stereotyping of the Jew in Polish Historiography." Shared History - Divided Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939-1941. (Leipzig, 2007), 67-101, at 85 ff.

There are a number of points about this document that are relevant to our evaluation of Snyder's book:

First: Is the lengthy account from the Belorussian archive of the June 24, 1943 meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia genuine? There are reasons to question its authenticity:

* The two accounts by Kalinin and Ilin claim that there was only one topic discussed at the meeting, and that Ponomarenko's report was short. The Studia Podlaskie document (pages 233-245 in the journal), and Ponomarenko's remarks are part of a discussion, not of a report.

* In this document Ponomarenko calls the Polish underground "patriots." But it is unlikely that the real Ponomarenko would have used the word "patriots" to refer to the anticommunist Polish underground. By this time the Soviets had already formed a pro-Soviet Polish organization and military. The Home Army was attacking and murdering Soviet and Jewish partisans. Ponomarenko might well call pro-Soviet Polish partisans "patriots." But how could he also call these hostile, anticommunist forces "patriots"? This ought to awaken the suspicions of any competent historian.

Second: Even if it is genuine Brakel - and, therefore, Snyder - have omitted a number of important facts necessary to evaluate Ponomarenko's statement:

* Ponomarenko claims that the Polish underground will expose the Soviet Party organizations and pro-Soviet partisans to the Germans, and therefore the Soviet forces must plan to do the same thing to the Polish underground. Brakel, like Musial, omits this context.

* Brakel and Snyder know that the Home Army was extremely hostile to communists as well as to Jews. The Polish Government-in-exile in London regarded the Soviets as an enemy just as much as they did the Germans. By February 1943 the massive German defeat at Stalingrad had already taken place, and everyone recognized that Germany would eventually lose the war. The Soviets suspected Polish collaboration with the Germans over the Katyn affair in April, 1943, when the London Poles worked closely with the Germans in a manner that completely undermined any sense of alliance with the Soviet Union. Soviet partisans would have regarded Katyn as a Nazi-Polish government-in-exile provocation, since this was Moscow's position.

With eventual German defeat inevitable and a pro-Soviet Polish leadership and army already set up, by June 1943 it was obvious that the Home Army would begin to fight the Soviets in any way they could. This is the context for Ponomarenko's remarks - assuming they are genuine, and they may not be. By the end of 1943 at the latest some officers of the Home Army were beginning direct military collaboration with the Germany Army against the Soviets.

Gogun, Stalinskie komandos, 144: Snyder gets this all wrong. The page is 145, not 144; the time is not "summer 1943" but November 6, 1943; the Polish nationalists were allegedly shot not before but after the meeting took place; and they are not identified as Home Army men.

Gogun claims that a commander of the guerrilla band of the famous Soviet Ukrainian partisan leader Aleksei Fedorov invited three Polish nationalist commanders to a celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution and then asked them to join the Soviet partisans. The Polish nationalist partisans refused and then left, whereupon the Soviet partisans shot them in the back and hid their bodies.

Did this event happen this way? Snyder did not check. Gogun cites two sources. One is a Polish nationalist history of an Home Army unit to which we do not have access. The other is the diary of the Soviet partisan commander - but this is unpublished, cited from an archive. Moreover, the Soviet commander's diary says only this:

«Тов. Зубко (заместитель Балицкого. - А. Г.) организовал убийство польских националистов - заядлые были нашей советской Родины.»

Translated:

"Comrade Zybko (Balitsky's assistant - A.G.) organized the killing of Polish nationalists - they were inveterate enemies of our Soviet Motherland."

It is Gogun who identifies the event referred to in this statement as the same murder described by a Polish nationalist source, asserting that they are "obviously" the same. But he cites no evidence that this is so. Evidently, neither source describes what took place at the meeting.

Other works on Soviet partisans and on the Home Army note occasions when Home Army forces killed pro-Soviet partisans. For example, there are several such accounts in the collection of essays edited by Bernhard Chiari, Die Polnische Heimatarmee in which Snyder himself has an essay. Snyder does not mention them.

#438
Sort of on topic to this thread: anyone know more about the Makhonovites (Ukrainian anarchists)? I've seen them toted as the Good part of the Bolshevik revolution and also seen claims of their slaughter by the Communists. Just curious, as I've been reading some of Eric Wolf's work on the peasantry as it's tangentially related to a couple things I've been reading and he mentions them in a seemingly favorable light, mentions them having an alternative answer to the "Kulak problem" because they were a less industrial worker more peasant based faction (hence their failure). He seems to mention anarchists a lot..

Edited by EmanuelaBrolandi ()

#439
this has some cool sources and quotes

The Makhno Myth
By JASON YANOWITZ
http://www.isreview.org/issues/53/makhno.shtml

his conclusion is that makhno's heart was in the right place and he was a good tactician and charismatic leader but he was incompetent at administration, politics and planning. like an anti-stalin.

two books it cites from are

The Myth of Nestor Makhno
Colin Darch
https://www.dropbox.com/s/lvf8h8c5iprzj7p/Myth_of_Makhno.pdf

and

Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War
Michael Malet
https://www.dropbox.com/s/t67p8ob6tft3dfp/Nestor_Makhno%20michael%20malet.pdf

the latter is also on lib com (anarchist website) if you want to link anarchists to the citations for the cool quotes http://libcom.org/library/nestro-makhno-russian-civil-war-michael-malet
#440
That seems like it make sense - he was a kinda Zapata-esque character, a social revolutionary from the peasant stratum who lacked an overarching ideology to guide his actions