#521
lmao the story in december 1941 was "they escaped to manchuria"

#522

tears posted:

thanks for posting that here!

Furr doesn't even bother disputing that some Polish officers were probably killed by Soviets, bringing up what Putin has also said, that there was a lot of resentment from the Polish occupation of Soviet areas earlier in the century and that it would be almost unimaginable that some Polish officers were not murdered by some Soviet soldiers, but these werent coordinated on a massive scale like the Nazi killings and probably comprise a miniscule number of the overall killed..

#523
Also, if anyone wants a brief intro to the second world war from the pov of the soviet union, written by trot hater and all round good person Harpal Brar, "the Soviet victory over Fascism", which also includes Mario Souzas piece "Anthony Beevor's Stalingrad - a piece of nazi propaganda" is availible here - good and easy read: http://www.cpgb-ml.org/download/publications/HarpalBrar_SovietVictory.pdf


friendly reminder that the soviet union defeated the nazis single handedly and that the "allies" only launched the normandy landings because they were worred about the USSR bringing socialism to europe
#524
The Americans say the trucks they sold the soviets were crucial, but they sold the nazis the same amount.
Ford co sold to one general motors the other.

Is there anything smaller than a book worth reading that details western press politicians industrialists and financiers colluding with the nazis before during and after the war, and ideally comparing that with whatever deals they struck with the su also
#525

xipe posted:

The Americans say the trucks they sold the soviets were crucial, but they sold the nazis the same amount.
Ford co sold to one general motors the other.

Is there anything smaller than a book worth reading that details western press politicians industrialists and financiers colluding with the nazis before during and after the war, and ideally comparing that with whatever deals they struck with the su also



https://thecapitalistholocaust.wordpress.com/2013/10/12/chapter-4-western-capitalists-serve-the-nazi-war-machine/

ive struggled to find a proper look at lend lease but this has some interesting stuff (accuracy unknown) http://orientalreview.org/2015/05/12/wwii-lend-lease-was-the-us-aid-helpful-enough-i/

#526

tears posted:

xipe posted:
ive struggled to find a proper look at lend lease but this has some interesting stuff (accuracy unknown) http://orientalreview.org/2015/05/12/wwii-lend-lease-was-the-us-aid-helpful-enough-i/



some of it is pretty hyperbolic

"Out of the 711 fighter planes that had arrived in the USSR from the UK by the end of 1941, 700 were hopelessly antiquated models such as the Kittyhawk, Tomahawk, and Hurricane,"

the battle of britain (late 1940) was won by hurricanes

#527
"Of course this list of lend-lease aid looks very impressive, and one might feel sincere admiration for the American partners in the anti-Hitler coalition, except for one tiny detail: US manufacturers were also supplying Nazi Germany at the same time …"

the ussr also traded extensively with germany immediately prior to the GPW

"In addition, the USSR paid for the Allied shipments with gold. In fact, one British cruiser, the HMS Edinburgh, was carrying 5.5 tons of that precious metal when it was sunk by German submarines in May 1942."

the soviet weapons were paid for with gold by the spanish republic during the spanish civil war

"Given the fact that lend-lease debts to other nations had been written off, this seemed like highway robbery"

britain also had to pay for the lend-leese loans (but she didn't renege on them like russia) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6215847.stm
#528

Panopticon posted:



the hurricane was actually a shit plane and the luftwaffe consistently owned the brits flying in their shit planes, it isn't hyperbolic to say that it was infact a shit and antiquated plane even in 1939, doesn't invalidate its importance in the "battle of britain" tho.

#529
"The first official assessment of the role played by lend-lease aid in the larger victory over Nazism was provided by the chairman of Gosplan, Nikolai Voznesensky" shortly before stalin shot him
#530

tears posted:

Panopticon posted:


the hurricane was actually a shit plane and the luftwaffe consistently owned the brits flying in their shit planes, it isn't hyperbolic to say that it was infact a shit and antiquated plane even in 1939, doesn't invalidate its importance in the "battle of britain" tho.



i bet the hurricane had a better kills:losses ratio against german fighters than the t-34 had against german tanks

#531
me: hurricane not as good as people say it was
u: but whatbout the t-34!?!?!

i mean seriously, how is this even relevant to a comment about how the hurricane was dross?
#532
fucking lmao @ trying to say the hurricane wasn't outdated. it had canvas wings and a spaceframe made out of the shittiest steel pipes you could buy mixed with literal honest to god wooden two by fours. compare to the spitfire which was a monocoque made of reynolds 531, with an engine subframe made out of R531 (butted?) seamless tubes

what made it useful in the battle of britain was that it was fighting like a couple of miles away from the airbases at most. so nazis could blow it halfway to fuck and they could land, use its kiddie looking mechano construction to repair it in a few hours, and then take off again to shoot more krauts

to do the same thing the nazis had to piss off back to france which meant they shot down before they got out of english airspace

i suppose you could say the hurricane could outhandle a kraut 109E but that isn't because of any inherent superiority. its because the hurricane was so shit and slow that it didn't need to take turns as widely as a faster plane does. if that's an "advantage" you might as well use a Polikarpov Po-2 and spend the battle circling an apple tree at 10mph
#533

tears posted:

me: hurricane not as good as people say it was
u: but whatbout the t-34!?!?!

i mean seriously, how is this even relevant to a comment about how the hurricane was dross?


if the hurricane was dross then the t-34 was too, and i doubt you'd agree with that

#534

Horselord posted:

fucking lmao @ trying to say the hurricane wasn't outdated. it had canvas wings and a spaceframe made out of the shittiest steel pipes you could buy mixed with literal honest to god wooden two by fours. compare to the spitfire which was a monocoque made of reynolds 531, with an engine subframe made out of R531 (butted?) seamless tubes

what made it useful in the battle of britain was that it was fighting like a couple of miles away from the airbases at most. so nazis could blow it halfway to fuck and they could land, use its kiddie looking mechano construction to repair it in a few hours, and then take off again to shoot more krauts

to do the same thing the nazis had to piss off back to france which meant they shot down before they got out of english airspace

i suppose you could say the hurricane could outhandle a kraut 109E but that isn't because of any inherent superiority. its because the hurricane was so shit and slow that it didn't need to take turns as widely as a faster plane does. if that's an "advantage" you might as well use a Polikarpov Po-2 and spend the battle circling an apple tree at 10mph


the mosquito was made of wood, still helped the war effort

#535
britain flew wooden planes and sent metal planes to russia and stalin still complained... shameful.
#536

Panopticon posted:

the mosquito was made of wood, still helped the war effort



the Mosquito was a state of the art ply layup that pioneered the techniques we use to work with carbon fibre today. it was not some 2"x4" planks nailed to scaffolding poles

#537

Panopticon posted:

tears posted:

me: hurricane not as good as people say it was
u: but whatbout the t-34!?!?!

i mean seriously, how is this even relevant to a comment about how the hurricane was dross?

if the hurricane was dross then the t-34 was too, and i doubt you'd agree with that



assumption that as i defend stalin on the internet im must have an opinion on the t-34 tank being great or some shit because thats what all the "tankies" go on about lmao. i don't know shit about tanks, t-34 or otherwise, but i do know that the hurricane was a shit plane.

please continue your "how can u have thoughts on one piece of british ww2 millitary hardware being shit if u dont have it on *this* piece belonging 2 the USSR" posting

#538
oh they got them for free too.
#539
no they didn't
#540
dirlewanger rides again

http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Ukrainian-Pro-Govt-Unit-Caught-on-Video-Raping-Young-Girls-20160808-0006.html
#541

Panopticon posted:

tears posted:

Panopticon posted:


the hurricane was actually a shit plane and the luftwaffe consistently owned the brits flying in their shit planes, it isn't hyperbolic to say that it was infact a shit and antiquated plane even in 1939, doesn't invalidate its importance in the "battle of britain" tho.

i bet the hurricane had a better kills:losses ratio against german fighters than the t-34 had against german tanks



What?

The T-34 was, at least, "good enough" since it was integral to the Soviet war effort. Pound for pound, it might not be better than later model German tanks, emphasis on "later model" since the early T-34s were impervious to German guns, with the exception of the Pak-88. Of course, "good enough" is what matters in a war, since other matters besides technical superiority of one's hardware are also relevant, such as logistics. The German tanks were too expensive to make in quantity, and they did not have the necessary impact in the war.

We are not comparing military hardware such as the F-35 and Russian jet fighters, that were not extensively used. but those actually used during the war. Simply put, the T-34 was good enough.

(As an aside, are the combat losses of the MiG-15 most attributable to inexperienced Korean pilots as opposed to technical inferiority?)
--

Furr, to my knowledge, took the minimalist route regarding disputing Katyn. He said that he was content with disproving the mainstream narrative of Katyn by elucidating the significance of the Volodymr-Volynsky excavations, not by disputing every piece of evidence.

So, do the V-V excavations cast, at least, reasonable doubt on the "Katyn massacre". It, at least, questions whether the transportation lists to three NKVD detention centers in Smolensk, Kharkov, and Kalinin were purported "death lists".

Perhaps the Soviet government lied because they did not want to admit that the POWs were "massacred" during evacuation or captured by the Germans (in addition to a few extrajudicial murders before Barbarossa).

Edited by Latias ()

#542

Panopticon posted:

lmao the story in december 1941 was "they escaped to manchuria"

http://i.imgur.com/2BseQnZ.jpg


it would be really great when you post stuff like this to say where it's from. author and title at a bare minimum. the specific reference for the conversation between stalin and sikorski would be appreciated too. tia

#543
[account deactivated]
#544
Janusz K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (1962)

i can't see what his citation is in google books.
#545
Thank you.
#546
for the Stalin-Sikorski convos 3-4 dec 1941 the source is probs going to be:

Kot, Stanislaw, (1963). Conversations with the Kremlin, and Dispatches from Russia. Oxford University Press.


(from Materski, Wojciech (2007). Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment. Yale University Press. p.494)

i cant find any of these on the internet but would be internested in reading the original record of the disussions if anyone could track down any of these

#547
Other stuff on Katyn

Furrs katyn webpage where he compiles a lot of different stuff: https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/pol/truthaboutkatyn.html

Furrs article "The “Official” Version of the Katyn Massacre Disproven? Discoveries at a German Mass Murder Site in Ukraine" - https://msuweb.montclair.edu/%7Efurrg/research/furr_katyn_preprint_0813.pdf

Discussion on the potential forgery of closed packet no. 1: https://mythcracker.wordpress.com/2011/01/03/katyn-mysterious-discoveries-of-the-katyn-documents/
and
http://katynmassakern.blogspot.gr/2010/07/katyn-berias-letter-was-written-on-two.html
amoung other stuff

if looking for any "captalist" sources, the best list of "soviets did katyn" sources is availible here: http://www.katyn.org.au/books.html
#548

Panopticon posted:

Janusz K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (1962)


so this is available on hathitrust: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015000552060

the reference in question:



unless there is a readily available, reliable english translation this is pretty much a dead end

#549

Petrol posted:

Panopticon posted:
Janusz K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (1962)

so this is available on hathitrust: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015000552060

the reference in question:

unless there is a readily available, reliable english translation this is pretty much a dead end

I can get you readily available: http://www.szukajwarchiwach.pl/800/22/0/-/40

My Polish is mediocre and couldn't claim reliability but i can stumble through it i think.

#550

your_not_aleksandr posted:

Petrol posted:

Panopticon posted:
Janusz K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (1962)

so this is available on hathitrust: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015000552060

the reference in question:

unless there is a readily available, reliable english translation this is pretty much a dead end

I can get you readily available: http://www.szukajwarchiwach.pl/800/22/0/-/40

My Polish is mediocre and couldn't claim reliability but i can stumble through it i think.



Hold up, ive found an english translation of the 3rd dec talks, will post once ive cleaned it up. but would be interested to compare back to an original

#551

tears posted:

Hold up, ive found an english translation



Catchphrase

#552
heres the meeting minutes, “Stalin-Sikorski talks”, 3rd Dec 1941, Moscow., based on Kots notes, some of this will have been double traslated russian->polish->english. as molotovs secretary was there it seems likely that there are USSR minutes of the same meeting, would be interensting to compare the two

The Katyn Forest Massacre: hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, second session, on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, Part 4 – April 16-19, 1952, p914-923 posted:

Exhibit 49C

Minutes of the Conversation Between Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, President of the Council of Ministers of the Polish Republic and Joseph Stalin, President of the Council of the Peoples' Commissars, AT the Kremlin on the 3d December 1941, in the Presence of Professor Kot, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. W. Molotov, Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, General Anders, O. C. of the Polish Forces in the U. S. S. R. and Mr. Molotov's Secretary. (Literal Translation From Polish.)

“Stalin-Sikorski talks”, 3rd Dec 1941, Moscow posted:

General Sikorski. I am exceedingly glad to greet you as one of the real creators of contemporary history and to congratulate you on the heroism of the Russian Army in the struggle against Germany. As a soldier I express my admiration of the heroic defense of Moscow, so efficiently directed by you who stayed on in the capital. At the same time I thank you for the most generous hospitality which I have enjoyed from the moment when I first set foot on U. S. S. R. soil.

Stalin. I thank you for your kind words and it gives me great pleasure to see you in Moscow.

General Sikorski. I shall begin by saying that I have had nothing to do with and shall never agree with the policy directed against Soviet Russia for the last 20 years. I therefore had a moral right to sign the agreement, which may be the crowning of the theories which I have held for so long. Moreover, in this most important issue for the future I have the backing of the Polish Nation just as much within our country as among the Poles living abroad in such large communities as in America where some 4 1/2 million Poles reside, in Canada, in France where there are 000,000 of them and in other smaller Polish communities scattered all over the world. Those who disapprove of such a policy as mine are against me. I do not want the slow realization of the terms of the agreement to weaken the policy of close cooperation between our two countries. On the loyal fulfilment of the agreement depends whether we now stand at the cross-roads of history. That depends on yourself whose decisions are final in this country. Our agreement must be put into effect, so that our people will cease to be harassed and driven. I am well aware of the difficulties in which Russia finds herself. Four-fifths of the whole armed forces of the German Reich has descended upon you. I realize this and am therefore upholding your cause in London and in the USA. Already several months ago I have deposited materials emphasizing the necessity for creating a second front in the West.

Stalin. Thank you, what you say is Just and right.

General Sikorski. But it is no easy task we are faced with. There are great difficulties, especially as regards shipping. It is no easy task to ship across the Channel a large number of troops and to capture and develop suitable positions on the Continent. This type of operations must be prepared very carefully and thoroughly and in detail; pressure cannot be exerted for fear of a repetition of the Dakar incident.

Stalin. You are right, should such an operation fail, it would shake the morale badly.

General Sikorski. But I must return to our affairs. I declare to you, Mr. President, that your announcement of an amnesty has not been fulfilled. A great many, and indeed the most valuable of our people are still in labor camps and prisons.

Stalin (makes a note). That is impossible, because the amnesty applied to all and all the Poles have been set free. {The last words are directed at Molotov, who nods.}

General Anders (at the request of General Sikorski gives details). That does not correspond to the real state of affairs; we have absolutely accurate data showing that first Jews were released from the camps, then Ukrainians, and finally the physically weaker Polish manpower. The stronger ones were detained, only a small proportion of them have been released. I have people in the Army who were freed only a few weeks ago from such camps and who affirm that in certain camps there still remain hundreds, even thousands, of our compatriots. The Government's orders are not put into effect there, because the commandants of the particular camps, having an obligation to carry out the production plan, do not want to lose their best labor, without which the execution of the plan would sometimes become impossible.

(Molotov smiles, nods his head.)

General Anders. Those people completely fail to understand the whole importance of our common cause, which is thus suffering a severe set-back.

Stalin. Those people ought to be brought up for trial.

General Anders. Yes, indeed.

General Sikorski. It is not our business to provide the Soviet Government with exact lists of our people, about whom your camp commandants have complete lists. I have with me a list of about 4,000 officers, who were forcibly deported and who are at present still in prisons and labor camps; but even this list is not complete, containing only names compiled from memory. I ordered an investigation to be made to ascertain whether they are in our country, with which we are in permanent contact. It appears that none of them are there, neither are they in camps for Polish prisoners of war in Germany. These people are here; not one of them has returned.

Stalin. That is impossible. They escaped.

General Anders. Where could they have escaped to?

Stalin. Well, to Manchuria.

General Anders. It is impossible that they could have all escaped, especially since, from the moment of their transfer from prisoner of war camps to labor camps and prisons, correspondence with their families has ceased entirely. I know definitely from officers who have already returned even from Kolyma that many of our officers, whose names they mentioned, are still there. I know that there were even convoys of Poles already prepared for release and departure, who at the last moment were detained. I am informed that our people are to be found even in Novaya Zemla. A great many of the officers named on this list are personally known to me. Among them are my staff officers and commanders. Those people are perishing and dying there under the most terrible conditions.

Stalin. They have certainly been freed, but have not yet arrived.

General Sikorski. Russia is immense and so are her difficulties. Perhaps the local authorities have not carried out their instructions. Those who have been released and have arrived say that the others are vegetating and working. If anyone had crossed the frontiers of Russia, he would certainly have reported I to me.

Stalin. You must know that the Soviet Government has not the slightest reason for detaining a single Pole. I have even released Sosnkowski's agents, who attacked and murdered our people.

General Anders. But reports are reaching us about people who are well-known to us, giving the names of prisons and numbers of cells in which they are confined. I know the names of a great many camps, in which a tremendous number of Poles are detained and are forced to go on working.

Molotov. We have only detained people who committed crimes, carried out diversionary activities, set up radio stations, etc., after the outbreak of war. Surely you are not concerned with them.

Ambassador Kot. Obviously not, but I have already requested, on many occasions, to have lists of these people because very frequently these accusations are levelled at persons whom I know to be good patriots and who are wholly innocent.

Molotov {nods his head}.

General Sikorski. Let us not touch on matters dating from the war. It would be a good thing if you were to issue a public explanation with regard to this matter, so as to bring about in Russia a fundamental change of attitude toward the Poles. These people are not tourists, they are people forcibly deported from their homes. They did not come here of their own will but have been deported and have undergone untold sufferings.

Stalin. The people of the Soviet Union are friendly to the Poles. Mistakes are only likely to be committed by officials.

General Anders. It is not only officials who carry out their instructions badly. The point is that the Russian people should understand that it is not of their own free will that Poles are concentrated in large groups in certain localities. We are particularly anxious to insure good relations with the local population.

General Sikoroski. I say in Kuybyshev a transport of our people which created an appalling impression upon me. They must receive instant assistance. I divide our people into two categories — first, those who can work and those ought to be given work with as good conditions as possible.

Stalin. On the same conditions as Soviet citizens.

General Sikorski. Not even on the same conditions as long as they are just bearable. It is in the interest of the common war effort to make proper use of our people. You naturally understand, Mr. President, that a specialist in building tanks who is cutting trees in a forest is not being made full use of, nor is an eminent chemist, who is doing manual labor in the fields. The second category are those unfit for labor — old people, women, and children who ought to be concentrated in localities with a suitable climate and conditions, so that our Embassy may look after their welfare. Everyone should be immediately freed from the camps, leaving only those who have settled in tolerable conditions. The uncoordinated transfer of people here and there only creates bad morale, for they find themselves in very bad conditions and so it appears to them that in making an agreement with you I have done them a wrong. People are dying as a result of the terrible conditions. Those corpses will greatly weigh on our future relations. These people must be helped and it is hardly worth-while haggling over a few million rubles — a sum, which especially in wartime, is of no importance whatever. A large-scale loan must be granted to the Polish Government. It is also imperative that delegates of the Embassy should be allowed access to all those localities where there are large concentrations of Poles and that they be granted genuine and not fictitious powers. For example, our delegate in Archangielsk is not in a position to extend any assistance to the Polish people and his work is limited to the dispatch of transports. He cannot even distribute warm clothing among them. I am most anxious to set up an office of the Delegate of the Embassy in Vladivostok, in view of the fact that Poles in America have collected large numbers of clothes for Poles in Russia, the despatch of which has been made conditional upon the possibility of handing them over to the Delegates of the Embassy.

Stalin. I agree to the delegates, and in Vladivostok too.

Molotov. I do not think it is possible that your people are still in the camps.

General Anders. Nevertheless I state most definitely that they are; I repeat that the strongest arc retained there because workmen are needed. By not freeing our people they are doing a bad service to the common cause.

Stalin. That will be arranged. Special instructions will be issued to the executive authorities, but it must be remembered that we are waging war.

General Sikorski. And you are waging it jolly well too.

Stalin. No, no. Only moderately well. Our transport was terribly overstrained. We removed our wounded, we evacuated the population, we transferred 70 large factories. We had to transport army units both ways. I want the Poles to understand the tremendous difficulties we were confronted with. But things will improve.

General Sikorski. The Polish population ought to be transferred to districts with a better climate.

Stalin. Let us consider which districts would be suitable for the Poles. To Fergana and Uzbekistan we normally supply grain because we mostly grow cotton there and we have even issued special instructions forbidding the cultivation of grain crops in these districts. From that point of view they are therefore unsuitable. But the southern parts of the Semipalatynsk District would be more adequate. We can anyhow see how it looks on the map. {All present get up and cross over to the map. Stalin points out on the map.} Therefore — Tashkent, Alma-Ata, and the entire southern Kazakhstan.

Ambassador Kot. For those from the Far East perhaps Barnaul and Novosibirsk would be better.

Stalin. Its very cold there, although a lot of bread.

Ambassador Kot. But where to send those who are now in the Archangielsk and Komi districts?

Stalin. Also to Southern Kazakhstan. {They sit down at the table.}

General Sikorski. As to the loan I think that a hundred million roubles would solve the matter for a long time, also because it would not make a bad impression and would prevent the raising of voices who might reproach yoou of making difficulties over such trifles.

Molotov. Haven't we already given 65 million?

Ambassador Kot. But that was for the Army.

General Sikorski. Hitler has taught us all how, without gold but merely by hard work, great things can be accomplished. Do not imitate the ministers of finance in the West, Mr. Commissar, who had initially quarrelled over every million.

Stalin (nodding). All right.

General Sikorski. That would be about all I wanted to say in the matter of the Polish civilian population. I now have various military problems I wish to raise. Should I first speak about the military question as a whole, or shall we discuss the various points one by one?

Stalin. As you wish, General.

General Sikorski. To us Poles war is not a mere symbol but we understand it as a real fight.

Stalin. {Acknowledges with a gesture.}

General Anders. We want to fight here, on the Continent, for Poland's independence.

General Sikorski. In the country we have at our disposal a powerful military organization which I have forbidden to boast about since over there one is shot for a single word. {Stalin nods, General Sikorski describes various details of the methods by means of which the Polish nation continues its fight against the Germans.} Our army fights everywhere. In the United Kingdom we have a corps which needs men to complete its establishments. We have a navy which functions most efficiently. We have in action 17 air squadrons which are supplied with the newest British aircraft and which fight magnificently. Twenty percent of the German air force losses over Great Britain were caused by Polish pilots.

Stalin. I know that Poles are courageous.

General Sikorski. If well directed. Thanks to Providence, and of course also due to you, Mr. President, we have General Anders who is my best soldier and whose eight stars for his eight wounds speak best of his courage. You put him to prison for having attempted to join me. He is a loyal commander, not a politician, who will not allow his subalterns to indulge in politics.

Stalin. The best policy is to fight well. {Turning to Anders.} How long were you kept in jail?

General Anders. For 20 months.

Stalin. How were you treated?

General Anders. In Lw6w very badly — slightly better in Moscow. But you know, Mr. President, yourself what "better" means in prison when you have been sitting there for 20 months.

Stalin. Can't be helped. Such were the conditions.

General Sikorski. I have a brigade in Tobruk which will be transferred to Syria and transformed into a mechanized division with two tank battalions. If needed I can throw it over to the east. I have a number of warships. After I had decorated with medals the crew of one of our submarines stationed in Malta for having sunk an Italian battle cruiser and a transport ship — the men got so excited that the next thing they did was to enter a Greek harbor and in spite of a damaged periscope they sunk one more cruiser and yet another transport ship. They returned with no damage or loss. That is how Polish soldiers will fight anywhere when under good leadership. Our country is occupied and the only reserve of young men we have is over here. I wish to send as supplements to Scotland and Egypt some 25 thousand — the remainder should be used for the formation of about 7 divisions. It is of greatest importance to those in the country which look toward this army as to a symbol of their resistance and the nation's independence. We want to fight and, therefore, our troops stationed in Scotland will be used as the vanguard in the formation of a western front or they may be even transferred here to the east. In which case I would personally take over the command. The present difficulties of maintenance, equipment, and training worry me because units formed in such conditions will be quite worthless. Instead of sacrificing their health and life for furthering our common cause they vegetate here or perish to no avail. This war will be a long one. Great Britain and the United States have disarmed to such an extent that their armament industry, especially the American one will need considerable time to attain full capacity again. In due course an avalanche of equipment will overtake us. But even already now I have the assurances from both Roosevelt and Churchill that our divisions will be armed together with yours without impairing the delivery of equipment to the Red army, subject however, to the condition that the formation of our army will take place in districts which will be easily accessible for our deliveries to reach us. The present armament of our divisions is wholly inadequate. The divisions in their present state are of no use in the field as they have not received the equipment they need. General Anders will explain this in detail.

(General Anders describes in detail the amount of equipment received already and the general requirements of armament for Polish troops and underlines the insurmountable difficulties he daily encounters.)

Stalin (Asks about certain details as to artillery equipment). Russia had entered the war with divisions which had establishments of 15,000 men but which proved to be too heavy and we therefore changed to a type of a lighter division counting only about 11,000 men.

General Sikorski. The present conditions in which the Polish Army is being formed are inadequate. The soldiers freeze in summer tents, they lack food and they are simply sentenced to slow death. I therefore suggest that the whole army together with the rest of the Polish manpower of military value should be transferred for example to Persia where the climate together with British and American supplies will contribute to their swift recovery and will allow us to organize a strong army, which would then return here and take over a whole sector of the front. This plan has Churchill's approval. On my part I am ready to make a separate declaration that this army will return to the Russian front and that it could be even strengthened by a few British divisions.

General Anders. {Proceeds with describing the state of organization of his troops and declared that under existing conditions of maintenance, accommodation, sanitary equipment, and climatic conditions the formation of units which would be capable of taking up the fight is quite impossible.} It is nothing else but a poor vegetation in which the entire energy is directed into the effort to survive and to live pretty badly at that. After all the main issue is to form as quickly as possible a battle-ready Polish Army which could fight for Poland side by side with the Allies. This is quite out of the question in present conditions. That is why it is absolutely essential to transfer these troops to climatic conditions which together with adequate maintenance and better deliveries of equipment, would at last move things forward. In view of the difficulties with which Russia was struggling, the British and American facilities of delivering supplies should be considered. Persia would be the most suitable region. All soldiers and all men capable of bearing arms should find themselves there. Once we take up the fight the blow delivered by our Army cannot be merely a symbolic blow. It must serve its purpose and further our aim for which we are fighting all over the world in our struggle for Poland.

General Sikorski. I would very much appreciate if the Soviet Government had confidence in my proposal. I am a man who if he says "yes" he means "yes," and if he says "no" he means "no," if I say nothing that means that either I cannot or I do not want to tell the truth.

Stalin. {In an irritated tone and obviously displeased.} I am an old and experienced man. I know that once you leave for Persia you will never come back here. I see that England has plenty to do and is in need of the Polish soldiers.

General Sikorski. We are bound to Great Britain by an alliance which she fulfils loyally. We also have our full sovereignty in England. I can even transfer my corps from Scotland to Russia and I assure you that the British will not make me any difficulties about it. In the same way I can add to our Army over here the units I have in Tobruk.

Ambassador Kot. A Pole fights the better the closer he is to his country.

Stalin. Persia is not so far off but the British can force you to fight with the Germans in Turkey and tomorrow Japan may also join in the war.

General Anders. We want to fight for Poland. We believe that not even the strongest air force or navy can end a war. It will be decided on the battlefields of the Continent. All of us, without exception, love our country and we want to re-enter it, before all others, we want to be ready to fight as soon as possible but under present conditions we cannot prepare ourselves for this fight.

General Sikorski. England today, compared with what she was before is like heaven to earth. The British have now enough troops to defend their isles, they, therefore, have no purpose to prevent our corps from leaving.

Molotov. {Suggests the summoning of General Panfilov and instructs the secretary to go and fetch him.}

General Anders. (Explains the difficulties of organization and the conditions of life in Koltubianka, Tatiszczew, and Tockim, the nonfulfilment of delivery of food, fodder, equipment, implements etc.) "This is nothing but a miserable vegetation and months of wasted time. Its quite impossible to form an army under such conditions."

Stalin. (Irritated) If the Poles don't want to fight let them go. We cannot retain the Poles. If they wish, then let them go.

General Sikorski. If we were given the chance to organize ourselves we would be fighting already, but how much time has been wasted here through no fault of ours. In our present dislocation we have no means of training our soldiers. {A silence.} May I therefore ask for some alternative solution.

Stalin. If the Poles do not want to fight here let them tell me straight forwardly — "yes" or "no". I am 62 and I know that there where an army will be formed there it will remain.

General Sikorski (sharply). Please find me another solution, because here the conditions are such as to make it quite impossible to form an army and I do not want to let my men perish to no avail. This is not an ultimatum, but in the conditions of a severe winter when gales and frost decimate my men I cannot just watch and remain silent.

General Anders. The temperature has at times fallen already to 33 centigrades below zero. The people are quartered in single-ply tents mostly without stoves, which are not supplied in sufficient quantities. They wake up in the morning with frostbitten noses and ears. This is not the organizing of an army, but a doleful vegetation.

General Sikorski. One cannot throw against the Germans untrained soldiers. We cannot risk being discredited. The Polish Army must be adequately armed and fight as an organized whole.

General Anders. As it is, I cannot but admire our soldiers who, in spite of the acute sufferings they have gone through in the last 2 years and in spite of their present abominable conditions — they had only received boots a few weeks ago and up till that time 60 percent of them went about barefooted — in spite of all that, they never complained — not even in spite of never receiving in full the food rations which are due to them and, for a long time, not even getting their pay.

General Sikorski (curtly). You have insulted me, Mr. President, by saying that our soldier does not want to fight.

Stalin. I am vulgar (in Russian, "grubyj") and I want to be told plainly — do you or don't you want to fight.

General Sikorski (firmly). That we do want can be proved by facts not by words.

General Anders. The reason why we are organizing ourselves is to fight — here, on the mainland. According to my calculations I can have 150,000 men the equivalent of eight divisions. As things stand now we have only two divisions and with limited possibilities of making them battle-ready at that. We do not receive sufficient maintenance supplies and any promises given in that respect are never kept.

Stalin (to General Sikorski). As you wish.

General Sikorski. I do not wish to force such an issue. I still await alternative suggestions and I am ready to accept any reasonable solution.

Stalin (with irony). I see that the British must be truly in need of good soldiers.

General Sikorski. This is not correct. They appreciate us in England but do not exploit us. I also know Churchill very well and I know he wishes to do everything he can to help Russia.

General Anders. I have 60 percent of soldiers of the reserve among my men, but they need to recover after the 2 years of hardships and they must be trained. The volunteers which join us also arrive in a deplorable state and must undergo adequate training for which time and suitable conditions are needed.

Stalin (irritated). Which means that we are nothing but barbarians and there is nothing which we can improve. It boils down to this that a Russian can only oppress a Pole but can do nothing to help him. But we can do without you. We can give them all away. We will manage alone. We shall reconquer Poland ourselves and then hand it back to you. But what will people say to that? The world will laugh aloud that we cannot do anything here now.

General Sikorski. I still have not received an answer to my question — Where am I to form an army which could take part in the fighting instead of having to perish in atrocious climatic conditions? Please give me a positive counter- proposal. I declare once more and categorically that we want to fight for Poland and arm in arm with you.

Stalin. Once you go to Iran you will have to fight maybe in Turkey against the Germans. Tomorrow Japan will join in and then against Japan. Wherever the British will order you to do so. Perhaps in Singapore.

General Anders. We want to fight against the Germans here on the Continent, for Poland. Our men have not seen their country for so long and no other men love their country as much as the Poles do. The shortest way is from here.

General Sikorski. Polish patriotism needs no certificates to prove it. I repeat that I am still awaiting a positive counterproposal.

Stalin. If you categorically insist — one corps, from two to three divisions, can leave. While if you really want I will give you the place and the means to form -seven divisions. However, I see that the British are in need of Polish soldiers. Haven't I received requests from Harriman and Churchill in which they want me to evacuate the Polish Army?

General Sikorski. Things are not so desperate with the British as to contend that the Polish Army formed over here was going to decide about their fate. They are slow but today they already represent a formidable force. It was I who had requested Churchill to make the move about the evacuation of our Army. But I shall give you a proof of my good will and I am willing to leave the army in Russia provided you allot us a suitable district for concentrating our men and give us an assurance of maintenance and dislocation which would create conditions suitable for its training.

Molotov. Panfilov is ready. Have you anything against General Panfilov coming in? {All nod their approval, enters General Panfilov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army.}

(A conversation follows between Stalin, General Anders, and General Panifilov about the conditions in which the Polish Army could be organized. Both sides quote a number of details.)

General Anders. I categorically state that I do not receive sufficient food, and not enough fodder for the horses. The divisions have. not received all the food they were entitled to, neither have they been supplied with such an essential thing as" the little stoves for the tents. Since the promise was made to supply me with tractors months have gone by and they haven't reached me yet. All my pleas have no result while the promises from Soviet military authorities remain unkept. Cases of typhoid fever have been reported from certain units but my urgent pleas for a sanitary train bring no response. For several months the soldiers haven't received any soap, no tools, no building materials, no boards, no nails. The soldiers do not receive any vegetables. A great number of food products is not added to our rations. Transport equipment is quite insufficient and in a verv poor state. A few weeks ago, all of a sudden, the number of food rations had been reduced from 44,000 to 30,000 and in spite of the promise of President Stalin to oui Ambassador that the rations will be raised back to 44,000 this has not yet taken place till today. The camp in Tockim has not received any rations at all for the day of 1st December. {He enumerates a number of other shortcomings in food and equipment.) It is untrue that we haven't sent complaints. I perpetually reminded about it Colonel Wolkowyski our liaison officer and I myself have sent numerous cables and a number of letters. {Panfilov remains silent.} I personally made several journeys in connection with these matters.

Stalin (very sharply to Panfilov.) Who is responsible for all that?

General Panfilov. The appropriate instructions have been issued, the orders were given by General Chrulov.

Stalin. When did I order to increase the number of food rations?

General Panfilov. Two and a half weeks ago.

Stalin. Then why have my orders not been put into effect till now? Are
they to eat your instructions? {All this part of the conversation is conducted
by Stalin in a very sharp tone. Panfilov stands to attention blushing and becoming pale in turn.}

General Sikorski. Only too great difficulties which we encounter and impossible conditions have forced me to adopt such a course in this matter.

Stalin. We can give the Polish Army the same conditions in which the Red Army has to carry on.

General Sikorski. In hitherto existing conditions not even a corps can be set on foot.

Stalin. I understand that they are bad; our troops are being organized in better conditions. I say that honestly that if you can get better conditions in
Iran, as far as we are concerned we are in a position to give you only such which we give to our own army. And the food that our soldiers get is better than that of the Germans.

General Anders. If they get the full amount which is allotted to soldiers, I deem it sufficient but it must be really delivered without these perpetual shortcomings which we are faced with. I must be given the opportunity to manage the supplies myself and to build up my own stock so as not to live from hand to mouth and if a transport fails- — to leave the men hungry.

General Sikorski. I restate once again our wish to fight alongside with you against our common enemy — the Germans.

Stalin. It seemed to me that the British were in need of your troops.

General Sikorski. No. It was I who^ — seeing the difficulties which we encounter over here^ — persuaded the British and the Americans to enable us to move our soldiers into better conditions.

General Anders {gives detailed explanations about the numbers of Polish soldiers located at present in the southern districts of the U. S. S. R. and names the respective places of their whereabouts. A discussion takes place about possible areas of concentration. The names of Uzbekistan, Turkestan and Trans-Caucasia are mentioned}. I count on roughly 150,000 men, therefore on 8 divisions together with non combatant services. Perhaps there are even more of our men but
amongst them quite a lot of Jewish element which is not keen on military service.

Stalin. Jews are poor soldiers.

General Sikorski. Many from among the Jews who have reported are speculators and men who have been sentenced for smuggling and they will never make good soldiers. I have no use for these in my army.

General Anders. 250 Jews deserted from Buzuluk at the false news that Kuybishev was bombed by the Germans. Over 60 deserted from the Fifth Division the day before the announced distribution of arms to the soldiers.

Stalin. Yes. The Jews are no good as soldiers.

(A discussion follows between Stalin, Anders and Panfilov about the armament and its deficiencies. Checking and counting from lists.)

General Sikorski. When will we be allotted new assembly areas and learn other details about the formation of the units?

(Stalin deliberates aloud with Panfilov and mentions for guidance the names of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Transcaucasia.)

General Sikorski. After completing the formation and training, all the units should be assembled together into one whole so as to strike as an army because only that will appeal to the imagination of the Polish Nation.

Stalin. It will take a long time.

General Anders. No — if everything will be carried out in a proper way the formation of the units after the supplying of arms will not take long.

(Stalin raises the question of forming an army without the formation of separate corps.)

General Sikorski. Maybe it would be better. We shall accept this suggestion, but so much stronger will have to be the equipment and armament of the divisions.

Stalin. An organization without corps units is better because the commander of an army which is divided into corps shifts over the responsibility upon corps commanders with the result that no one is responsible for anyone. It would be better if your army had simply seven divisions similar to what we have in our armies.

General Sikorski. I shall look to it that the equipment from abroad reaches you in a constant stream. With a little good will it can be done.

Stalin. We will supply part of it, the British should send the rest. But sea transports often fail to reach us on schedule. They can be delayed and this should be borne in mind.

General Sikorski. I must withdraw 25,000 men from here because I need them for the air-force, the navy and the armored troops. Further to that we can set on foot seven divisions. It is here that we have our only manpower reserve. Have you enough of aircraft?

Stalin. There can never be enough of aircraft. In numbers we are not worse
off than the Germans, as for quality we are even better. On the other hand our situation in respect of tanks is much worse.

General Sikorski. Lybia has already swallowed up a considerable part of the German Air Force.

Stalin. For the last 2 months we no longer feel the superiority of the German Air Force. They use very young and inexperienced pilots now. Their planes are relatively slow. How many planes has your squadron?

General Sikorski. 27, of which 18 in the first and 9 in second line.

Stalin. This corresponds to our regiment.

General Sikorski. We could send a few air squadrons from Great Britain to our army over here.

(Stalin: praises British airmen who are at present in Russia.)

General Sikorski. Our airmen have excellent eyes and a quick orientation.

Stalin. Slavs are the best and the most courageous airmen. They act swiftly because they are a young race which has not used itself up as yet.

General Sikorski. The present war will rejuvenate the Anglo-Saxons. The British are not like the French who are in fact already done for.

Stalin. I do not agree to that.

General Sikorski. Perhaps the lower classes still have something in them but the upper class in its majority presents but little value.

(Follows a lengthy discussion about Petain, Veygand, and others.)

Stalin. The Germans are strong, but the Slavs will overpower them.

General Sikorski. I would like to undertake a journey now to inspect the troops and visit the assembly camps of the civilian population, after which I would like to return to Moscow so as to be able to see you once again, Mr. President.

Stalin. By all means — do. I am at your service.

General Sikorski. I shall broadcast tomorrow in the name of the German-occupied nations. The text of my speech was to be sent to you by Commissar Wyszynski.

Stalin. Yes, I have read it. It will be very good if the transmission takes place.

General Sikorski. I think it will do the world a little good. The B. B. C. and America will take it up.

Stalin. In Russia, I have ordered to translate your speech into 40 languages.

General Sikorski. May I ask you to introduce my speech. I suggest that we sign a common political declaration. I do not insist but I leave you, Mr. President, a draft of the text. {He hands over the draft of the declaration.}

Stalin. In principle I agree. I will read it and we shall settle it together tomorrow.

General Sikorski. I take it for granted that the questions relating to the army have been mutually agreed upon. In the mixed commission which should hold a meeting as soon as possible in order to settle these matters General Anders will deputize for me. Would you be so good as to appoint your trustees for the visiting tour of the camps.

Stalin. I quite agree. {He mentions Panfilov and Vishitiski asking whether they would be agreeable to General Sikorski.}

(General Sikorski answers in the affirmative and bids farewell. Ambassador Kot and General Anders do the same. They leave but Stalin retains General Anders.)

(The conversation between Stalin and Anders lasts a few minutes. Stalin asks whether the cooperation with Panfilov is satisfactory. Anders states that they got along quite smoothly but that Panfilov was unable to do much.)

General Anders. Now that you have promised to solve our difficulties, Mr. President, I do believe that the formation of our army will be satisfactorily accomplished.

Stalin. I regret not to have met you before.

General Anders. It was not my fault that I had not been asked for an interview, Mr. President.

Stalin. I would very much like to see you from time to time.

General Anders. Mr. President, I am at your disposal at any time and will come when only you wish to see me.



(The conversation lasted two and a half hours.)

(These minutes were taken down to General Anders' dictation based on notes made by Ambassador Kot throughout the interview.)



Cleaned by me, tears, from here, ur welcome: https://archive.org/stream/katynforestmassa04unit/katynforestmassa04unit_djvu.txt
original (pdf pages 422-431): https://ia902701.us.archive.org/26/items/katynforestmassa04unit/katynforestmassa04unit.pdf

Edited by tears ()

#553

tears posted:

The Katyn Forest Massacre: hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, second session, on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, Part 4 – April 16-19, 1952, p914-923 posted:

“Stalin-Sikorski talks”, 3rd Dec 1941, Moscow posted:

Stalin (with irony).





good find

#554
Stalin. There can never be enough of aircraft. In numbers we are not worse
off than the Germans, as for quality we are even better.

:crying-hurricane:
#555


*hmmm, how can i embelish the minutes of this meeting*

S T A L I N

F E I G N E D

E X T R E M E

S U P R I S E
#556
everything stalin ever said out loud or wrote down and published or even wrote in private correspondence was actually fake specially to fool us. his real orders went out telepathically through the moustache antenna
#557

Horselord posted:

everything stalin ever said out loud or wrote down and published or even wrote in private correspondence was actually fake specially to fool us. his real orders went out telepathically through the moustache antenna

No, apparently he wrote and said it all but forgot to include the stage directions

#558

swampman posted:

No, apparently he wrote and said it all but forgot to include the stage directions



this is actually a tactic i've seen used before

there's a paper by michael ellman where he argues the famine in ukraine was intentional by first downplaying the absence of directives ("The fact that no document has been found in which Stalin explicitly orders starvation is not by itself conclusive"), then taking Stalin's stated concerns about kulaks waging a "war of starvation" from his letter to Sholokhov to actually be the opposite: a declaration of his own war-by-starvation ("In his study of publicity and propaganda Mucchielli drew attention to the role in political propaganda of ‘accusation in a mirror’.11 ‘This consists in imputing to the opponents one’s own intentions, i.e. the actions which one is planning oneself").

in short, ellman argues stalin was concern trolling the ukrainians

of course, why one private correspondence (which he notes parenthetically "remained unpublished for decades and the Khrushchevite partial publication of which was distorted to blacken Stalin") would be the primary vehicle for this, we're left to imagineer for ourselves. that's the name of the game, after all.

edit: davies & wheatcroft wrote ellman a response, too

Edited by Constantignoble ()

#559
Some other stuff that should really see the light rather than being buried in thousand page pdfs and poorly OCR'd docs


The Katyn Forest Massacre: hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, second session, on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, Part 7 – June 3, 4 and November 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952, p2132-2138 posted:

Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January- 1944

{Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow}

On January 23, 1944 members of the foreign press were taken to Smolensk to get first hand the evidence compiled by the Commission on the Katyn incident.

The party was shown the graves in the Katyn Forest and witnessed post mortems of the corpses. As no member was in a position to evaluate the scientific evidence given, it had to be accepted at its face value.

The testimonial evidence provided by the Commission and witnesses was minute in detail and by American standards petty. We were expected to accept the statements of the high ranking Soviet officials as true, because they said it was true.

Despite this it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans. The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manner in which the job was done, something the Commission thought not sufficiently important to stress. They were more interested in the medical evidence as conclusive proof and the minute circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime.

Following is a description of what we saw and most particularly the manner in which the story was presented.

1. Inspection of Katyn Forest graves

The Katyn Forest turned out to be small unspectacular little wood, sparsely filled with young trees, the bigger ones having been apparently chopped down by the Germans. The soil was orange and very sandy.

To date the Commission has found seven graves in all — six in the general area called Goat Hill, about the size of an acre, and one more several hundred yards away. They are still looking for more graves and expect to find from twelve to fifteen thousand bodies in all.

The senior member of the Medical Committee, Burdenko, took us around each and every grave— asked that we scrutinize each detail. He willing answered every question put to him of medical bearing and was most helpful.

On the basis of a meticulous post mortem of seven hundred corpses we were given the following information.

1. The corpses were Poles — the majority enlisted men with no rank badges, but some officers. Where, as the privates ranged from twenty-five to thirty, the officers were considerably older — forty-five to fifty years.

2. The majority of the corpses were dressed in topcoats, had long underwear. Those wearing just tunics had sweaters.

3. The pockets of the uniforms had been ripped and their documents taken out — except for a few that apparently had been missed.

4. On the basis of a thorough autopsy, the doctor stated that the bodies had been in the ground about two years — certainly not four. We were told that although sandy soil in a dry climate tends to mummify bodies, the soil in Katyn is damp hence had no preservative qualities.

5. Two graves had the bodies laid out meticulously in rows three deep, the top row being about three meters from the surface. Each one of these corpses had a metal tag — (put on by the Germans when they themselves dug up the bodies in the spring of 1943). The other graves had either six or eight layers of bodies thrown in helter-skelter — the pockets of these soldiers had been ripped.

6. Each corpse bore the markings of a single wound made either by a 7.65 mm. bullet or a 9.00 mm. bullet that entered the head at the base of the skull and came out at the top of the forehead. We saw enough skulls to see that the wounds were all identical, except that a very few had received two bullet wounds instead of just one. To date no body wounds have been found.
In fact the corpses were all proclaimed to be in "good physical condition". The minority of the corpses had their hands tied. We were told that the bullets had been fired at close range from an "automatic weapon".

7. Evidence that the bodies were little more than two years old was on the basis of the following information. Some skulls still had hair, at any rate epidermis; the internal organs, though considerably flattened and shrunken, were only partly decayed; the liver and spleen green. There was still firm colored meat on the thighs.

The autopsies were conducted in heated tents by teams each headed by a qualified doctor with several assistants, including a secretary who took page long notes on each case.


Two. Evidence given by Atrocity Commission

We had two meetings with the members of the "Special Commission to Establish and Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist Invaders of Captive Polish Officers in the Katyn Wood," The first, during the afternoon, lasted three hours. We were read prepared statements and allowed to ask questions. Besides a detailed story of the sequence of events, we were told the substance of data collected from witnesses, much of which was repeated verbatim by the witnesses later on that night. Alexey Tolstoy, a member of the Commission, was of greatest assistance. Some questions we asked required
information not on hand. He had it for us by night. In the main during this session our questions were answered willingly.

Our second meeting was conducted in the same room. This time there were Klieg lights and movies and photos were taken throughout the proceedings. The Committee sat along a long table covered by red baize at one end of the room, the press were strung along a similar table down one side. Witnesses sat directly opposite the Committee and were brought in one at a time. Aside from the photographer and one stenographer, there was no one else present.

At first the Committee refused to interrupt the testimonies for translation, but when the members of the press objected they agreed with some lack of grace. During the testimony the committee chatted and whispered between themselves and most didn't appear to listen. We were told we could question any witness, through the Committee, but the questions appeared to annoy them though not apparently due to their substance. Only one question was called irrelevant and not answered — the present job of one of the witnesses. Tolstoy later gave it to us.

The witnesses themselves were very well rehearsed, and they appeared subdued rather than nervous, their pieces having been learned by heart. Only the girl had an air of self-assurance.

When the last witness had been heard general questions were asked, some of import to the Katyn Incident, others not. Shortly, however, the representatives of the Foreign Office Press Department got up and said we'd better break up as our train was due to leave shortly. I got the distinct impression that the Committee was relieved. They had been told to put on a show for us — the show was over — and they did not want to be bothered any further. The meeting broke up without any informal chatting.


3. Members of Commission

(1) N. N. Burdenko, Member of U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences.

(2) Alexei Tolstoy.

(3) Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev, Galovski and the Ukraine Republic.

(4) Lieutenant General A. S. Gunderov, Chairman of the Pan-Slav Commission.

(5) S. A. Kolesnikov, Chairman of U. S. S. R. Red Cross and Red Crescent.

(6) V. P. Potemkin, Commissar of Education of the R. S. F. S. R.

(7) Colonel General E. I. Smirnov, Chief of Central Medical Service Administration of the Red Army.

(8) R. E. Melnikov, Chairman of Smolensk Regional Executive Committee.

The above-mentioned arrived at Smolensk "a few days" after the Germans evacuated Smolensk on September 25, 1943, to look into various German atrocities committed in the Smolensk region. The Committee did not start to investigate the Katyn graves until January 16, 1944. The reason given was that they had other atrocities to investigate first. We were given no information about these other atrocities, execept the statement that 135,000 Russians and Jews had been killed in the Smolensk area. Presumably it is significant that Russians didn't think the Katyn graves were worth bothering about until after Polish-Soviet relations again became a big issue.

On January 10 the Commission's scientific experts opened up the Katyn graves, exhumed bodies and started meticulous post-mortems on each body. Simultaneously, other members of the Commission questioned witnesses of the crime and compiled the evidence of the witnesses, and documented all papers found on corpses.

As a result of the work and exhumation of 700 bodies out of an estimated total of 12,000 the Commission reach the following conclusions:

1. Between August and September 1941 the Germans killed Polish prisoners of war on Goat Hill (one area of the Katyn Forest);

2. Later in the Spring of 1943. feeling their position unstable, the Germans hastily covered up evidence of their crime;

3. For this purpose the Germans:
(a) Re-opened graves on Goat Hill.
(b) Tortured witnesses into giving evidence that the Russians murdered the Poles.
(c) Dug up other bodies of Poles murdered elsewhere and brought them to the Katyn Forest and buried them there.


4. The Commission's story

(1) Position of Polish prisoners of War Prior to German Invasion. After the Russo-Polish campaign 2,932 Polish soldiers, mostly officers, were evacuated to Siberia. The rest were put in three camps: one thirty-five kilometers West of Smolensk on the Moscow-Minsk highway, a second, twenty-five kilometers west of Smolensk on the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, and a third, forty-five kilometers West of Smolensk in the Krasnenskoye area. (This information was supplied at our asking by Tolstoy.)

The Polish prisoners of war were brought to the above camps back in 1939. They were employed by the Soviets for work on the roads and when the Russo-German war began, the Polish prisoners remained in the West Smolensk province and continued their work digging and building roads.

With a sudden tank thrust, the Germans suddenly broke through to Smolensk on July 15-16. The question immediately arose how should the Polish prisoners be evacuated. The Commission told us, and their testimony was later upheld by a witness, Ivanov, the station master of Gnezdov railway (village outside Smolensk) that in mid-July 1941 Ivanov received a phone call from the Administrator of the Polish prisoners of war camps asking that he provide empty railway cars in which to evacuate the Polish prisoners. He had none, but tried to get some from the Smolensk station. The Commission told us that railway cars could not be provided from Smolensk because that section of the railway running between Smolensk and Gnezdov was already under artillery fire. Furthermore, the Soviet Government "had to reconcile itself to the fact that even the local inhabitants could not be evacuated. So, due to artillery fire along the railway and lack of box cars, the Polish prisoners of war, along with the native population, had to remain In this district."

After the arrival of the Germans, the Poles remained in their prison camps. A number of witnesses testified (we did not hear any) that the Poles continued to do road repair work for the Germans. When autumn came, all ditches were cleared and the mud taken away. (Here It was made clear to us that there wasn't any more useful work for the Poles to do. )

We were then told that although many witnesses confirmed that for a short time the Polish prisoners remained In the Smolensk region, no witness had yet been found who saw any Pole after September 1941.

(2) How atrocity was committed: The Katyn Forest is .situated fifteen kilometers outside of Smolensk and during peacetime was the favorite Sunday pick-nicklng ground for the Smolensk population. One section of Katyn Forest is known as Goat Hill. Here the NKVD had a datcha which they used for a rest home. The Smolensk population were allowed to walk freely through the NKVD property, but when the Germans arrived the whole Katyn Forest area was surrounded by barbed wire: sentries were stationed at all road entrances and signs posted saying to the effect that any trespasser would be shot at sight. The NKVD
datcha was taken over by the Germans and used as headquarters for the 537th "Construction Battalion."

This headquarters employed three girls from the neighboring village of Borok. All three have given evidence on what happened and we heard one of the girls testify.

Thirty German officers and noncommissioned officers lived in the datcha. They got up late In the morning, ate well, etc. The servants did not live in, but were escorted to and from the main road by guards and were not allowed to clean the bedrooms except when a guard was present.

We heard one girl testify (Anna Mlhailovna Alexeyeva) that towards the end of August 1941 she and the other girls noted that often opened and closed cars and trucks could be heard turning off the highway at the Goat Hill entrance. When this happened invariably the Germans in the datcha would go out into the woods. About ten minutes later single shots, fired at regular Intervals, would be heard. When the shots ceased the officers, accompanied by German noncommissioned officers and enlisted men driving empty trucks, would return to the datcha. Always on these days the bath house water was heated. The men went directly to the baths and returned to be served a "particularly tasty meal" plus double the usual hard liquor ration. The girl said on these days the soldiers seemed noisier than usual and talked more. Once Alexeyeva was asked to wash off fresh blood from one of the noncommissioned officers' sleeves.

We were told that "the girls guessed without difficulty that the Germans living in the datcha were engaged in killing." The Commission asked witness Alexeyeva how she guessed it was Poles, not Russians, who were being killed. She answered readily that one day she was ordered to return home early even though her work was not yet finished. She was escorted to the main Smolensk-Vitebsk road as usual. En route to her village she noticed some German sentries and Polish prisoners walking along the highway. She recognized the Poles by their characteristic cap. The group turned off at the Goat Hill entrance. Alexeyeva hid in the bushes and waited and soon heard the familiar shots, one after another.

Another day one girl heard noises near the datcha and looked out and saw two Poles hovering around under guard. She was ordered back into the kitchen, but her "feminine curiosity" got the best of her. She went back to the window and saw the Poles were being led away into the woods. Soon after two single shots were heard.

Alexeyeva said that walking down the side road to the highway each day she frequently noticed German soldiers digging sand heaps. These grew as time went on. Once she asked her sentry what was going on. The reply was, "we are digging dugouts." The Commission was asked to ask Alexeyeva if she ever noticed any odd smell around Goat Hill and she said "no."

During this whole period the Germans were combing the countryside for Poles — tracking them down. We were told that numerous inhabitants have confirmed these searches. In particular, the Metropolitan told us about the statement of one Father Oblobin, priest at Kuprino, a village in the neighborhood of Katyn Forest. Prior to the German invasion he had been priest at the village of Katyn, but the Germans tore down his house and he moved to Kuprino. The Metropolitan told us that Oblobin was able to give particularly valuable information due to his contact with his parishioners. Oblobin had told him that during August 1941 there was much talk among the parishioners about the Poles. Many people reported seeing groups of twenty to thirty being taken into the Katyn Forest. During 1942 Polish prisoners of war were not mentioned; but in the Spring of 1943 Poles again became a current subject of talk.

Aside from information obtained from the girls working in the datcha and the peasants living nearby, the Commission told us that they had received further evidence of the Germans' actions from the assistant burgomaster, Boris Bazilevsky.

We heard Bazilevsky testify. Prior to the German invasion he had been a professor of astronomy in Smolensk. He had been asked by the traitor burgomaster, Menshagin, to serve as his assistant. He protested on grounds that he knew nothing about civil affairs, but on being threatened with death if he refused, he took the job and held it from July 1941 until October 1942, hoping thereby "to be able to help the plight of the local population in some ways."

Once he approached Burgomaster Menshagin with the request to help get a local school teacher out of concentration camp, also to try to improve general conditions in camps as epidemics were starting and there was fear that soon the entire population might become infected. Menshagin reluctantly agreed. A few days later, mid-September 1941, he informed Bazilevsky that von Schwetz, head of the German Gestapo in Smolensk, had turned down his request on the grounds that he, von Schwetz, had received word from Berlin demanding that harsher treatment be given in the Smolensk concentration camps. Bazilevsky asked Menshagin if he figured that was possible — to make things any tougher than they already were — to which Menshagin replied "yes". Then confidentially he whispered in Bazilevsky's ear that things were going to be made tougher for the Russian prisoners so that they would die a natural death due to exposure, disease, etc., but that the Polish prisoners were going to be liquidated * * * liquidated in the most precise and literal meaning of the word * * * Some days lifter this meeting in the beginning of October 1941 Menshagin told Bazilevsky that the directive about the Poles had been carried out, that they had been shot in the neighborhood of Smolensk.

Bazilevsky relayed this information to his close friend, Professor Yefimov. Yefimov, we were told, upholds Bazilevsky's story. As Menshagin left Smolensk with the Germans his testimony was not available.

Aside 'from this verbal testimony the Commission told us they had some written evidence- in the form of Menshagin's personal notebook. (We were shown a photostatic copy of the crucial pages of this notebook) A committee of experts had confirmed that these notes were in Menshagin's own handwriting.

An insert dated August 15, 1941, said "all escaped Polish prisoners of war should be detained and turned over to the German headquarters." A few pages further on was an annotation to remember to ask the chief of the Russian police "if there are any rumors circulating among the population about the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war." The Commission stressed to us the significance of this note, that the Germans must have been worried about talk among the villagers of the atrocity, which apparently they wanted to keep secret.

The Commission told us that they had wanted to get information on the motive of the crime. Here again Bazilevsky proved useful. He told us about a "very candid" conversation between himself and the Gestapo chief in which the latter had told him that "the Poles are harmful people and inferior, therefore, the Polish population can serve usefully only as manure and so create space for the widening of the Leibensraum of the Germans." The Gestapo chief went on to tell him that no intellectual class had been left in Poland itself.

We were later told that other reasons for the German mass killing of the Poles was due to the tendency of Poles to go over to the Red Army.

From September 1941 on until the spring of 1943 all discussion of Polish prisoners stopped.

The Metropolitan quoted Father Oblobin (priest of nearby village) as saying that beginning in 1943 there was a marked nervousness amongst the Germans and an increase in their harshness. He pointed out that this general change of atmosphere for the worse coincided with the end of the battle of Stalingrad. Oblobin believed that the Germans spread rumors of the Russian mass killing of Poles so as to try and strengthen their position among the local population.

In the spring of 1943 the Germans published stories in the three quisling local papers telling of the murder of Poles at Katyn during March and April 1940, by the NKVD. The Commission told us that they had interviewed the stenographer who had typed the articles.

Next the Germans searched out witnesses to confirm their story. We saw three men who had been questioned and beaten by the Gestapo, one of whom was the Gnezdov station master, the two others peasants. All three were tortured into signing documents, the contents of which they did not understand.

Failing to get any direct information from the local population, the Germans next issued a poster (we saw a photostat of it) written in grammatically incorrect Russian saying the following: "Who can give testimony on the mass murder of the Bolsheviks against Polish prisoners and members of the clergy? Who saw the Polish prisoners of war in Goat Hill adjoining the Katyn highway? Who observed Poles going from Gnezdov to Goat Hill? Who saw or heard the shots fired? Who knows members of the population, who can testify? Every bit
of information will be rewarded. Send information to German Police Headquarters in Smolensk and Gnezdov." The poster was dated May 3, 1943 and signed by an officer of the German police. The Commission told us that the Germans, failing to get the needed information, then began the work of setting up the proper "stage scenery" on Goat Hill. First, they set about the gruesome work of digging up Polish corpses. From concentration camp No. 126 they imported 500 Red_Army prisoners of war to do the work, and when the work was completed the Soviet prisoners of war were marched away to be shot. One managed to escape and sought shelter in the house of citizen Moskovskaya. Though the Gestapo later found him, she had full details of the story which the Commission gave us.

It goes as follows. Not only did the Germans dig up the Polish bodies in the Katyn Forest, but by night they imported in big tarpaulin-covered German trucks bodies of Poles that they had massacred elsewhere at the Kozelsky Camp (in the South Smolensk Province) and from the Starobelsky Camp (in the Ukraine between 200 to 250 kilometers from Smolensk). We were told that a number of witnesses confirmed the story of trucks coming into the Goat Hill, their load identified by the unmistakeable stench.

As they were dug up, the Germans tagged each corpse with a metal number, slit open the pockets and removed all papers they could find that bore dates later than March and April 1940 and looted the pockets of any money and valuables. They imported a corpse specialist called "Butz" from Berlin to make an investigation and to prove scientifically that the bodies found were buried in the Spring of 1940.

The German authorities organized compulsory excursions to Goat Hill, so that the local Smolensk population could see for themselves. Among the visitors was Zubkov, a Soviet doctor, whom we saw. Zubkov testified that, as a pathological anatomist, he could rightly say that at that time none of the bodies could possibly be more than a year and a half old. The Commission stressed Zubkov's statement to us that to his knowledge the (Germans conducted no autopsies, that the German specialist Butz was not interested in conducting a scientific investigation — loot from the pockets of the dead was what he was after, and dated documents that would compromise the German story. It took Butz three months to accomplish his task.

3. Documents found on the Polish Corpses: The final act of the Germans was to route out and either kill or deport any person who might have information proving the whole Polish incident was a fake. They caught all but a few of the men they had beaten into signing false evidence and the three girls who had been servants at the Goat Hill datcha.

Despite the thoroughness of the pocket ripping by the Germans, out of the seven hundred corpses the Commission have so far investigated. 146 items have been found. The earliest date was found on a postcard — March 1940 — and the latest — an unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. We were shown all these documents and trinkets and the most important and significant ones were translated for us. They included letters from Warsaw and Moscow dated in the winter of 1940, receipts for valuables dated in the Spring of 1941 and numerous newspaper clippings dated from early 1940. through early 1941. In particular we were shown documents with communist leanings. The Commission inferred that the Polish prisoners of war had pro-Soviet rather than pro-German leanings.




& from the same:


The Katyn Forest Massacre: hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, second session, on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, Part 7 – June 3, 4 and November 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952, p2138-2141 posted:

Report Written by Mr. John Melby After Visiting Katyn in January 1944

{Enclosure No. 1 to Despatcli No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow}

Trip to Smolensk and the Katyn Forest, January 21-23, 1944

We left Moscow, in company with seventeen newspaper men and including Czech, Polish, and Spanish newsmen, at 4:00 p.m., January 21, for Smolensk on a special train which had been put at the disposal of the party. We were the first foreigners to visit Smolensk since its occupation by the Russians on September 25, 1943. We did not arrive in Smolensk until 10:00 a.m. the following morning, 220 kilometers from Moscow, presumably because military traffic had the right of way on the railroad. Since most of the trip was made by dark there was small opportunity to observe along the way. During the daylight hours little rolling stock was seen on the sidings and almost no military supplies along the single-track line. We saw only one troop train of a dozen boxcars, dirty and with straw covering the floor. The troops appeared to be work battalions rather than line troops. Outside Smolensk there were some seventy-five boxcars and three locomotives which had been turned off the track and burned. The closer we came to Smolensk the more evidence there was of
destroyed buildings and blown-up bridges. Almost none of the buildings had been replaced and generally only enough bridges to supply one or two lines of traffic in the railroad yards. The railroad yards in Smolensk itself were a complete shambles, only enough having been rebuilt to keep operations along.

We were met in Smolensk by the Secretary of the Special Commission to Establish and Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist Invaders of Captive Polish Officers in the Katyn Woods. He took us first on a short tour of the city to witness the damage. The first thing noticeable was that every bridge over the Dnieper had been destroyed, the only crossing point for road and motor traffic being one temporary wooden structure. The railroad does not cross the river at this point. In the city it is difficult to find a structure which has not been damaged. Most of the destruction seems to have been caused by demolition, and there was little evidence of fire. The city once
contained 7,900 buildings. There now remain 300, of which only 64 are stone structures, the rest being one-story wooden houses. The remaining population lives in the cellars of the wrecked buildings. The Lenin Library is a total loss, and the books were either burned or removed by the Germans. According to official figures, the population of Smolensk is now about 30,000 as compared with a prewar figure of 185,000. In and around Smolensk the Germans are alleged to have massacred 135,000 Russians.

After the tour of the city we were taken out to the Katyn Forest, some fifteen kilometers west of Smolensk on the Vitebsk highway. We were met there by a battery of movie cameras and the surgeon who is in charge of the exhumations of Polish bodies and the postmortems. He told us that 700 bodies have already been exhumed from seven graves and that there are perhaps a total of twelve to fifteen thousand. This is pure estimate. The six graves on which the most work has been done are approximately twenty-five feet square and vary in depth from three to ten feet. In two of them the bodies are laid out in rows; in the others they are simply piled in. As each body is exhumed it is taken to a tent for examination, approximately 120 bodies being examined daily by eleven crews. After examination the bodies are laid in rows in a field which we inspected. Despite the freezing temperature, there was no doubt they had been dead a long time.

Every one of the bodies seen wore a Polish Army uniform, a preponderance being uniforms of enlisted men. Each one had a warm topcoat or heavy underwear. All pockets had been ripped open prior to exhumation by the Russians, but a wide selection of documents and miscellaneous items are being found which were missed in the previous searching by the Germans. All items found are taken to Smolensk for examination and classification. Every skull we saw contained a bullet hole at the base of the skull and a second one just above the forehead. The holes were made by bullets varying from 7.6 mm. to 9.5 mm. On the skulls where skin or hair is left powder burns are in evidence. The brain, flesh, and organs of each body are also examined. The doctor in charge said that the state of decomposition proves the men cannot have been dead much more than two years. A number of the bodies had small, rectangular metal clips attached to the lapel of their overcoats, bearing only numbers. The highest number seen was 2032. These were on the bodies said to have been exhumed by the Germans in 1943.

We were later taken to see the dacha which was used as headquarters by the German occupation forces in the forest. It had previously been an NKVD rest home. It lies about a quarter of a mile from the graves and beyond the road, overlooking the river. It was completely destroyed by the Germans when they withdrew.

During the afternoon the Commission held a press conference at which one member, V. P. Potemkin, read a previously prepared statement. Its principal points were as follows: The Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities in Smolensk arrived in the city shortly after its capture from the Germans on September 25, 1943. Experts started to work on the Katyn Forest murders on January 16, 1944. After the occupation by Russia in 1939 of Eastern part of Poland several camps of Polish prisoners of war were established to the West of Smolensk. These prisoners were used on road construction work, officers included. In July 1941. the Germans suddenly broke through the line at Smolensk and enveloped the city. It had been planned to evacuate the Poles to the West and a requisition was put in for a train to do so. This request was refused because of the shortage of trains to move even the civilian population of Smolensk. In any event, the Germans were already shelling the railroad.

After the occupation the German 537th Construction Battalion moved into Katyn and put a wire fence around it. Three Russian girls were put to work cleaning the dacha which was used as headquarters. They were constantly under sentry guard. In August 1941, according to the testimony of one of them, Andreeva, they frequently heard trucks coming into the forest. The officers quartered in the dacha would then go out. Shortly after the girls heard single shots at regular intervals. The trucks would leave and the
officers would return, noisy and excited. One time one of the girls noticed blood on an officer's tunic. Another time one of the girls saw two Polish soldiers outside the window. They were led into the forest by Germans. Shortly thereafter she heard shots. Still another time one of the girls while walking down the road saw a group of men approaching. She hid in the bushes and saw they were a group of Poles who were led into the forest. Later she heard shots. All during August and September 1941, Poles were rounded up from the countryside. After the end of September 1941, no one saw any more
Poles.

The above statements are further corroborated, according to the Commission, by other testimony. The traitor B. G. Menshagin, a lawyer, was in close communication as occupation mayor of the town, with the German commander in Smolensk, and was assisted by B. V. Bazilevski, formerly director of the Smolensk Observatory. In August Menshagin told Bazilevski that orders a received "to liquidate Polish prisoners." He added that the Russian prisoners would die of "natural causes." Sometime later he said the orders had been carried out. He is reported to have given the same information to other persons.
When Menshagin was later evacuated with the Germans he left behind him his notebook. His handwriting has been verified. An entry of August 15, 1941, states that orders had been issued for all detailed Poles to be turned over to the German authorities. Subsequent entries state that execution orders had been carried out.

With reference to the motive for these executions, Bazilevski testified he had been told by Hirschfeld of the SD that it is "an historical fact the Poles are an inferior race and hence it is a good act to kill them." He added that all Polish intellectuals had been killed.

Father Alexander Oslobin, of the parish of Katyn, testified according to Potemkin, that his parishioners had talked in 1941 of the events in the forest. During 1942 there was no talk. Then it started again in the early part of 1943 at a time when the Germans were exhibiting great nervousness and greater harshness of treatment toward the Russians. The first public notice was in the spring of that year when the local German paper printed a story that the NKVD had murdered Polish officers in Katyn during March and April of 1940. This same story was reeprinted in three other papers at the same time and was designed to improve the position of the Germans. The Germans then began searching for witnesses to substantiate their statements, using torture to obtain what they wanted. When the Germans evacuated they tried to take with them or destroy all witnesses they had used. To strengthen their case further they opened some of the graves, using 500 Russian prisoners from concentration camp No. 126 for labor. Once the job was done the Russians were in turn killed, except for one who managed to escape in the melee. He was sheltered by an old peasant woman, Moskovskaya, to whom he told the above story before he was recaptured
and executed himself. During the exhumation the Germans removed all documents from the bodies, especially those dated later than April 1940. They did, however, overlook some, including one unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. Before closing up the graves the Germans brought to Katyn the bodies of other Poles from other graves and camps in order to concentrate in one spot all the alleged atrocities by the Russians. And finally, in March 1943, the Germans organized compulsory excursions of the local citizenry to the graves before they were again closed.

Potemkin then stated the conclusions of the Commission:

1. During August and September 1941, the Germans killed in the Katyn Forest all Poles in the vicinity of Smolensk.

2. Feeling their position insecure in 1943 they attempted to blame the incident on the Russians.

3. To implement this position the Germans opened the graves, searched the bodies, sought witnesses for their case, and added bodies from elsewhere to those in Katyn.

In answer to a question, it was stated that prior to August, 1941, there were three camps of Polish prisoners: Camp No. 1 was thirty-five kilometers West of Smolensk on the Minsk highway, containing 2,932 Poles who were sent to Siberia finally; Camp No. 2, twenty-five kilometers West of Smolensk on the Vitebsk highway; and Camp No. 3, thirty-five kilometers West of Smolensk.

We were then taken to inspect the collection of miscellaneous items taken from the pockets of the Polish soldiers. This collection consisted of letters, books, newspapers, personal items, money. We wore also shown eleven twenty United States dollar gold pieces, one fifty dollar note, and numerous dollar bills. A major portion of the dated evidence, such as letters and newspapers was prior to or during March and April 1940 and included a copy of Izvestiya of Apiil 11, 1940. There were, however, letters bearing Moscow postmarks as late as June 1941.

During the evening the Commission held a session devoted to questioning the witnesses whose testimony had earlier boon summarized by Potemkin. It soon became apparent that the session was staged for the benefit of the correspondents and that the witnesses were merely repeating stories they had already given the Commission. The show was staged under hot and blinding klieg lights and motion picture cameras. In all, five witnesses were produced who added nothing to what had been said at the press conference. Attempts by the correspondents to question the witnesses were discouraged, and finally permitted reluctantly only through the members of the Commission. All witnesses were shunted out of the ro{om as quickl?}y as possiWe upon finishing their statement. There was also an argu{ment abou?}t translation of the testimony, this finally being agreed to.

The {???}tness told how he had been forced to turn evidence for the Germans in 1943{???} second, Alexeyeva, told of her work in the dacha; the third, Bazilevsky, rec{ounte?}d his association as assistant burgomaster; the fourth, Zukhov, an expert in {“c?}riminal medicine," told of his "excursion" to the forest in the spring of 1943 and his belief that the bodies could not have been three years old; the fifth, Ivanov, the local station master who had been unable to supply a requisition of forty cars to move the Poles in 1941, told of conditions during the German break-through and of being forced to give evidence for the Germans in 1943.

All the statements were glibly given, as though by rote. Under questioning the witnesses became hesitant and stumbled, until they were dismissed by the Commission. Bazilevsky was ludicrous when one correspondent asked him why he was now so excited by the murder of 10,000 Poles when he also knew that 135,000 Russians had been killed in the same area, and he answered that the Poles were prisoners of war and it was an outrageous violation of international law for them to be massacred.

The atmosphere at the session grew progressively tense as the correspondents asked one pointed and usually rude question after another. At midnight it was announced abruptly that our train would leave in one hour. Just before the meeting broke up Alexei Tolstoy, a member of the Commission, who had apparently sensed that matters were not going well and who has had the most foreign contacts of anyone on the Commission, produced answers to several questions which had earlier been passed over. The members of the Commission
were hasty and formal with us in their farewells, and the earlier atmosphere of at least semicordiality had disappeared.

The Polish correspondent who accompanied us, and who slept noisily through most of the press conference, a captain in the Polish Army and the editor of Wolna Polska under Wanda Wasilevska, told me that the present investigation has no interest for the Poles in Russia since it is obvious that the Germans committed the crimes and that therefore it is pure "political provocation" on the part of the Russians. Certainly the members of the Commission were not at all pleased when leading questions were asked. On the return trip the Foreign Office officials who accompanied us were almost unduly anxious on the return
trip to be assured that we were convinced. It is apparent that the evidence in the Russian case is incomplete in several respects, that it is badly put together, and that the show was put on for the benefit of the correspondents without opportunity for independent investigation or verification. On balance, however, and despite loopholes the Russian case is convincing.



cleaned by me, from here: https://archive.org/stream/katynforestmassa07unit/katynforestmassa07unit_djvu.txt
Originals: https://ia601406.us.archive.org/31/items/katynforestmassa07unit/katynforestmassa07unit.pdf




in conclusion:

#560
I'm still digging through the primary source but that specific phrase was

Stalin: /z odcieniem ironii/ Widze, źo Anglicy potrzebują dobrego wojska
Stalin: (with a shade of irony) I can see that <the> English need good soldiers.

Regarding "feigned extreme surprise," this addition is not in the primary source document. It was written down simply as

Stalin: To jest niemożliwe, oni uciekli.
Stalin: That is impossible, they fled.

So obviously the author was doing some creative interpretation of the scene. Ambassador Kot has shown no reluctance (from what I can tell) in transcribing pertinent non-verbal information so inserting "feigned extreme surprise" is an obvious dramatization.

Edited by your_not_aleksandr ()