RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
To kick the speculation train off:
"Iran is on the march,” Sen. John S. McCain (R-Ariz.) warned last week . “In Yemen, it's not AQAP that's taken over the government, it's the Houthis.” McCain said the solution was “more boots on the ground” — not a U.S. invasion force, but special operations forces.
Obama administration officials insist that those fears are overblown. The Houthis “get support from Iran, but they're not controlled by Iran,” one official told me last week.
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-yemen-houthis-20150208-column.html
Language that this restraint is not typically used when talking about Hezbollah (though it may very well be true that the extant of Iranian involvement is limited).
Notable also how little the talk of "supporting partners" was backed up in the case of Hadi:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/01/20/four-months-ago-obama-called-yemens-war-on-terror-a-success-now-the-yemeni-government-may-fall/
All of this makes sense when one bears in mind that Houthis rebel faction has been considered a legitimate political faction by Washington for awhile now
"Mubarak responded next that both the Houthis’ resort to arms and struggle against al-Qaeda had dangerous implications. Both Al-Eryani and Mubarak expressed frustration that the Houthis would not nominate official candidates for government positions but instead opted for informal influence. Mubarak said that the Houthis “want the power without the responsibility” of governance. He warned that the Houthi use of force to achieve political aims is unacceptable, and fighting Sunni extremists raises the possibility of inflaming sectarian tensions throughout the country.
In response to the narrative al-Emad presented—that the Houthis have largely acted in a defensive posture—Mubarak said that the Houthis’ rise has caused much of the instability in the country and that Houthi action against Islah or Salafist forces started just one month after the completion of the National Dialogue. Since September, the Houthis have intensified their activity and they are destabilizing the country by fighting tribesmen who are already anxious at the prospect of losing some of the benefits of a centralized state."
A movement which is both committed to fighting the war on the terror as a local ground force in a direction that Washington approves of and which at the same time is opposed to strengthening the power of the state in the favor of regional and tribal interests. Its not surprising in the least that the US seems to be friendly towards them at the moment. Not to mention the usefulness of regime change effected by such forces in Yemen in terms of keeping the GCC nations on their toes.
"Iran is on the march,” Sen. John S. McCain (R-Ariz.) warned last week . “In Yemen, it's not AQAP that's taken over the government, it's the Houthis.” McCain said the solution was “more boots on the ground” — not a U.S. invasion force, but special operations forces.
Obama administration officials insist that those fears are overblown. The Houthis “get support from Iran, but they're not controlled by Iran,” one official told me last week.
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-yemen-houthis-20150208-column.html
Language that this restraint is not typically used when talking about Hezbollah (though it may very well be true that the extant of Iranian involvement is limited).
Notable also how little the talk of "supporting partners" was backed up in the case of Hadi:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/01/20/four-months-ago-obama-called-yemens-war-on-terror-a-success-now-the-yemeni-government-may-fall/
All of this makes sense when one bears in mind that Houthis rebel faction has been considered a legitimate political faction by Washington for awhile now
"Mubarak responded next that both the Houthis’ resort to arms and struggle against al-Qaeda had dangerous implications. Both Al-Eryani and Mubarak expressed frustration that the Houthis would not nominate official candidates for government positions but instead opted for informal influence. Mubarak said that the Houthis “want the power without the responsibility” of governance. He warned that the Houthi use of force to achieve political aims is unacceptable, and fighting Sunni extremists raises the possibility of inflaming sectarian tensions throughout the country.
In response to the narrative al-Emad presented—that the Houthis have largely acted in a defensive posture—Mubarak said that the Houthis’ rise has caused much of the instability in the country and that Houthi action against Islah or Salafist forces started just one month after the completion of the National Dialogue. Since September, the Houthis have intensified their activity and they are destabilizing the country by fighting tribesmen who are already anxious at the prospect of losing some of the benefits of a centralized state."
A movement which is both committed to fighting the war on the terror as a local ground force in a direction that Washington approves of and which at the same time is opposed to strengthening the power of the state in the favor of regional and tribal interests. Its not surprising in the least that the US seems to be friendly towards them at the moment. Not to mention the usefulness of regime change effected by such forces in Yemen in terms of keeping the GCC nations on their toes.
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
~
My sympathies in that roundtable discussion, btw, were with the octogenarian GPC loyalist:
"Reflecting on how Yemen will move forward, al-Eryani affirmed that the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes and the GCC initiative still serve as a roadmap for Yemen—despite the Houthi incursion into Sana’a and elsewhere. He also advocated that all parties should strive to create the federal system agreed upon at the conclusion of the Dialogue and focus on producing a new constitution enshrining those principles. However, al-Eryani wryly noted that Yemen’s political environment is challenging, and with a knowing smile, he remarked that “as a prominent member in the General People’s Congress, some wings of party are making life difficult for me,” presumably referring to the ongoing influence of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and efforts to oust al-Eryani from GPC party leadership.
Perhaps most notably, al-Eryani was direct and candid about his discomfort with the Houthi movement’s tactics, describing them as a “non-civic, political movement that resorts to military means to advance their aims” and described their “objectives as undefined and unlimited.” Responding to the notion that the Houthis are in a defensive, rather than offensive, posture al-Eryani said that the Houthis have more heavy weapons and artillery at this point than the Yemeni army. According to the September 21 Peace and Partnership agreement, the Houthis were supposed to return all heavy arms to the government, but they have yet to do so. For al-Eryani, this fundamental gap calls into question their true aims and their desire for a political solution. In his view, so long as the group’s political objectives remain unclear, a political solution will be difficult to obtain."
Dr. Ahmed Bin Mubarak, by contrast, was playing the chump:
"Dr. Mubarak was more conciliatory and acknowledged that the Houthis had played a very positive role in the National Dialogue..."
"Reflecting on how Yemen will move forward, al-Eryani affirmed that the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes and the GCC initiative still serve as a roadmap for Yemen—despite the Houthi incursion into Sana’a and elsewhere. He also advocated that all parties should strive to create the federal system agreed upon at the conclusion of the Dialogue and focus on producing a new constitution enshrining those principles. However, al-Eryani wryly noted that Yemen’s political environment is challenging, and with a knowing smile, he remarked that “as a prominent member in the General People’s Congress, some wings of party are making life difficult for me,” presumably referring to the ongoing influence of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and efforts to oust al-Eryani from GPC party leadership.
Perhaps most notably, al-Eryani was direct and candid about his discomfort with the Houthi movement’s tactics, describing them as a “non-civic, political movement that resorts to military means to advance their aims” and described their “objectives as undefined and unlimited.” Responding to the notion that the Houthis are in a defensive, rather than offensive, posture al-Eryani said that the Houthis have more heavy weapons and artillery at this point than the Yemeni army. According to the September 21 Peace and Partnership agreement, the Houthis were supposed to return all heavy arms to the government, but they have yet to do so. For al-Eryani, this fundamental gap calls into question their true aims and their desire for a political solution. In his view, so long as the group’s political objectives remain unclear, a political solution will be difficult to obtain."
Dr. Ahmed Bin Mubarak, by contrast, was playing the chump:
"Dr. Mubarak was more conciliatory and acknowledged that the Houthis had played a very positive role in the National Dialogue..."
Edited by RedMaistre ()
NoamTrotsky
NoamTrotsky
Post rating:
~
Women Singer-Songwriters in Rock: A Populist Rebellion in the 1990s (Google eBook)
cars
cars
UNUSUALY COOL
Post rating:
+
RedMaistre posted:not a U.S. invasion force, but special operations forces
catchphrase
gyrofry
gyrofry
Kurdt
Post rating:
+
finally a mali thread. thank u
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
~
"Yemen's ousted President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi has accused the Houthi militia that seized power last month of staging a coup.
In his first statement since escaping house arrest in the capital Sanaa, Mr Hadi said all measures taken by the Houthis were "null and illegitimate".
Speaking from his political stronghold in the southern city of Aden, he said he was still the president.
He called upon world powers
to reject the coup'."
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31564933
In his first statement since escaping house arrest in the capital Sanaa, Mr Hadi said all measures taken by the Houthis were "null and illegitimate".
Speaking from his political stronghold in the southern city of Aden, he said he was still the president.
He called upon world powers
to reject the coup'."
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31564933
xipe
xipe
Post rating:
+
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/yemen-s-collapse-taste-things-come-456530551
Yemen is on the brink of civil war. The collapse of the US-backed government in the 2,500 year old capital city, Sanaa, and the takeover by Shiite Houthi rebels from the north, has left the country in turmoil, amidst the threat of yet another regional conflagration along sectarian lines.
Britain, the United States and France have already closed down their embassies, but less clear is how they can respond to a crisis that looks ready to spiral out of control.
The war pundits have been out in force offering all manner of stale recommendations, largely rehashed from the last decade of failed counter-terrorism policies.
We are running out of options, but the reason for this is more nuanced than some might assume.
The core drivers of state failure in Yemen are neither Islamists, al-Qaeda jihadists, nor Houthis: they are structural, systemic, and ultimately, civilisational.
Welcome to the post-oil future
Yemen’s story is one of protracted, inexorable collapse. Around 2001, Yemen’s oil production reached its peak, since then declining from 450,000 barrels per day (bbd), to 259,000 bbd in 2010, and as of last year hitting 100,000 bbd. Production is expected to plummet to zero in two years.
This has led to a drastic decline in Yemen’s oil exports, which has eaten into government revenues, 75 percent of which depend on oil exports. Oil revenues also account for 90 percent of the government’s foreign exchange reserves. The decline in post-peak Yemen revenues has reduced the government’s capacity to sustain even basic social investments.
Things are looking bad now: but when the oil runs out, with no planning or investment in generating another meaningful source of government revenue, the capacity to sustain a viable state-structure will completely collapse.
Water woes
It’s not just oil that’s disappearing in Yemen: it’s water. Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world. In 2012, the average Yemeni had access to just 140 cubic metres of water a year for all uses, compared to the regional average of less than 1,000 cubic metres – which is still well below adequate levels. Now in 2015, Yemenis have as little as 86 cubic metres of renewable water sources left per person per year.
The water situation in Yemen today is catastrophic by any reasonable standard. In many cities people have only sporadic access to running water every other week or so. In coming years, Sana’a could become the first capital in the world to effectively run out of water.
Climate change has already played a role in aggravating regional water scarcity. From 1974 to 2004, the Arab world experienced rises in surface air temperature ranging from 0.2 to 2 degrees Celsius (C). Forecasting models generally project a hotter, drier, less predictable climate that could produce a 20-30 percent drop in water run-off in the region by 2050, mainly due to rising temperatures and lower precipitation.
According to the World Bank, while “climate change-induced alterations of rainfall” have worsened Yemen’s aridity, this has been compounded by the rapid growth in demand due to the “extension and intensification of agriculture; and fast growth in urban centres.”
Demographic disaster
At about 25 million people, Yemen has a relatively small population. But its rate of growth is exorbitantly high. More than half the population is under the age of 18, and by mid-century its size is expected to nearly double.
Last year, at a conference organised jointly by the National Population Council in Sanaa and the UN Population Fund, experts and officials warned that within the next decade, these demographic trends would demolish the government’s ability to meet the population’s basic needs in education, health and other essential public services.
But that warning is transpiring now. Over half the Yemeni population live below the poverty line, and unemployment is at 40 percent generally, and 60 percent for young people. Meanwhile, as these crises have fuelled ongoing conflicts throughout the country, the resulting humanitarian crisis has affected some 15 million people.
A major impact of the high rate of population growth has been in the expansion of qat cultivation. With few economic opportunities, increasing numbers of Yemenis have turned to growing and selling the mild narcotic, which has accelerated water use to around 3.9 billion cubic metres (bcm), against a renewable supply of just 2.5 bcm.
The 1.4 bcm shortfall is being met by pumping water from underground water reserves. As these run dry, social tensions, local conflicts and even mass displacements are exacerbated, feeding into the dynamics of the wider sectarian and political conflicts between the government, the Houthis, southern separatists and al-Qaeda affiliated militants.
This has also undermined food security. As around 40 percent of Yemen’s irrigated areas are devoted to qat, rain-fed agriculture has dropped by about 30 percent since 1970.
Like many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Yemen has thus become evermore dependent on food imports, and its economy increasingly vulnerable to global food price volatility. The country now imports over 85 percent of its food, including 90 percent of its wheat and all of its rice.
Between 2000 and 2008, the year of the global banking collapse, global food prices rose by 75 percent, and wheat in particular by 200 percent. Since then, food prices have fluctuated, but remained high.
But rampant poverty means most Yemenis simply cannot afford these prices. In 2005, the World Bank estimated that Yemeni families spend an average of between 55 and 70 percent of their incomes just on trying to obtain food, water and energy. And while 40 percent of Yemeni households have got into food-related debt as a result, most Yemenis are still hungry, with the rate of chronic malnutrition as high as 58 percent, second only to Afghanistan.
Slow collapse
For more than the last decade, then, Yemen has faced a convergence of energy, water and food crises intensified by climate change, accelerating the country’s economic crisis in the form of ballooning debt, widening inequalities, and the crumbling of basic public services.
Epidemic levels of government corruption, contributing to endemic levels of government mismanagement and incompetence, have meant that what little revenues the government has acquired have mostly disappeared into Swiss bank accounts. Meanwhile, much-needed investments in new social programs, development of non-oil resources, and infrastructure improvements have languished.
With revenues plummeting in the wake of the collapse of its oil industry, the government has been forced to slash subsidies while cranking up fuel and diesel prices. This has, in turn, cranked up prices of water, meat, fruits, vegetables and spices, leading to food riots.
There can be no doubt, then, that the rise of violent and separatist movements across Yemen, including the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has been largely enabled by the protracted collapse of the Yemeni state. That process of collapse has been driven primarily by trends that are at play across the world: the peak of conventional oil production, intensifying extreme weather events due to climate change, the impacts on water and food scarcity, and deepening economic crisis.
As the government has failed to deliver even the most basic goods and services, it has lost legitimacy - and the vacuum left behind has been exploited by militants.
The ‘war’ on starved, thirsty, and unemployed Yemenis
The US “war on terror” in Yemen is thus an ideal case study in failure: the failure of the “war on terror” as a strategy; the failure of the Yemeni state; the failure of neoliberal economic prescriptions; and, ultimately, the naval-gazing failure to understand how and why we are failing.
For the last few decades, successive US administrations have subsidised these failures by propping up corrupt, authoritarian regimes. Instead of recognising the fundamental drivers of state collapse, the approach has been to deal with the surface symptoms by propping up the police and military powers of a doomed and illegitimate state-structure.
The previous government of Abdullah Saleh was effectively toppled under popular protests in 2011, which forced Saleh to hand over the reigns of power to his vice president, Mansour Hadi. But Saleh, now blacklisted by Washington for sponsoring “terrorism” and “destabilising” Yemen by conspiring with the Houthis, was a staunch US ally, who even voluntarily took the blame for US drone strikes in the country, which have killed large numbers of civilians.
Saleh saw his main task as consolidating state coffers at the expense of the rest of Yemen, and deploying overwhelming indiscriminate military force to put down popular rebellions.
Throughout his rule, Saleh was supported by tens of millions of dollars in US aid annually – which reached a height of $176 million for military training and counter-terrorism assistance in 2010.
Yet as documented by groups like Human Rights Watch (HRW), US military aid was used to ruthlessly crush secessionist and opposition movements. Massive aerial bombardment and artillery shelling regularly inflicted consistently “high civilian casualties,” according to HRW. Government forces routinely opened fire on unarmed protestors years before 2011, usually “without warning” and from short-range.
Why do our friends love al-Qaeda?
Our blossoming love affair with Saleh was justified by the need to fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which of course recently claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris.
But Saleh’s regime had harboured al-Qaeda terrorists for decades, and largely with US knowledge. Since 1996 at latest, the National Security Agency (NSA) had been intercepting all of Osama bin Laden’s communications with his al-Qaeda operations hub in Yemen, based in Sanaa, which functioned as a logistics base to coordinate terrorist attacks around the world, including the US embassy bombings in East Africa and the bombing of the USS Cole.
But much of this terrorist activity also occurred under the patronage of the Saleh regime, as candidly described by a US Congressional Research Service report in 2010. The report explains how in 1994, “President Saleh dispatched several brigades of ‘Arab Afghans’ to fight against southern late secessionists,” with US backing. In the same period, al-Qaeda linked militants “began striking targets inside the country.”
Despite this, the Congressional report points out that “Yemen continues to harbor a number of al-Qaeda operatives and has refused to extradite several known militants on the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists” – including people who had been convicted of targeting Yemeni oil installations.
Former FBI special agent Ali Soufan said: “If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally. Until it does, US aid to Yemen should be reevaluated. It will be impossible to defeat al-Qaeda if our ‘allies’ are freeing the convicted murderers of US citizens and terrorist masterminds while receiving direct US financial aid.’”
The rabbit hole goes much deeper than this, though. Almost immediately after AQAP formally declared its existence through a partnership between al-Qaeda operatives based in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saleh “struck a deal with Ayman Zawahiri,” al-Qaeda’s incumbent emir, according to Yemen analyst Jane Novak.
“In the latest round of negotiations, Saleh reportedly asked the militants to engage in violence against the southern mobility movement,” wrote Novak, whose blog www.armiesofliberation.com was banned by the Yemeni government in 2007. “The deal has reportedly included the supply of arms and ammunition to al-Qaeda paramilitary forces by the Yemen military.”
A copy of an internal AQAP communiqué obtained by a Yemeni news publication revealed that al-Qaeda legitimised fighting for the state by referencing the 1994 war.
“Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula explained to its followers that President Saleh wants jihadists to fight on behalf of the state, especially those who did already in 1994, against the enemies of unity – southern oppositionists,” reported Novak. “AQAP in return will gain prison releases and unimpeded travel to external theatres of jihad, the letter explained.”
Protecting our oil
US support for Yemen’s authoritarian, terror-toting state-structure continues. Since the arrival of Saleh’s successor, Mansour Hadi – deposed in the wake of the recent Houthi coup – Obama had authorised nearly $1 billion in aid to the Yemeni government. The support was supposed to be a model success for political transition, offering a blueprint for how to take-on the “Islamic State” (IS).
Yet Hadi, like his predecessor, was no reformer. He came to power in a phony “democratic” election in which he was the only candidate, a US-backed process brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consisting of some of the world’s most brutal dictatorships, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Now, in the wake of the GCC powers threatening a joint invasion to remove the Shiite Houthis, the Houthis have agreed to form a “people’s transitional council” with rival parties to resolve the political crisis.
For the US, the real issue in Yemen is its strategic position in relation to the world’s oil supply. Yemen controls the Bab el-Mandeb strait, through which 8 percent of global trade travels including 4 percent of global oil products. The Houthi coup threatens the Yemeni government’s ability to control the strait, and could even force it to close if violence worsens.
The closure of the strait would increase transit times and costs with severe implications for global oil prices that could potentially trigger an economic crash.
The biggest problem with the strategy in Yemen, then, is its obsession with sustaining business-as-usual, no matter how defunct. Our global chronic dependence on fossil fuels is driving climate change, which in turn is accelerating regional water and food scarcity. But it also means that we must maintain a pliant authoritarian regime in Yemen to ensure that an anti-US government cannot come to power, undermine our access to this strategic region, and destabilise the global economy.
Yet it is precisely the execution of this very strategy that has intensified instability in Yemen; fuelled the grievances that feed dissent, rebellion and even terrorism; and culminated in the Houthi coup that we are now desperate to find a way to quell and accommodate.
Until all actors in the crisis are willing to recognise and address its deeper causes, the new “transition council” in Yemen will solve nothing. In coming years, Yemen’s state will crumble, and US-led efforts to shore it up by empowering its most repressive structures will merely accelerate the collapse.
Yemen’s crisis, in that respect, serves as a grave warning for the looming risks to states in coming years and decades, not just in the region, but around the world.
Yet there is an alternative. If we want a stable government in Yemen, we would do well to re-think the efficacy of focusing so much of our aid on corrupt and repressive regimes in the name of countering terrorism, a process that has contributed to the wholesale destruction of Yemeni society.
We need a new model, one that is based on building grassroots community resilience, facilitating frameworks for mutual inter-tribal political and economic cooperation, and empowering communities to implement best practices in clean energy infrastructure, local water management and sustainable food production.
That we would rather shoot, bomb and kill our way to victory instead, in cahoots with regimes that sponsor terrorism under our noses and with our support, reveals how neck-deep in self-induced delusion we really are about the unsustainable nature of our chosen course.
Yemen is on the brink of civil war. The collapse of the US-backed government in the 2,500 year old capital city, Sanaa, and the takeover by Shiite Houthi rebels from the north, has left the country in turmoil, amidst the threat of yet another regional conflagration along sectarian lines.
Britain, the United States and France have already closed down their embassies, but less clear is how they can respond to a crisis that looks ready to spiral out of control.
The war pundits have been out in force offering all manner of stale recommendations, largely rehashed from the last decade of failed counter-terrorism policies.
We are running out of options, but the reason for this is more nuanced than some might assume.
The core drivers of state failure in Yemen are neither Islamists, al-Qaeda jihadists, nor Houthis: they are structural, systemic, and ultimately, civilisational.
Welcome to the post-oil future
Yemen’s story is one of protracted, inexorable collapse. Around 2001, Yemen’s oil production reached its peak, since then declining from 450,000 barrels per day (bbd), to 259,000 bbd in 2010, and as of last year hitting 100,000 bbd. Production is expected to plummet to zero in two years.
This has led to a drastic decline in Yemen’s oil exports, which has eaten into government revenues, 75 percent of which depend on oil exports. Oil revenues also account for 90 percent of the government’s foreign exchange reserves. The decline in post-peak Yemen revenues has reduced the government’s capacity to sustain even basic social investments.
Things are looking bad now: but when the oil runs out, with no planning or investment in generating another meaningful source of government revenue, the capacity to sustain a viable state-structure will completely collapse.
Water woes
It’s not just oil that’s disappearing in Yemen: it’s water. Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world. In 2012, the average Yemeni had access to just 140 cubic metres of water a year for all uses, compared to the regional average of less than 1,000 cubic metres – which is still well below adequate levels. Now in 2015, Yemenis have as little as 86 cubic metres of renewable water sources left per person per year.
The water situation in Yemen today is catastrophic by any reasonable standard. In many cities people have only sporadic access to running water every other week or so. In coming years, Sana’a could become the first capital in the world to effectively run out of water.
Climate change has already played a role in aggravating regional water scarcity. From 1974 to 2004, the Arab world experienced rises in surface air temperature ranging from 0.2 to 2 degrees Celsius (C). Forecasting models generally project a hotter, drier, less predictable climate that could produce a 20-30 percent drop in water run-off in the region by 2050, mainly due to rising temperatures and lower precipitation.
According to the World Bank, while “climate change-induced alterations of rainfall” have worsened Yemen’s aridity, this has been compounded by the rapid growth in demand due to the “extension and intensification of agriculture; and fast growth in urban centres.”
Demographic disaster
At about 25 million people, Yemen has a relatively small population. But its rate of growth is exorbitantly high. More than half the population is under the age of 18, and by mid-century its size is expected to nearly double.
Last year, at a conference organised jointly by the National Population Council in Sanaa and the UN Population Fund, experts and officials warned that within the next decade, these demographic trends would demolish the government’s ability to meet the population’s basic needs in education, health and other essential public services.
But that warning is transpiring now. Over half the Yemeni population live below the poverty line, and unemployment is at 40 percent generally, and 60 percent for young people. Meanwhile, as these crises have fuelled ongoing conflicts throughout the country, the resulting humanitarian crisis has affected some 15 million people.
A major impact of the high rate of population growth has been in the expansion of qat cultivation. With few economic opportunities, increasing numbers of Yemenis have turned to growing and selling the mild narcotic, which has accelerated water use to around 3.9 billion cubic metres (bcm), against a renewable supply of just 2.5 bcm.
The 1.4 bcm shortfall is being met by pumping water from underground water reserves. As these run dry, social tensions, local conflicts and even mass displacements are exacerbated, feeding into the dynamics of the wider sectarian and political conflicts between the government, the Houthis, southern separatists and al-Qaeda affiliated militants.
This has also undermined food security. As around 40 percent of Yemen’s irrigated areas are devoted to qat, rain-fed agriculture has dropped by about 30 percent since 1970.
Like many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Yemen has thus become evermore dependent on food imports, and its economy increasingly vulnerable to global food price volatility. The country now imports over 85 percent of its food, including 90 percent of its wheat and all of its rice.
Between 2000 and 2008, the year of the global banking collapse, global food prices rose by 75 percent, and wheat in particular by 200 percent. Since then, food prices have fluctuated, but remained high.
But rampant poverty means most Yemenis simply cannot afford these prices. In 2005, the World Bank estimated that Yemeni families spend an average of between 55 and 70 percent of their incomes just on trying to obtain food, water and energy. And while 40 percent of Yemeni households have got into food-related debt as a result, most Yemenis are still hungry, with the rate of chronic malnutrition as high as 58 percent, second only to Afghanistan.
Slow collapse
For more than the last decade, then, Yemen has faced a convergence of energy, water and food crises intensified by climate change, accelerating the country’s economic crisis in the form of ballooning debt, widening inequalities, and the crumbling of basic public services.
Epidemic levels of government corruption, contributing to endemic levels of government mismanagement and incompetence, have meant that what little revenues the government has acquired have mostly disappeared into Swiss bank accounts. Meanwhile, much-needed investments in new social programs, development of non-oil resources, and infrastructure improvements have languished.
With revenues plummeting in the wake of the collapse of its oil industry, the government has been forced to slash subsidies while cranking up fuel and diesel prices. This has, in turn, cranked up prices of water, meat, fruits, vegetables and spices, leading to food riots.
There can be no doubt, then, that the rise of violent and separatist movements across Yemen, including the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has been largely enabled by the protracted collapse of the Yemeni state. That process of collapse has been driven primarily by trends that are at play across the world: the peak of conventional oil production, intensifying extreme weather events due to climate change, the impacts on water and food scarcity, and deepening economic crisis.
As the government has failed to deliver even the most basic goods and services, it has lost legitimacy - and the vacuum left behind has been exploited by militants.
The ‘war’ on starved, thirsty, and unemployed Yemenis
The US “war on terror” in Yemen is thus an ideal case study in failure: the failure of the “war on terror” as a strategy; the failure of the Yemeni state; the failure of neoliberal economic prescriptions; and, ultimately, the naval-gazing failure to understand how and why we are failing.
For the last few decades, successive US administrations have subsidised these failures by propping up corrupt, authoritarian regimes. Instead of recognising the fundamental drivers of state collapse, the approach has been to deal with the surface symptoms by propping up the police and military powers of a doomed and illegitimate state-structure.
The previous government of Abdullah Saleh was effectively toppled under popular protests in 2011, which forced Saleh to hand over the reigns of power to his vice president, Mansour Hadi. But Saleh, now blacklisted by Washington for sponsoring “terrorism” and “destabilising” Yemen by conspiring with the Houthis, was a staunch US ally, who even voluntarily took the blame for US drone strikes in the country, which have killed large numbers of civilians.
Saleh saw his main task as consolidating state coffers at the expense of the rest of Yemen, and deploying overwhelming indiscriminate military force to put down popular rebellions.
Throughout his rule, Saleh was supported by tens of millions of dollars in US aid annually – which reached a height of $176 million for military training and counter-terrorism assistance in 2010.
Yet as documented by groups like Human Rights Watch (HRW), US military aid was used to ruthlessly crush secessionist and opposition movements. Massive aerial bombardment and artillery shelling regularly inflicted consistently “high civilian casualties,” according to HRW. Government forces routinely opened fire on unarmed protestors years before 2011, usually “without warning” and from short-range.
Why do our friends love al-Qaeda?
Our blossoming love affair with Saleh was justified by the need to fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which of course recently claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris.
But Saleh’s regime had harboured al-Qaeda terrorists for decades, and largely with US knowledge. Since 1996 at latest, the National Security Agency (NSA) had been intercepting all of Osama bin Laden’s communications with his al-Qaeda operations hub in Yemen, based in Sanaa, which functioned as a logistics base to coordinate terrorist attacks around the world, including the US embassy bombings in East Africa and the bombing of the USS Cole.
But much of this terrorist activity also occurred under the patronage of the Saleh regime, as candidly described by a US Congressional Research Service report in 2010. The report explains how in 1994, “President Saleh dispatched several brigades of ‘Arab Afghans’ to fight against southern late secessionists,” with US backing. In the same period, al-Qaeda linked militants “began striking targets inside the country.”
Despite this, the Congressional report points out that “Yemen continues to harbor a number of al-Qaeda operatives and has refused to extradite several known militants on the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists” – including people who had been convicted of targeting Yemeni oil installations.
Former FBI special agent Ali Soufan said: “If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally. Until it does, US aid to Yemen should be reevaluated. It will be impossible to defeat al-Qaeda if our ‘allies’ are freeing the convicted murderers of US citizens and terrorist masterminds while receiving direct US financial aid.’”
The rabbit hole goes much deeper than this, though. Almost immediately after AQAP formally declared its existence through a partnership between al-Qaeda operatives based in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saleh “struck a deal with Ayman Zawahiri,” al-Qaeda’s incumbent emir, according to Yemen analyst Jane Novak.
“In the latest round of negotiations, Saleh reportedly asked the militants to engage in violence against the southern mobility movement,” wrote Novak, whose blog www.armiesofliberation.com was banned by the Yemeni government in 2007. “The deal has reportedly included the supply of arms and ammunition to al-Qaeda paramilitary forces by the Yemen military.”
A copy of an internal AQAP communiqué obtained by a Yemeni news publication revealed that al-Qaeda legitimised fighting for the state by referencing the 1994 war.
“Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula explained to its followers that President Saleh wants jihadists to fight on behalf of the state, especially those who did already in 1994, against the enemies of unity – southern oppositionists,” reported Novak. “AQAP in return will gain prison releases and unimpeded travel to external theatres of jihad, the letter explained.”
Protecting our oil
US support for Yemen’s authoritarian, terror-toting state-structure continues. Since the arrival of Saleh’s successor, Mansour Hadi – deposed in the wake of the recent Houthi coup – Obama had authorised nearly $1 billion in aid to the Yemeni government. The support was supposed to be a model success for political transition, offering a blueprint for how to take-on the “Islamic State” (IS).
Yet Hadi, like his predecessor, was no reformer. He came to power in a phony “democratic” election in which he was the only candidate, a US-backed process brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consisting of some of the world’s most brutal dictatorships, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Now, in the wake of the GCC powers threatening a joint invasion to remove the Shiite Houthis, the Houthis have agreed to form a “people’s transitional council” with rival parties to resolve the political crisis.
For the US, the real issue in Yemen is its strategic position in relation to the world’s oil supply. Yemen controls the Bab el-Mandeb strait, through which 8 percent of global trade travels including 4 percent of global oil products. The Houthi coup threatens the Yemeni government’s ability to control the strait, and could even force it to close if violence worsens.
The closure of the strait would increase transit times and costs with severe implications for global oil prices that could potentially trigger an economic crash.
The biggest problem with the strategy in Yemen, then, is its obsession with sustaining business-as-usual, no matter how defunct. Our global chronic dependence on fossil fuels is driving climate change, which in turn is accelerating regional water and food scarcity. But it also means that we must maintain a pliant authoritarian regime in Yemen to ensure that an anti-US government cannot come to power, undermine our access to this strategic region, and destabilise the global economy.
Yet it is precisely the execution of this very strategy that has intensified instability in Yemen; fuelled the grievances that feed dissent, rebellion and even terrorism; and culminated in the Houthi coup that we are now desperate to find a way to quell and accommodate.
Until all actors in the crisis are willing to recognise and address its deeper causes, the new “transition council” in Yemen will solve nothing. In coming years, Yemen’s state will crumble, and US-led efforts to shore it up by empowering its most repressive structures will merely accelerate the collapse.
Yemen’s crisis, in that respect, serves as a grave warning for the looming risks to states in coming years and decades, not just in the region, but around the world.
Yet there is an alternative. If we want a stable government in Yemen, we would do well to re-think the efficacy of focusing so much of our aid on corrupt and repressive regimes in the name of countering terrorism, a process that has contributed to the wholesale destruction of Yemeni society.
We need a new model, one that is based on building grassroots community resilience, facilitating frameworks for mutual inter-tribal political and economic cooperation, and empowering communities to implement best practices in clean energy infrastructure, local water management and sustainable food production.
That we would rather shoot, bomb and kill our way to victory instead, in cahoots with regimes that sponsor terrorism under our noses and with our support, reveals how neck-deep in self-induced delusion we really are about the unsustainable nature of our chosen course.
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
If "facilitating frameworks for mutual inter-tribal political and economic co-operation" is the aim then the building up of the power of the central government is the means required. But doing this in earnest has not been on the agenda for years, especially since 2011, because imperialism does not want it; the would be reformers, lacking in resources to begin with, are ideologically rotted by NGO formula about dialogue, decentralization, and constitutional rule* which is of little relevance to their circumstances, and the armed Shia groups, in the context of Yemen, are the minority intent on maintaining sectional and tribal privileges at the expense of any larger national or Arab interest.
But if the primary aim, as in the text, is "building grassroots community resilience", that is already happening now, as the US has already reached out to the "grassroots" knowledge of the Houthi rebels and appreciates their usefulness as an irregular alternative to the regular army. This cultivation of communalism is already part of the strategy of American empire managing the costs of mounting social and economic decay around the world. Nor does "the grassroots" have any solution to a problem as large as exhaustion of water resources or creating a substitute source of national (and for that matter, regional) wealth as the oil runs out.
*"The Regions Document includes a number of important provisions, the most significant of which is that the map can be revisited after one five-year electoral term—the first elections are expected to be held in 2015. This encompasses reevaluations of the borders of states—formerly known as governorates—within the same region, as well as the borders between the six regions within the Federal Republic of Yemen.
The relationship between the regions and the federal government will be written into the constitution. The details will be defined in a Federal Regions Law after the constitution has been approved via a national referendum, expected to take place three months after the creation of the Constitutional Drafting Committee.Each region will have the autonomy to devise its own regional laws to define the relationship among its various states.
Moreover, in order to ensure fairness among the states within the regions,it has been agreed that parliamentary leadership rotate among the states each term. "
But even this arrangement was too intrusive for the Houthi militants.
But if the primary aim, as in the text, is "building grassroots community resilience", that is already happening now, as the US has already reached out to the "grassroots" knowledge of the Houthi rebels and appreciates their usefulness as an irregular alternative to the regular army. This cultivation of communalism is already part of the strategy of American empire managing the costs of mounting social and economic decay around the world. Nor does "the grassroots" have any solution to a problem as large as exhaustion of water resources or creating a substitute source of national (and for that matter, regional) wealth as the oil runs out.
*"The Regions Document includes a number of important provisions, the most significant of which is that the map can be revisited after one five-year electoral term—the first elections are expected to be held in 2015. This encompasses reevaluations of the borders of states—formerly known as governorates—within the same region, as well as the borders between the six regions within the Federal Republic of Yemen.
The relationship between the regions and the federal government will be written into the constitution. The details will be defined in a Federal Regions Law after the constitution has been approved via a national referendum, expected to take place three months after the creation of the Constitutional Drafting Committee.Each region will have the autonomy to devise its own regional laws to define the relationship among its various states.
Moreover, in order to ensure fairness among the states within the regions,it has been agreed that parliamentary leadership rotate among the states each term. "
But even this arrangement was too intrusive for the Houthi militants.
babyhueypnewton
babyhueypnewton
Post rating:
+
That person at middleeasteye seems to know a lot about Yemen and how imperialism works. But how can one possibly talk about solutions in Yemen without the obvious fact that Southern Yemen was a socialist state and the civil war was fought to re-establish socialism and the Yemeni Socialist Party? The author abstractly talks about the Southern Yememi separatists, and even understands they are the true enemy of the U.S. in Yemen, but fails to mention why in an exercise of pure ideology.
Oil is the major concern of the middle east, but oil is only the surface appearance of the real essence: capitalism and it's endless drive for consumption and suplus value. Thus, things which confront this surface like "green" capitalism or community based solutions are the hope of an already dying capitalism. The only solution, like always, is a new socialism built on the legacy of the achievements of the Yemeni socialism of the past but overcoming its weaknesses and for the whole middle east. Obviously in the short term, an anti-imperialist regime allied to Syria-Iran-Hezbollah would vastly increase this possibility. Whether the Houthi are that or are an impotent ad-hoc regime with future puppet potential like redmaistre thinks I'm not sure.
Oil is the major concern of the middle east, but oil is only the surface appearance of the real essence: capitalism and it's endless drive for consumption and suplus value. Thus, things which confront this surface like "green" capitalism or community based solutions are the hope of an already dying capitalism. The only solution, like always, is a new socialism built on the legacy of the achievements of the Yemeni socialism of the past but overcoming its weaknesses and for the whole middle east. Obviously in the short term, an anti-imperialist regime allied to Syria-Iran-Hezbollah would vastly increase this possibility. Whether the Houthi are that or are an impotent ad-hoc regime with future puppet potential like redmaistre thinks I'm not sure.
Edited by babyhueypnewton ()
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
~
On the flimsy basis of the charges of corruption made against the former Saleh government:
"In an interview on Democracy Now Abdul Ghani-Iryani, the source of the claim, was introduced as "political analyst and co-founder of the Democratic Awakening Movement". The Middle East Institute says says
Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani is a businessman and a political consultant based in Sana‘a. He received an MA from Portland State University and an MPH from Boston University.
So Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani is U.S. educated, businessman, political consultant, development analyst, political analyst or whatever. But he mainly is an anti-Saleh activist (U.S.paid?) making some unfounded claims about Saleh which are then quoted as pure "allegations" by U.N. experts and turned into U.N. expert findings by Reuters."
"In an interview on Democracy Now Abdul Ghani-Iryani, the source of the claim, was introduced as "political analyst and co-founder of the Democratic Awakening Movement". The Middle East Institute says says
Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani is a businessman and a political consultant based in Sana‘a. He received an MA from Portland State University and an MPH from Boston University.
So Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani is U.S. educated, businessman, political consultant, development analyst, political analyst or whatever. But he mainly is an anti-Saleh activist (U.S.paid?) making some unfounded claims about Saleh which are then quoted as pure "allegations" by U.N. experts and turned into U.N. expert findings by Reuters."
HenryKrinkle
HenryKrinkle
hi
Post rating:
~
Saudis are bombing Yemen now
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
~
And "the (drone) attacks will go on" whoever wins.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-26/yemen-government-s-fall-is-another-blow-to-obama-s-war-on-terror
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-26/yemen-government-s-fall-is-another-blow-to-obama-s-war-on-terror
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
The US nonchalance about the fall of a close ally in Yemen and its efforts to distance itself from the Saudis on this matter signals to the extant to which its "counter-terror" strategy has shed the need for co-operation with stable state entities as opposed to networks within the local military castes, the NGOs, and the murky assortment of irregular partisans like the Houthi rebels that survive and even flourish under conditions of ever increasing anomie.
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
This omits entirely the fact that the Houthi revolt that started last year was fundamentally over attempts to strengthen the central government, not drone strikes.
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2015/03/yemen-joins-the-axis-of-resistance.html#comments
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2015/03/yemen-joins-the-axis-of-resistance.html#comments
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
"QUESTION: You know, that -- that's astounding. You're saying that you still see Yemen as the model? I mean, the central -- building up the central government, a central government which is now collapsed; a president who has apparently fled the country. You know, Saudi troops massing on one border; the Iranians, you know, supporting the rebels. You consider this -- this as a model for counterterrorism?
EARNEST: Again, John, what the United States considers to be our strategy when confronting the effort to try to mitigate the threat that is posed by extremists, is to prevent them from establishing a safe haven. And certainly in a chaotic, dangerous situation like in Yemen, what the United States will do and has done is worked to try to support the central government, to build up the capacity of local fighters, and use our own technological and military capabilities to apply pressure on the extremists there."
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/white-house-continues-back-yemen-model-successful-counterterrorism/story?id=29901029
Note that you don't really need a central government to do either of the objectives in bold.
EARNEST: Again, John, what the United States considers to be our strategy when confronting the effort to try to mitigate the threat that is posed by extremists, is to prevent them from establishing a safe haven. And certainly in a chaotic, dangerous situation like in Yemen, what the United States will do and has done is worked to try to support the central government, to build up the capacity of local fighters, and use our own technological and military capabilities to apply pressure on the extremists there."
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/white-house-continues-back-yemen-model-successful-counterterrorism/story?id=29901029
Note that you don't really need a central government to do either of the objectives in bold.
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
Its important to remember that this was a sudden shift after weeks of hemming-and-hawing, not an inevitable or natural response to "terrorism" or "chaos."
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen
A shift motivated perhaps less by concern for the Saudis as much as by a desire to prove to the US Congress, a re-elected Netanyahu, and opinion makers like the one below that the White House is aggressive enough to negotiate with Iran.
"Michael Lewis, professor at Ohio Northern University College of Law and a former navy fighter pilot who watches Yemen closely, said before the White House confirmed its involvement: “This is all about Sunni v Shia, Saudi v Iran. can’t be a disinterested observer. Nobody’s going to buy that. What we needed to do was pick a side.”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen
A shift motivated perhaps less by concern for the Saudis as much as by a desire to prove to the US Congress, a re-elected Netanyahu, and opinion makers like the one below that the White House is aggressive enough to negotiate with Iran.
"Michael Lewis, professor at Ohio Northern University College of Law and a former navy fighter pilot who watches Yemen closely, said before the White House confirmed its involvement: “This is all about Sunni v Shia, Saudi v Iran. can’t be a disinterested observer. Nobody’s going to buy that. What we needed to do was pick a side.”
Edited by RedMaistre ()
dipshit420
dipshit420
political car tune
Post rating:
+
RedMaistre posted:
tell that to nemtsov
RedMaistre
RedMaistre
Post rating:
+
"Without Mr Saleh’s help, it is unlikely that the Houthis would have been able to achieve their vertiginous ascent of the past two years.
When the rebels sliced through Amran, a tribal stronghold of conservative Sunnis who previously fought the Houthis, it was with the backing of tribes loyal to Mr Saleh. And when the Houthis arrived in Sana’a last September, they did so with the support of military units loyal to the Saleh family, according to a UN Security Council report last month
“The Houthis . . . received explicit help from the Republican Guards organised by members of the Saleh family, which facilitated their invasion of Sana’a and control of multiple government buildings and ministries,” said the report."
"Now 73, Saleh ruled Yemen for three decades until an "Arab Spring" uprising drove him from power in 2011. But unlike his counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—who ended up exiled, imprisoned, and murdered, respectively—Saleh managed to step down in exchange for immunity. That he extracted such a deal was, given his history, unsurprising. During his tenure as Yemen's president—a job he famously likened to "dancing on the heads of snakes"—Saleh was an acknowledged master manipulator: a Middle East Frank Underwood. Saleh allowed the U.S. military to launch drone strikes against al-Qaeda positions while, at the same time, ceding control of an entire province to the terrorist organization. During his presidency, Saleh waged an anti-insurgent campaign against the Houthis. But since his ouster, he has emerged as their great champion, and forces loyal to the ex-president have assisted the Houthis in their sweep across the country. Abandoning his low profile, Saleh delivered a speech on Saturday, urging a truce and disparaging the Saudi-led air strikes."
"The airstrikes appear to have softened Saleh’s stance. On Saturday the former president called for an end to the strikes and offered an agreement in which his relatives would refrain from running in coming elections. But the Houthis have dug in — defiantly rejecting the idea that they will be bombed into submission."
"The son of isolated Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been injured with more than half of his body suffering from burns. Despite this, Saleh – who is allied with the Houthis who support Iran – is the mastermind of the current mayhem in Yemen that erupted months ago. Saleh, the wounded fox, was betrayed by his own intelligence and hasn’t yet comprehended that he would no longer govern the country after thousands of Yemenis took to the streets demanding an end to his rule which lasted for about 40 years and had lost all legitimacy and credibility. Just like he himself was burnt by the revolution, he is now behind burning the political future of his eldest son Ahmad, whom he had planned protests for in Sanaa a week ago calling for Yemenis to appoint him as president."
(Do not endorse the editorial line of that last link, but yes)
Yemen reads as a completely different sort of story when read from this angle, as opposed to the filtering of a Sunni vs. Shia clash of civilizations narrative.
When the rebels sliced through Amran, a tribal stronghold of conservative Sunnis who previously fought the Houthis, it was with the backing of tribes loyal to Mr Saleh. And when the Houthis arrived in Sana’a last September, they did so with the support of military units loyal to the Saleh family, according to a UN Security Council report last month
“The Houthis . . . received explicit help from the Republican Guards organised by members of the Saleh family, which facilitated their invasion of Sana’a and control of multiple government buildings and ministries,” said the report."
"Now 73, Saleh ruled Yemen for three decades until an "Arab Spring" uprising drove him from power in 2011. But unlike his counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—who ended up exiled, imprisoned, and murdered, respectively—Saleh managed to step down in exchange for immunity. That he extracted such a deal was, given his history, unsurprising. During his tenure as Yemen's president—a job he famously likened to "dancing on the heads of snakes"—Saleh was an acknowledged master manipulator: a Middle East Frank Underwood. Saleh allowed the U.S. military to launch drone strikes against al-Qaeda positions while, at the same time, ceding control of an entire province to the terrorist organization. During his presidency, Saleh waged an anti-insurgent campaign against the Houthis. But since his ouster, he has emerged as their great champion, and forces loyal to the ex-president have assisted the Houthis in their sweep across the country. Abandoning his low profile, Saleh delivered a speech on Saturday, urging a truce and disparaging the Saudi-led air strikes."
"The airstrikes appear to have softened Saleh’s stance. On Saturday the former president called for an end to the strikes and offered an agreement in which his relatives would refrain from running in coming elections. But the Houthis have dug in — defiantly rejecting the idea that they will be bombed into submission."
"The son of isolated Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been injured with more than half of his body suffering from burns. Despite this, Saleh – who is allied with the Houthis who support Iran – is the mastermind of the current mayhem in Yemen that erupted months ago. Saleh, the wounded fox, was betrayed by his own intelligence and hasn’t yet comprehended that he would no longer govern the country after thousands of Yemenis took to the streets demanding an end to his rule which lasted for about 40 years and had lost all legitimacy and credibility. Just like he himself was burnt by the revolution, he is now behind burning the political future of his eldest son Ahmad, whom he had planned protests for in Sanaa a week ago calling for Yemenis to appoint him as president."
(Do not endorse the editorial line of that last link, but yes)
Yemen reads as a completely different sort of story when read from this angle, as opposed to the filtering of a Sunni vs. Shia clash of civilizations narrative.
swampman
swampman
Dont Mess With Sucess
Post rating:
~
It seems that the Houthis have just bombed a Riyadh military base from 40km away ++
winebaby
winebaby
bb bourgeoisie
Post rating:
~
hey, they're getting GOOD at that
[account deactivated]
cars
cars
UNUSUALY COOL
Post rating:
+
United States did it
[account deactivated]
ilmdge
ilmdge
Online
Post rating:
+
Yemen had a cholera outbreak of 500,000 people (it's abated since, I believe) and is also currently facing the world's worst famine, as it's bombed by the US-supported Saudis. But could it get far worse still???
-All ports and borders are being now closed/blockaded in response to a missile launch, cutting off all aid to the starving people
-Israel sent out a cable to all its ambassadors worldwide, encouraging them to stress to their host nations the importance of the Yemen siege and support for Saudi Arabia in the conflict
-Saudi Crown Prince who is main architect of the siege is consolidating power
-Saudi Arabia's puppet president of Yemen is placed under house arrest in Saudi Arabia (kind of weird?). This follows Abbas's impromptu summons to Saudi Arabia and Hariri being called there and resigning
So in terms of the humanitarian crisis I think it's going to escalate and become even more insane, could reach peak atrocity levels.
and I don't know if that's even the biggest news, as it's just one front in what appears to be the escalation of proxy warfare against Iran. Because that Israeli cable also talks about the evil of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was also the content of Hariri's resignation speech, and it seems like Israel/KSA are raging extremely hard and wanting to lash out because Hezbollah helped defeat ISIS and other sectarian rebels in Syria and Iraq which was a great affront to everyone's pride and efforts to crush all potential dissent in the region.
-All ports and borders are being now closed/blockaded in response to a missile launch, cutting off all aid to the starving people
-Israel sent out a cable to all its ambassadors worldwide, encouraging them to stress to their host nations the importance of the Yemen siege and support for Saudi Arabia in the conflict
-Saudi Crown Prince who is main architect of the siege is consolidating power
-Saudi Arabia's puppet president of Yemen is placed under house arrest in Saudi Arabia (kind of weird?). This follows Abbas's impromptu summons to Saudi Arabia and Hariri being called there and resigning
So in terms of the humanitarian crisis I think it's going to escalate and become even more insane, could reach peak atrocity levels.
and I don't know if that's even the biggest news, as it's just one front in what appears to be the escalation of proxy warfare against Iran. Because that Israeli cable also talks about the evil of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was also the content of Hariri's resignation speech, and it seems like Israel/KSA are raging extremely hard and wanting to lash out because Hezbollah helped defeat ISIS and other sectarian rebels in Syria and Iraq which was a great affront to everyone's pride and efforts to crush all potential dissent in the region.
ilmdge
ilmdge
Online
Post rating:
~
tpaine please move this thread to LF, thanks
edit: thank you again.
edit: thank you again.
Edited by ilmdge ()
lo
lo
Post rating:
+
what do you all make of the purges in saudi? obviously its an attempt to consolidate power but where's he going with it? seems like his support base is more liberal segments of the population who dont think the really conservative religious elements are good for business or whatever, but its hard to tell and im certainly no expert.
colddays
colddays
Post rating:
+
Some very knowledgeable people I follow on facebook are saying that these are preparations for a regional war that the Saudis are going to start with Lebanon. Makes perfect sense considering how they coerced the Lebanese PM into resigning and are threatening Lebanon to get rid of Hizbullah. They've also got Abbas flying in to Riyadh, presumably to "ask" him to make sure there isn't any Palestinian resistance as Israel joins in this war. Apparently, the American empire and its Saudi cronies are very scared of Iran getting too much regional power, especially with the situation in Syria not going well for them, which is why we hear so much hand-wringing about "Iranian proxies/militias" and the Saudis blaming the missile that was fired from Yemen on Iran.
This twitter thread is about Israel drumming up support for the Saudi plan. The purges are apparently to eliminate any possible internal resistance to starting the war and consolidate power for a more effective wartime state.
Everything I've read about this is pretty convincing and kinda terrifying.
1 \ I published on channel 10 a cable sent to Israeli diplomats asking to lobby for Saudis\Hariri &against Hezbollah https://t.co/AbeLPC35GP
— Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid) November 6, 2017
This twitter thread is about Israel drumming up support for the Saudi plan. The purges are apparently to eliminate any possible internal resistance to starting the war and consolidate power for a more effective wartime state.
Everything I've read about this is pretty convincing and kinda terrifying.
chickeon
chickeon
chickeon
Post rating:
+
Lebanon's been on the list since 2001 at least, and there was already some moves around 2012-2013 that were really worrying but didn't take off. ISIS was just completely eliminated in Lebanon so they're probably not happy about that
xipe
xipe
Post rating:
+
They also confiscated 1200 bank accounts and just the top princes they arrested bought MBS $35 billion, by way of financial motive
The arms deal they did with trump at the start of the year ate up a large chunk of their currency reserves
The arms deal they did with trump at the start of the year ate up a large chunk of their currency reserves
herbsaint
herbsaint
ive gender
Post rating:
+
lo posted:what do you all make of the purges in saudi? obviously its an attempt to consolidate power but where's he going with it? seems like his support base is more liberal segments of the population who dont think the really conservative religious elements are good for business or whatever, but its hard to tell and im certainly no expert.
WELL,
dimashq
dimashq
Post rating:
~
Assuming conflict is going to break out in Lebanon, I don't believe an Arab Spring type model will work out; Hezbollah will completely own any Saudi death squads. The only shot at success would seem to be a ground invasion from Israel or Saudi forces sweeping through Southern Syria from Jordan, a sort of Saudi Schlieffen Plan.
Whatever ends up happening, I feel pretty confident that this is the death rattle of imperial ambitions in the Middle East.
Whatever ends up happening, I feel pretty confident that this is the death rattle of imperial ambitions in the Middle East.
ilmdge
ilmdge
Online
Post rating:
~
Hezbollah already kicked ISIS's ass out so yeah. I can easily imagine Saudi/Israeli missiles dropping all over Lebanese civilian zones while the world press carries on about Lebanon using human shields and having terrorists in their government... but I'm not sure what outcome KSA/Israel would hope to gain by doing that. It definitely looks like the usual suspects are gearing up to initiate hositilies against Lebanon somehow, though.
[account deactivated]
colddays
colddays
Post rating:
~
WW3? Maybe?? Russia would definitely respond. Scary stuff!
lo
lo
Post rating:
~
haven't the saudis been doing quite badly in yemen, military wise? are they able to fight hezbollah effectively, even with US support?
colddays
colddays
Post rating:
~
Yes I think you are right, that's why they're banking on destroying all agricultural infrastructure and blockading the country. I doubt they would be able to achieve any military objectives against the better equipped, trained, and organized Hezbollah. Maybe they think they have some kind of trump card up their sleeves, or maybe they're just recklessly diving head first into this conflict out of frustration. Maybe they believe that it's a critical moment and waiting any longer will leave the Iranian power bloc with too much regional power. I have no clue, just thinking out loud based on the analyses I've read on social media.
tears
tears
Post rating:
+
maybe its the other way round - Israel are going to invade lebanon, and the saudi purges are to get rid of opposition to MBS recognising the state of israel
tears
tears
Post rating:
~
what if the KSA-Qatar near war was a US provoked plot to create a border war with a thought to breaking up the KSA with the help of UAE; don't forget that it was UAE which provoked and pushed Qatar and KSA to the brink of war, what if that's why we have seen raprochment between MBS and Russia & China, what if
xipe
xipe
Post rating:
~
tears posted:what if the KSA-Qatar near war was a US provoked plot to create a border war with a thought to breaking up the KSA with the help of UAE; don't forget that it was UAE which provoked and pushed Qatar and KSA to the brink of war, what if that's why we have seen raprochment between MBS and Russia & China, what if
what if UAE plots against KSA in much the same way as rhizome plots against SA
ilmdge
ilmdge
Online
Post rating:
+
Really hope we don't end up needing a Lebanon thread...
BREAKING: Saudi Arabia orders its citizens out of Lebanon 'immediately'
— The Associated Press (@AP) November 9, 2017