10 years of revolution in Congo
The battle waged by Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele
Ludo Martens

scanning was done from a dutch copy obtained from ebay
ocr was done by tesseract-ocr + manual corrections
translation was done using google translate + manual corrections
i have tried to stay as close as possible to the original, it is possible i left in some clunky dunglish. hopefully, that won't diminish the informative value of the text too much.
i will post chapter per chapter here as i process them, this will take a while. if there are dutch readers here, i can send a raw scan of the book for previewing
apologies in advance for any mistakes, if you see anything weird let me know and i will double check/correct
this book was published in 1988 and was probably translated from the french manuscript by martens himself (who is a native dutch speaker)

Table of contents:
Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele, together in battle, together in death

I. Congo is a beautiful colony
The familiy composition of the colonial Trinity
Three Belgian beauties: exploitation, oppression, repression

II. The social classes at the end of the colonial regime
The enemy - the monopoly bourgeoisie
The three classes on which imperialism relied
The Congolese people

III. Mulele during the anti-colonial struggle
In the small seminary of Kinzambi
Rebel in the Force Publique
The first forms of organization
The first signs of a politicization
The discovery of progressive and Marxist literature
Mulele and the founding of the PSA
Two different political views within the PSA
The stay in Guinea and the electoral campaign

IV. Who conquered independence?
The decisive role of the workers and the peasants
The évolués divide themselves into three trends

V. Lumumba, this unknown
The flag of Patrice Lumumba: a revolutionary anti-imperialist program
Patrice Lumumba, the spokesman for the radicalism of workers and farmers
Lumumba gave the signal for the armed struggle against imperialism in Congo
Imperialism in Congo
Lumumba. the inexorable opponent of the collaborators
Lumumba, that bandit. that terrorist, that murderer, that traitor, that criminal of common law

VI. Mulele in the storm. July 1960 - February 1962
The Lumumba government
The nationalist government of Stanleyville
Lovanium or the conclave of capitulation

VII. A regrouping of forces preparing a new revolution
On the side of foreign interests
On the side of the Congolese people

VIII. Some causes of the uprising in Kwango-Kwilu
Poverty and misery
Suppression and arbitrariness

IX. Some specific information about Kwango-Kwilu
Some geographical data
Some information about the population

X. Beijing. back and forth
The manifesto of Bengila
The return of Mulele and the preparation of the Maquis

XI. The implantation and organization of the Mulelists: August-December 1963
The first partisans
The enemy informed
The recruitment of intellectuals
The repression
Political and military education
The expansion of the movement in Kwilu
The repression intensifies
December 1963 in the maquis

XII. The CNL and its program
The progress of reaction in Léo
The turning and the tearing of the CNL
The CNL program
The action program of the Conseil National de Libération
Mulele’s political lesson
How to make themselves understood by the villagers?

XIII. The beginning of the uprising: January-March 1964
The attack on the INEAC and the first operations
The terror of Mobutu’s army
The general offensive of January 22, 1964
The size of the liberated area

XIV. The revolution on the rise, April 1964 - June 1965
The consolidation April-November 1964
The defense, December 1964-February 1965
Division March-June 1964

XV. The structures of the liberated zone
The central leadership
The zone commanders
The equipe and the village committee
The regional leadership

XVI. Some aspects of life in the maquis
The economy
Case law
The participation of women
Marriage in the maquis
Mulele’s lifestyle

XVII. The revolution and the Catholic Church
They should go!
Religion in the maquis
The participation of priests in the revolution
The Mobutist church
The church and the pacification

XVIII. The military views in the maquis
The ideological and political structure of the partisan army
The military education
Armament and tactics
Errors in the views of the armed struggle
The efforts to break up the ANC

XIX. The problem of the vanguard party
The attitude of Bengila and Mulele on their return from China
Progress towards the nationalist party
Consequences of the absence of a vanguard party
The desertion of the Congolese intellectuals
A letter from Mulele about the party
Thomas Mukwidi's analysis

XX. The decline of the revolutionary movement
A text from Pierre Mulele
The slow-moving pacification
A scattered but stubborn resistance
The situation on the general management
Political changes are necessary
A mess with the enemy

XXI. The central core broken
The pacification and the return to colonial affairs
The events on the central leadership
The decisive attack by Mobutu’s army

XXII. A man alone keeps hope alive
A political lesson from Pierre Mulele
Mulele's statement: to the delegation from Brazzaville

XXIII. The events in Brazza, Léo and the East
The first military missions of the CNL-Bocheley
The CNL-Gbenye
"Reconciliation" around Tshombe
July 25, 1964: Bolobo
The recolonization in Léo
With the President of the Republic of Gbenye
Brazzaville, August 1964 - March 1965
The maquis of Mukwidi

XXIV. A vengeful murder
The departure of Mulele to Brazzaville

Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele, together in battle, together in death

The day the black peoples have a decisive voice in writing the history of their continent, they will give a place of honor to a warrior whose name, fifteen years after he was killed, appears to many Africans to be unknown: Pierre Mulele.

Under the colonial regime, the established power in the Belgian Congo had managed to erase the names of all patriots who had resisted the white conquerors with weapons in their hands. In 1897, more than 6,000 black soldiers revolted against their Belgian officers, led by Baron Dhanis. They organized several maquis in the Uvira Baraka-Kahambare-Kasongo region. The troops of the King-Civilizer, Leopold II. needed 10 years to wipe out the last cores of resistance. Sixty years later, even Lumumba never heard of Pierre Kandolo or Munie Pore, of Saliboko, nor of the Changuvu, who in 1897 led the armed resistance of the Batetela, the Bakusu, the Bango-Bango, the Baluba, the Tanganyka, etc. (1).

For the neo-colonial regime, too, it is a matter of vital importance to erase the names and the work of its most determined opponents from the memory of the people. But now history is progressing at an accelerated pace and it will not take sixty years for the Congolese people to fully appreciate the historic merits of Pierre Mulele.

In the 75 years of colonial rule, the Congolese people were crushed, divided, fragmented: no anti-colonial movement succeeded in taking on national proportions, Patrice Lumumba was the first to unite all patriots of the numerous different ethnic groups in a single movement against the common enemy: the colonial regime. That happened in 1958-1960.

Three years later, Pierre Mulele gave the signal for the second revolutionary movement of national scope. Because of its massive character and size, it greatly exceeded the struggle for independence. This popular uprising, which started on January 1, 1964, is
unique in the entire history of the Congolese population. The Basenji ("natives") became, arms in hand, aware of their national interests.

Lumumba has become a myth after his death. Mulele became a legendary figure during his life itself. The myth of Lumumba has fully developed among the peasants and workers, for they alone recognized themselves entirely in this hero, who did not hesitate to sacrifice his life to conquer national liberation. Certain évolués, on the other hand, were delighted with the disappearance of this burden, which had prevented them from throwing themselves fully into the arms of the Belgians. Others, who flaunted their self-assigned title as Lumumba's spiritual heir, were thinking in particular of the material inheritance they would soon receive if they succeeded in gaining power under the flag of Lumumbism.

After their hero was killed, the people who had given birth to the myth of Lumumba did not feel defeated. It wanted to avenge the martyr at all costs. Only weakly organized and unaware, the people needed a new hero and a new myth to be able to stand up against the enemy. For the people there was no doubt that Lumumba would return and that in his second life he would crush the supporters of the PNP(Parti des Negres Payés, Party of Paid Negroes) without mercy.

Gizenga was the right person to take up the torch again, but he lacked the revolutionary boldness that the people needed so much. The reborn Lumumba had to be a warrior for everything. And the one who appeared before the people as a warrior was Pierre Mulele. It was a modest man who, unlike Lumumba, did not like clattering speeches for blazingly enthusiastic masses. It is only because of his actions that Mulele has become a legend during his life. The farmers and workers had never taken note of a program or statement from Mulele, and yet people spoke. even in the farthest corners of the country, about this man, who acted like no one had ever done before: he had gone to the villages among the peasants, the hunters, the pickers of palm nuts; he had unleashed the armed struggle with lances, axes, chopping knives, molotov cocktails; he had established the power of the poor in the liberated areas against the collaborators.

At the end of his life, as he felt death approaching, Lumumba began to see the great truths of national democratic revolution. Mulele resumed history, where Lumumba had pushed her forward with extreme effort. Mulele took her infinitely much further. He led the first major people's revolution against neo-colonialism in post-independence Africa. He showed that the cause of independence is inseparably linked to the struggle of the peasants and workers and that it can only conquer if it is led by a Marxist-Leninist thought.

In the eyes of the reactionaries, Pierre Mulele and Patrice Lumumba deserved to die twice. Lumumba was murdered on January 17, 1961 during a complex operation in which Mobutu and Kasavubu, Tshombe and Munongo each played their part. For the crime to be fully realized, it still had to be completed by a spiritual murder. And then the unprecedented, shameless spectacle took place in which the Tshombes and Mobutus hailed their victim as our national hero, with the obvious intention of controlling the memory of Lumumba, mutilating his work, distorting his thinking and everything what was really revolutionary in this man.

Mulele was also murdered twice. On 3 October 1968, by order of Mobutu, he found an extremely cruel death. His enemies tried to kill him spiritually by wiping his work out of the memory of the people, by all means, including the most terrible terror.

Mulele would not have been able to carry out his work if Patrice Lumumba had not laid the foundations for it and it is impossible to fully realize the scope of Lumumba's action if one does not understand its logical continuation in Mulele's revolutionary activity.

The peasants and workers who stood up against neo-colonialism in 1963-1968 called themselves mulelists or lumumbists arbitrarily. The new generations of Congolese revolutionaries will find their weapons in the legacy that Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele have left behind.

(1) MEYERS, Le prix d’un empire. Bruxelles, 1943, p.137-138, 197.

come on i just finished putting another book up on WWw.rEAdMARXeVeRYdaY.ORG - don't make me start another one
I. Congo is a beautiful colony *

The secrets of Belgian colonization in Congo are not hard to decipher for the all too numerous Congolese who have become familiar with the mysteries of the Holy Trinity from their earliest youth. With the same ease with which the three divine persons merge into one God, the three essential forces of Belgian colonialism united in a single exploitation mechanism. In the most natural tone, Governor General Pétillon asked the following question: "Do not the Church, capital and administration form the three cornerstones on which Leopold II began the work of constructing the Congo that was then continued by Belgium (1)?"

The history of Belgian colonialism takes us back to the problems of the period 1958-1960 in two different ways. Firstli, the specific characteristics of Belgian colonization exerted a major influence on the struggle for independence, led by Patrice Lumumba in 1958-1960, and on the popular uprising against the neo-colonial power, led by Pierre Mulele in 1963-1968.

Subsequently, Mobutu’s absolutism, installed on November 24, 1965, restored several elements of the colonial absolutism that molded Congolese society between 1885 and 1960.

We describe certain general characteristics of Belgian colonization in Congo, while also referring to some specific data from the region of Kwango-Kwilu, where Pierre Mulele led the revolution from 1963 to 1968.

The familial composition of the colonial Trinity

In the colonial Trinity, the position of the Father was taken by the state power

At the height of its power, the Belgian bourgeoisie began to feel ashamed of the bourgeois revolution that had brought it to power. She looked back with envy at the robust firmness of the feudal state. The state power that it would establish in Congo had all the characteristics of feudalism in its full glory. The feudal apparatus, which encircled a capitalist-type economy, was composed of three elements: the absolute monarchy, the army (called Force Publique), and the colonial administration.

On February 23, 1885, at the Berlin Conference, the Western powers recognized the Congo Free State as the private domain of Leopold II, King of the Belgians. Here are the terms in which the latter expressed himself in a letter of 3 June 1906 to the secretary general: "Congo has therefore been a personal work and it cannot be anything else. No right is more legitimate and respectable than the right of an author to his own work, the fruit of his work ... My rights to the Congo are not shared with anyone else, they are the result of my efforts and my expenses ... The way in which public power is exercised in the Congo depends solely on the creator of the State; in the interests of Belgium, he has legal and sovereign authority, and must necessarily remain alone, with everything that he has created in Congo (...) (2). "

This regime lasted until October 18, 1908, the date on which the king transferred his modest private property, called Congo, to the Belgian state.

Between 1885 and 1908 King Leopold II worked out a number of fundamental legal and economic regulations that would form the basis of the actual Belgian colonization from 1908 to 1960. Never in colonial history has a royal family played such an important role as the Belgian royal family that did in Congo (3).

Before 1908, the legislative power belonged to Leopold II "who as the sole authority to make decisions"; "In urgent cases, the governor general of the Congo had the power to issue legislative progress (4)."

The Colonial Keure of 1908 hardly made any changes to this system. In general, the legislature was exercised through decrees; the Belgian parliament did not intervene. "The King exercises the legislative power through decrees ... issued on the proposal of the Minister of Colonies (5)." But in urgent cases, the governor general, who was staying in the colony, briefly suspended the implementation of these decrees and issued regulations by force of law (6).

Before 1908, the executive power was governed by the "Decree of the Sovereign Prince" of 1 September 1894 (7) and by the Decree of October 1894 (8). The king appointed a state secretary "charged with implementing the measures we have decided". The State Secretary was assisted by a general treasurer and three general secretaries; together they formed the "central government," residing in Brussels (9); in the Independent Congo State, a "local government" was appointed under the high leadership of a governor-general. This last one was “responsible for managing the territory and ensuring the implementation of the measures decided by the central government. The Governor General is in charge of all administrative and military services. established in the state (10) ".

This situation hardly changed after 1908. The executive power remained in the hands of the king and was exercised by the governor-general. The latter represented the king in the colony and his power was practically unlimited. He exercised the executive power that the king delegated to him through regulations. The Handbook for the Officials said the following: "He alone has the right to exchange correspondence with the government in the metropolis... The Governor General is in charge of final management of all administrative and military services "established in the colony." He drafted the colony's draft budget, ensured its implementation and collected taxes in Congo. Naturally, any political activity was prohibited for the black population. In the Belgian parliament, at least until 1956, the political parties showed virtually no interest in everything that happened in the colony.

The army played an essential role in colonial absolutism. From 1877 piece by piece this immense realm was conquered through a series of bloody operations that succeeded each other year after year. In 1923 not all regions of Congo were subdued. Absolute power possesses the peculiar trait of character that it comes along mainly from a ground strewn with countless corpses.

It is no coincidence that the last commander-in-chief of the Force Publique, Major General Emile Janssens, who took office on March 7, 1954, made himself known as a noble vassal who took every opportunity to swear allegiance to his king. He wrote: "It is with real blood, with real deaths and with real sacrifices, that the soldiers came over from Belgium and created Congo with their soldiers. By their example they have always imprinted the Congolese soldiers with the fundamental concepts of our civilization (12). '

After admitting that the village chiefs sent "their worst subjects (13)" to the army, Janssens notes that it took seven years of military service to "impose strict and absolute discipline on our soldiers, which is crucial for the Bantu (14). " His 25,000 men, Janssens instilled absolute obedience to the king and the colonizing power, with psychological means and material benefits and through a strict police control system. "All means were put in place for this: the educational service, press, radio, social action, monitoring by the G2 service, information officers, inspections and a very close and effective link with State security (15)."

Janssens stated on the radio on January 1, 1959, without ever having a slump in his passion for absolutism: "The Force Publique with its former warriors and former soldiers forms a large family living together in unity and order (...) and who knows only one thing: Boula Matari. Boula Matari, that is our King, who rules Belgium and the Congo, which are inseparably united. " Now that Janssens has taken such a lead, it will hardly be surprising that he expressed his admiration for Portuguese fascism: "One leader, one politics, one language, one religion."

The colonial administration was omnipresent in the Congo. Even the "native" in the deepest bushes did not escape the nasty feeling that a white man unfolded his guardianship over him.
In the 1920s, Belgian colonization even put the farthest village in direct contact with the white rulers. "The government attaches the utmost importance that regional officials regularly visit the various parts of the area under their authority and that they thereby always make contact with the natives (18). "

On 30 June 1960, there were 1,590 regional officials and 708 agronomists spread across the Congolese territory. At that time, Congo had a total of 10,024 white officials in the administration (19).

Belgian capital was the central and dominant force in the colonial Trinity, in which it played the role of Christ-King

To commence the exploitation of his private domain, Congo, on December 27, 1886, Leopold II created the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, the CCCI. From its inception, this company received a concession of 150,000 hectares of land that it could choose itself. In 1928 she fell under the control of the Société Générale. In 1960 she controlled forty companies, including the Compagnie Cotonnière Congolaise (Cotonco) and the Entreprises Agricoles de la Busira au Lomami SAB.

ln 1891, Leopold II wanted to reinforce his control of Congo with the occupation and operation of Katanga. At his request, the CCCI created the Compagnie du Katanga, which was given full access to territory six times the size of Belgium. On June 19, 1900, the Compagnie du Katanga, a private company, and the Independent Congo State, privately owned Leopold II, decided to merge their patrimony in the womb of a new organism, the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK). This company was given the right to manage most of Katanga, to levy taxes and to organize a police force that already had 1,057 units in 1904. The Comité Spécial du Katanga became the main shareholder of the Union Minière, created in 1906 to operate the copper mines. Later, the Société Générale would make its appearance in the Union Minière with big fanfare. The CSK was also the main shareholder of Géomines, the second Congolese tin producer, which was granted the right to carry out prospects over an area of ​​900,000 ha in 1910 (20).

In 1906, Leopold II shared guardianship over the Formière, the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo, with the Société Générale and the Ryan-Guggenheim group, who received a 3,916,000 ha concession in Kasai for diamond mining (21).

On April 14, 1911, the Englishman Lord Leverhulm signed a convention with the Belgian authorities, who granted him a concession of 750,000 hectares. mainly in Kwango-Kwilu. On April 4, 1911, Socialist Vandervelde had declared in the Chamber : "The day he (Mr. Lever) will be in Congo will bring great benefits to the natives." (22) On May 11, 1911, the English group founded Lever a branch in Congo, the Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB), which was allocated the majority of the palm groves of Kwilu (23) The Belgian Socialist Party obtained a seat on the board of directors of the HCB (24)!

From the beginning of the colonization, the high degree of concentration of capital in the Belgian Congo was striking. Four financial groups controlled 74.6% of all capital immobilized in Congo between 1920 and 1930: the Société Générale, Empain. the Cominière and Brufina. The Société Générale alone controlled 5.4 billion francs on a total of 8.3 billion. i.e. 65% (25)

Just before independence, 70 large companies, representing 3% of the total number of companies, employed 51% of all wagers. Ten companies grouped 20% of the Congolese working class. Three quarters of the total amount of invested capital was concentrated in 4% of the companies. Three financial groups controlled 75% of the economic activities of the colony: the Société Générale, the Bank of Brussels and the Empain group (26).

In the colonial enterprise, the Church acted as the embodiment of the Holy Spirit

Without the Church, Belgian colonization would not have taken place in Congo. When Leopold II made the decision to realize his insane dreams, he found few volunteers willing to storm unknown Africa. The good Belgian people were hopelessly indifferent. It was necessary for Cardinal Lavigerie, primate of Africa, to come to Belgium on the orders of Pope Leo XIII to recruit troops for the "new civilizing and Christian crusade" - the expression with which Leopold II denoted his future profitable operations. From the primate: “Your King granted you access to a country 60 times as large as yours (...) So this was an immeasurable field for apostolate and charity (...) From the religious point of view you failed to give the man spreading the Christian light all the cooperation which you were obliged to in the fight against the barbarians"(27).

In 1891, about a hundred men whose eyes were opened to their Christian duty, embarked on an "anti-slavery campaign," under the command of the future General Jacques, who made a mess in the Albertville area.

The cooperation of the Church was also vital for colonizing the spirit of the black population. The military subjugation of the Congolese peoples had to be supplemented by a spiritual subjugation, the only one capable of ensuring a relative calm to the colonizer. Commander Michaux, a pioneer of the conquest of the Belgian empire, stated in 1910: “The missionaries are the natural educators of the savages. Only the missionaries will ensure that our colony will someday become an extension of the motherland "(28). The Ministry of Colonies gave clear instructions to all its officials in Congo: "The missionaries (...) are best placed by their religious and profane teachings to touch the innermost personality of the native, they are to transform it, to win it in its innermost core for the new social order.

Consequently, the Colonial Keure formulates the duty of the administrations to protect and favor the mission and their work. Officials are therefore obliged to support the activity of the missions in the areas of evangelism, education, medical and social works "(29).

As a product of feudalism, the Catholic ideology in Europe encountered great difficulties in adapting to the modern bourgeois world. The papal encyclicals continued to praise the "workers' question" to praise the feudal ideals: the nobility of the aristocrats, the obedience of the common, the subordination to the masters, the order and the hierarchy in the corporations . The colonization offered the Church an immeasurable test site where it could without limitation impose its feudal views on millions of people who had not the slightest chance to oppose this.

The colonial administration. which worshiped the principles of feudalism, fully supported the Church in its efforts to force the black population into their moral views.

A book that appeared in 1947 under the title Elite Noire and was prefaced by the Secretary-General of the Belgian Congo, Gustave Sand, expresses this orientation in a wonderful way (30). The point of departure is unambiguously put into words: "Christian civilization is at the basis of Western civilization (...) Its religious principles meet the foundations of morality" (p. 55). Turning to the evolue, the book says: "You have taken an enormous step on the road of civilization ... Form this aristocracy of indigenous society, form its elites (...) The masses (...) have remained inert and formless "(p17-18). While the black elite must be aware of its superiority over the half-wild natives, it must have an equally clear awareness of its duties to the absolute colonizing power. "It is appropriate to note that the majority of Europeans bear a clear good will towards you and that all of them participate in the common task through their work that consists of civilizing you.”

"So show some gratitude to this nation that has already given you so much (...)"

"What does one expect from you?"

"From the worker, from the servant, from he who is the civilian's direct aid: serious work and perseverance in effort; from everyonel: submission. discipline and a little love to be able to work together in peace and unity 'for the well-being of human society' (p.105)

When the book addresses the relationships between the patrons and the workers, we are presented with the most extinct feudal propositions from the social doctrine of the Church. "An honest servant not only loves his profession, but also the master he serves. He does not consider the latter to be a tyrant who demands more and more (...) Such elements harm the appearance of the elites, who must be the best black assistants for their employers (...) Your employers know very well that your payment must be in proportion to the lifespan. They do not forget that you are entitled to a minimum life. But instead of constantly demanding pay increases, have you ever thought about researching your family budget? Don't you think it would be possible to alleviate this by dropping a series of unnecessary and frivolous editions? " (p.81-82 and 75-76)

On May 26, 1906, a convention was signed between the Holy See and the Congo Free State, stipulating that each mission would establish a school and be given between 100 and 200 hectares of land for free; the document further underlines "the need to maintain perfect harmony between missionaries and state officials (31)."

In 1949, the Belgian Congo had 3,825 white priests and European sisters (32). In 1960, the Congo was spanned by a dense network of 669 Catholic missions, served by 6,000 Belgian missionaries (33).

The numerous interconnections between the state apparatus, capital and the Church turned the colonial Trinity into a formidable sledgehammer that crushed black society without mercy.

Former soldiers populated the administration and large companies. A soldier, Captain Thys, who had been the chief officer of Leopold II, led the first major colonial society, the Compagnie du Congo pour Commerce and l'Industrie (34).

The administration of Katanga has been run by a vice-governor-general since 1910. The first man to be assigned to this post was a soldier, Major Wangermée, who at the same time represented the Special du Katanga Committee, the main shareholder of the Union Minière (35). Major Stubbe was in 1919 Director-General of the Huileries du Congo Belge in Brussels. Former soldiers who had served in Congo found easy work in administration and large companies as heads of department or overseers (36).

In the beginning, Leopold II ruled his colony with an administration that was composed almost exclusively of former soldiers. Governor-General Pétillon later stated: "In Africa the administration has maintained a military allure for a very long time because of its structures, its spirit and its traditions." The governors and officials are often soldiers or former soldiers "(37).

The administration resolutely placed itself at the service of large capital. The Ministry of Colonies gave the following instructions to the colonial administration: "The most widespread support from the authorities for economic enterprises must be ensured. Officials will endeavor to the best of their ability to facilitate the establishment of planters, industrialists and traders in their area (38).

After 23 years of service in the administration, the colonial officials were retired at the time when many of them were still relatively young. They were then often recruited by major companies to management posts (39).

The missionaries, who were just as much the envoys of the monarchy as of God, placed themselves at the service of the great societies and the colonial administration. In 1945, 96 Catholic congregations had already settled in Congo, "The largest number of them came to settle in the Congo at the insistence of King Leopold II and with his effective help." The king had exclaimed in 1886: 'So give missionaries to me! (40)" The Revue générale des missions wrote about the black workers of large corporations:" The uprooted people must be led and supported. To this end, it is not enough for the priest to visit the camps every month. His apostolate can only be effective with the cooperation of the companies and the settlers (41). "

The state gave the missions a monopoly of education and subsidies for their schools contributed to the maintenance of missionaries. donated 100 to 200 hectares of land to every mission founded (42).

This conquering Church felt closely related to the professional soldiers. Here are the terms in which the Jesuit P.L. Peeters put this into words in 1943 in a brochure devoted to Kwango-Kwilu: 'The Jesuits, a military order. It was perhaps remembered in Brussels that the Compagnie de Jésus was founded by the captain of Pampeluna. This distant relationship undoubtedly created a bond between colonials of our time who were all glorious warriors (1893) and the Jesuits (43). "

The state, and especially the army, was given the task of physically subjugating the savages: the Church undertook to morally subjugate them by inculcating obedience and submission. Without the armed conquest. there would have been no room for the Church; and without the Church, "the savages" would have revolted more often against the colonizer. In any case, the first bishop of Belgian Congo, Monsignor Roelens, thinks about this:

"Without the long-term pacifying work done by missionaries, the powder would have spoken in many circumstances: it would have made victims and generated new hatred.

"As far as missionaries are concerned, they are well aware that without the army they would have been expelled from certain regions (...) It is fitting that we pay tribute to the important civilizing work of the armed forces (44)."

The Church did not limit itself to sprinkling holy water on capitalist exploitation, it also applied it for its own account. Donatien Mokolo wrote: 'In the report of the provincial service of economic affairs of Leopoldville (1959) the missions occupy a very important place among the associations that carry out an economic activity in Kwilu (...) The missions are concerned with animal husbandry , vegetable and fruit growing, plantations, forest extraction, mechanical sawmills, mechanical and artisanal oil companies, joinery, coffee. etc. (...) A certain mission made a profit of two million francs a month in 1960. The missions had obtained extensive concessions, depriving the native population of its lands. Until 1960 the workers were catechumens. That is, people who waited for their baptism and who, in order to prepare for it and as a sign of penance, stayed on the mission for two to three years to work in the various activities cited above. This means that the majority of the workforce was free (45). "

Three Belgian beauties: exploitation, oppression, repression

The colonial Trinity weighed with a crushing weight on the Congolese population and more specifically on the working class and peasant masses.

The economical monopoly (and not free competition) was in line with the feudal conception of absolute power, while it also fit in well with the major Belgian financial companies.

The monopoly of trade in "vacant land" products was reserved to the state by a decree of 1891. This decree also obliged blacks to collect marketable products from trees and plants in the forests and from hunting and to deliver them to state officials; this mainly concerned rubber, ivory and palm nuts. This state monopoly was able to finance the conquest of the colony and the development of its infrastructure (46).

From 1911 this monopoly was transferred to the major private companies such as the Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB) and Cotonco. The 1920s saw an intense development of mine production, mainly driven by the industrial monopoly, the Union Miniere.

The labor power of the blacks was made available to large societies, not as a result of the operation of the eternal laws of the market economy, but with force and coercion exercised by the state.

An ideological conception of the black man, designed by the Holy Spirit of the colonial Trinity, justified this permanent. structural violence "All kinds of difficulties arise for the priest-colonizers. First there is the climate (...) Then there is the terrible blunting, the corruption of this unfortunate black race. Poor people! They can be placed very low on the grading scale of the human race without damaging them. The beast almost always dominates in them, and unfortunately in a very repulsive way! ' The Jesuit Pierpont, for example, kicked it out in a study in 1907, "The Mission of Kwango" (47).

From this point of view, forced labor in the mines and on the plantations seems to be the surest way that leads to the realm of Jesus Christ. Monsignor Roelens: "To civilize the blacks one must teach them morality. but at the same time they must be used to work. Without work no education will bear good fruit, and the black will remain wild... The state and the societies in a certain sense performed pious works when they imposed certain performances the natives who were subject to their authority (48). "

The large societies and the state were able to impose a merciless absolutism on the black working population that could no longer be put into practice in Europe because of the power of the Poverty movement: compulsory cultures, extremely low compulsory prices, crushing taxes, recruitment of labor under pressure ...

The freedom of the forces of the market, so praised by the Société Générale and the Brussels-Lambert group, was therefore almost completely absent in the formation process of their gigantic colonial fortune.

With force and coercion from the state, immense sites and abundant labor were made available to the railway companies and mining companies; the workers were obliged to produce under conditions that enabled the realization of extremely large capital gains.

The skimming of the surplus of the farmers was also achieved by the direct intervention of the formidable force of the state. This system of accumulation reached its peak during the war of 1940-1945.

Congo confirms what Engels wrote about Java: "Primitive communism forms an excellent, broadest possible basis for exploitation and despotism." He considered "production under state control" in the colonies as a form of "feudal reaction '(49). Thus, in the colonial oppression, Marx and Engels saw a particularly clear confirmation of their view of the class nature of each state apparatus. **


As early as July 1, 1885, Leopold II published a regulation stating that the vacant lands should be considered state property (50). The king-civilizer thus suddenly became the largest landowner in the world.

At that time, the black population could feed thanks to hunting, which required vast areas that apparently were vacant, and thanks to a system of changing cultures where fields remained undeveloped for a long period of time.

The king generously made immense territories available to the societies in the form of donations or concessions. The colonizer seized the lands which, due to their situation and other geographic conditions, are particularly well suited to colonization or agriculture by Europeans. It should not be possible for the natives to take possession of this type of land, which may be vacant, or to expand their activities there, thereby preventing or hampering the introduction of European colonization, wherever it is possible'. This the instructions from the Ministry of Colonies teaches us (51).

The farmers were driven back to parts of the territory that were always limited; they were obliged to cut the periods during which the land remained undeveloped, and therefore to work a soil that quickly became exhausted.

The 1911 convention granted the Huileries du Congo Belge a 750.000 ha concession, which had to be chosen in five circles with a 60 km diameter. The first circle, centered on Leverville, covered almost the entire Kikwit region; there were the best palm groves in the Congo. Another circle, around Brabanta, included part of the north of Kwilu. In 1938 the concession was limited to 350,000 ha; the HCB only gave up the least interesting grounds. A regional administrator noted in a report dating from 1916: "The HCB society seems to want to seize all the banks in the area that interests them. They may leave the inaccessible swampy areas to the blacks …” (52) He added in 1919:" I am keen to point out that the natives who are in the concession of the HCB believe that they are sold to the English by the state (53). '

Father Legrand, the former attorney for the Kwango mission, wrote in 1928; "The rights of the natives over the land and the palm bushes are being ignored (...) The concession holder seizes all good lands and palm groves and ... during the definitive settlement in 1936 the natives will only have the least available good soils, with a very poor location, and very few palm trees (54). "

On May 2, 1910, the colonizer introduced a native tax, a capital tax owed by all taxpayers, whose purpose was to involve farmers in the framework of capitalist exploitation. Indeed. the tax had to be paid in cash and therefore required the farmer to commercialize his products or to sell his own labor. Two managers of companies, Messrs. Thys and Delcommune, put it as follows, in the noble way of thinking so specific to Belgian business: the tax 'has a higher scope, which consists in making the blacks used to labor (55). . " The tax robbed the farmers to such an extent that the Colonial minister considered it necessary to make the following recommendation: "One should also avoid an excessive tax absorbing all the money of the natives; they must be left with a part 'to encourage them to work (...) (56).'

In 1925 the farmer, who is obliged to care for certain cultures, whose products he has to deliver at very low prices, sees his monetary income amputated by 40 to 50% when paying the roll tax (57).

To pay this direct tax and to acquire a certain additional purchasing power, in 1940 a worker had to work three to six months a year (58).

The tax forced a large number of villagers in Kwilu to work for foreign companies. The following figures refer to the 1930s. "The black person must pay 45 fr. Principal tax. while the palm fruits yield him only three centimes (0,03 fr.) per kilo. He must therefore chop 1,500 kg of nuts, 43 boxes of 35 kg. It is difficult for him to harvest more than one box per day. If one takes the rainy days into account, he needs more than a month and a half to collect the money that is necessary to pay the personal income tax. If one adds the supplementary tax for the polygamists, the amount to be paid is often 80 francs. '

The ordinance of 20 February 1917 introduced the system of compulsory cultures in rural areas. In each district, the Commissioner determined the mandatory cultures for farmers every year (60). The purpose of this was to provide foodstuffs for the camps of the workers who worked for society and also for urban centers; production intended for export, such as the production of palm nuts and cotton, was also imposed. The legislation allowed for a maximum of sixty days of compulsory work, but this limitation was practically never respected (61). In 1937, the number of family heads who fell under this system was estimated at 700,000 (62).

During the Second World War, the compulsory cultures were expanded to the maximum. The mandatory area for cotton increased from 70,000 ha. in 1933 to 375,000 ha. in 1944. Between 1939 and 1944 the area on which mandatory palm trees were to be planted increased from 18,000 to 35,000 ha., the mandatory area for rice increased from 50,000 to 132,000 ha. and this for manioc from 157,000 to 340,000 ha. (63).

In Kwilu, the palm fruit pickers were obliged to supply a certain amount of palm nuts to the companies. The state, which authorizes prices on a ridiculously low level, also granted the monopoly on the purchase and processing of palm nuts to the major companies such as Lever and the Compagnie du Kasaï. Furthermore, in the region of Kwango-Kwilu, mandatory cultures of manioc, corn and barley were founded, which were necessary to feed the palm forest workers and the oil mills.

The 'natives' also had to perform a number of compulsory activities without any compensation: building a prison in the capital of every 'circonscription', creating places of residence for persons with infectious diseases, carrying out work ordered by the doctors of the colony for hygienic reasons. The farmers were obliged to perform other activities for which only a very meager allowance was charged, as determined by the district commissioner. The black population, for example, had to build roads, build a school and a home for the Europeans who were passing through in the capital of every "circonscription" (64). Furthermore, the "natives" could be claimed 25 days a year as guides, porters or rowers (55).

The exploitation of the farmers was closely linked to that of the workers. The farmers had to sell the food they produced under pressure from the state at prices that were set very low by the administration. Consequently, the worker did not have to spend much to maintain his labor-power, and the patron could therefore pay him a miserable wage. In 1924, Vice-Governor Moulaert estimated the annual cost of a Union Minière worker at 8,000 to 9,000 francs, while raising 50,000 francs (66).

In 1946, Governor General Pierre Ryckmans himself was obliged to identify the extreme misery in which 60 years of civilization had submerged the population of the countryside. 'Our natives from the villages have no margin: their level of life is so low that we have to conclude that it cannot only be reduced, but that it is even below the minimum life. The traditional village communities of black Africa are terribly poor. The totality of their activities hardly allows the residents to provide for their most basic needs. The masses are poorly housed, poorly dressed, poorly fed, illiterate and at the mercy of disease and premature death ... All those who know the bush agree that the population is tired of the hard war effort. We cannot ask her to continue this effort - and even less to increase it. The limit has been reached (67). "

During the preparation of his speech of 17 June 1956, Governor-General Pétillon had noted some figures that were very revealing for the situation of the black workers. He was advised to delete those figures. Pétillon found that the 25,000 whites who were employed earned almost as much as all black workers combined, that is to say 1,200,000 employees. The income of those 25,000 whites was also comparable to the income of the whole of the rural population, i.e. 10,000,000 people. Indeed, 22% of the national income went to 25,000 Europeans. 24% went to the 1,200,000 Congolese wage earners and 28% was distributed to the entire population of the bushes. 10,000,000 people. A black worker earned around nine thousand francs a year; a white wager was awarded an average of 400,000 francs (68). For the year 1957, the CRISP published similar figures: 1,147,712 black wage earners received 13.9 billion francs, while 29,689 European wage-earners divided the generous amount of 12.4 billion francs among themselves (69).


At the beginning of the century, most villages in Kwilu were deeply hidden in the forest, usually close to the river. In the 1920s, the colonizer decided to relocate them by force. This decision could be justified for medical reasons, because the proximity of the water facilitated the spread of sleeping sickness. But administrative motives also played a role as the villages were grouped and nailed along the highland roads to facilitate the collection of taxes.

The administration encountered fierce resistance from the villagers, which they had to control with the power of the weapons. In 1919, for example, the regional ruler of Kikwit wrote that he had succeeded in moving 20,000 Bapende from the Lushima region to the plateau. He owed this great result to the fact that the population felt terrorized after the execution of eight Bapende, who had opposed the orders of the administration in the village of Kizungu (70).

In order to channel the immense wealth of the Congo such as copper, tin, diamond, gold, palm oil and coffee to Belgium, the wedge of civilization, the Belgian patrons had to find enough human merchandise to exploit the country. And this did not go smoothly. The Minister of Colonies came to the following conclusion: "How can we get the cooperation of a lazy population, which easily finds the means in its own environment to meet its modest needs with regard to food, housing and clothing? This summarizes almost the entire colonial issue (71). "

At least until 1945, the creation of a labor market and the involvement of African labor in the international capitalist system were mainly ensured by the use of force (72). The forced recruitment of miners and palm nut pickers was the order of the day. The number of employed blacks evolved from 47,000 in 1917 to 543,957 in 1939. The war was an excellent pretext for pushing the forced labor system to the limit: in 1944, the Congo had 691,067 employees (73).

From the outset, the HCB was confronted with a labor shortage, because the best palm forests, such as those in the Leverville and Kikwit area, were located in sparsely populated areas. Thousands of blacks were forced to work as pickers: they had to leave their villages and move over a distance that sometimes amounted to one hundred to two hundred kilometers.

In September 1925, a regional administrator of an area where Lever recruited labor for her palm forests, said the following: "The regional administrators are well placed to know to what extent day-to-day acts of violence are increasing and the population is not allowed to rest or have freedom ..." he sees how the villages, as soon as his arrival is reported, deflate as he encounters the arrival of a slave merchant. (74) Alarmed by this depopulation of an entire region, a missionary wrote: “A system that is contrived smartly, encapsulates (the native) from all sides and in all ways. Everything has been provided for, calculated, put together so that he would be forced to "voluntarily" be recruited (...) In any case, the will of the people was perfectly contained and their resistance destroyed (75). "

Jungers wrote in his report by the Colonial Minister responsible for investigating the causes of the Bapende insurrection: directly by the officials and officials of the regional service. How could it be otherwise? No broussard who is somewhat aware of the taste and habits of the natives will admit that the latter, who have virtually no shortage of their village, would simply work on five or six days of marching distance from their village, thereby for leaving women and children behind for six months, to live in circumstances that are still terrible for many of them (76). "


An inexorable repression descended on every black person who dared to raise their voice against an exploitation that, as the authorities themselves admitted, had reached the limit of what was bearable. The colonial government wrote: "The population can easily be excited and certain serious rebellious movements have only been able to develop, because one had failed to keep the instigator in check on time (77)." Consequently, they will be arrested and locked up without trial for the duration of a month, which is always renewable, 'the natives' who are alleged to have committed crimes against the security of the State, who have provoked disobedience to the laws or who would otherwise compromise the public peace or the stability of the institutions (77). "

The Decree of 5 July 1910 stipulated that "any native from the colony who endangers public rest because of his behavior" could be banned: he was forced to live in a place designated by the district commissioner, where he could easily be monitored and where he can no longer influence his environment of origin (79). On December 31, 1944, there were 2,993 blacks who had been banned for political reasons; their number was 4,235 at the end of 1948 and 2,338 at 31 December 1958 (80). The entire colonial history is full of extensive operations against villages and collectivities that were guilty of disobedience. Three different types of operations were distinguished: occupation, police operation and military operation.

The occupation consisted of the regional manager, assisted by an army detachment, coming to settle where the troubles had occurred. The residents were obliged to provide accommodation and food to the occupying forces, to carry out the work imposed by the latter and to obey their orders.

The police operation had the content that the "Force Publique" was sent to a certain place to intimidate the residents and "disperse concentrations or collections of natives".

The military operation consisted of sending army detachments charged with, if necessary, using weapons, breaking the rebellion or riot, by seizing the positions occupied with a view to an uprising, by the disorganizing rebels, obliging them to lay down their weapons and bringing them back to obedience to the legal authorities.

In the crisis of 1929-1930, the HCB and the Compagnie du Kasaï reduced the purchase price of palm nuts by 20 to 60% (82). The taxes, on the other hand, which were previously unbearable, increased further. The societies increasingly resorted to the use of power and violence to recruit workers. Driven to the limit, the Pende people of Kilamba killed a regional officer named Ballot. From Kandale to Kilamba, the Bapende revolted under the leadership of their head Yongo. Their resistance lasted several months. In 1964 this region will be one of the hard cores of the mulelistic movement.

The military operation against the Bapende, which was undertaken in 1931, caused 550 deaths among the black population. A colonial newspaper even mentioned the figure of 1,500 murdered Bapende. The Force Publique had no regrets whatsoever ... The brave Belgians who applauded this slaughter stated without blinking that the standards of civilization in use in Belgium could not apply to the savages in Congo. Representative Fieullien said in parliament: "The idealistic views of civilization, of humanity or democracy as they are understood in Europe" are not articles for colonial exports. (Very good. Very good! On the right) "(83).

* We emotionally think of Henri Pauwels with emotion, who under this title
sang to the colonial beauties described in this chapter.
Pauwels was chairman of the General Christian Trade Union Confederation until 1946
and one of the pioneers of Christian syndicalism in Africa.


** Two authors from the Belgian Communist Party, Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin, set out their party's view of the neutral nature of the state, even in the colony, in their book Les Trusts au Congo. They write under the title "The State's right of control": "The possession of this important (colonial) portfolio should in principle allow the public authorities (...) to exercise full control over certain important sectors." (p.279) But, oh misfortune, "The Belgian authorities have almost always ceded effective management to the companies." (p.280) Marx and Engels saw in the colonial state the most perfect form of the state as an instrument of the dictatorship of a class. 'Joye and Lewin regard the colonial state as a neutral force ' able to control big capital ', but which unfortunately fails to fulfill its duties.

(didnt proofread yet)
1 LAM. PETILLON, Témoignage et réflexions Bruxelles, 1967, P.22,
2. Lois en vigueur dans l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, Bruxelles, 1905, p.109-1, 109-2.
3. C. YOUNG, Introduction à la Politique Congolaise, Bruxelles, 1968, p.38,
4. V. DEVAUX, Quelques considérations sur le Pouvoir législatif au Congo in Bulletin de la
‘Société Belge d'Etudes et d'Expansion (Liège), 140, maart-april 1950, p.244
5. Receuil à 'usage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service territorial au Congo belge, S me
édition, Bruxelles, p.17.
6. Ibid..P25.
7. Lois en vigueur dans l'Etat Independant du Congo, p.340.
8. Ibid, p3S3.
9. Ibid. p.353
10. Ibid. p.353.
11. Recueil à usage des fonctionnaires er des agents du service territoria au Congo belge, p.38-30.
12. E. JANSSENS, Au fil d'une vie, Bruxelles, 1972, p 393-394.
13. ID. ibid, p.342.
14. ID. J'áiais le Général Janssens, Bruxelles, 1961, p.23,
15. ID. ibid. p.53-54.
16. ID. Au fil d'une vie, p.393-304. 1
17. ID. J'érais le Général Janssens. p.41
18. Recueil à l'usage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service territoria au Congo belge, p.38-39.
19. J.BRASSINNE., L'assistance technique belge au Congo. Juli 1960-juni 4968. In Chronique
de politique étrangère, 21. 3-4, 1968, p.296,
20. P.JOYE et R. LEWIN, Les Trusts au Congo, Bruxelles, 1961, p.216, 227.
21. Ibid.
22. H. NICOLAI. Le Kwilu, Etude géographique d'une région congolaise, Bruxelles, 1963. p.
23. P. JOYE et R. LEWIN, oc, Bruxelles, 1961. p.203-205, p. 209-213
24. H. NICOLAI oc. p.312.
25. F. BEZY, J-P. PEEMANS. J-M WAUTELET. Accumulation ef sous-développement au
Zaire 1960-1980. Louvain la Neuve, 1981, p.21.
26. Courrier hebdomadaire (Bruxelles). 22 mei 1959. p.1S.
27. J-M. DEBUCK. Jacques Dixmude, (Collection Durandal), Bruxelles. 1933. p.54.
28. MICHAUX. Pourquoi et comment nous devons coloniser, Bruxelles. 1910, p. 196-197.
29. Recueil à l'usage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service territorial au Congo belge. p.1l
30. J-M. DOMONT. Elite Noire, Bruxelles. 1953.
31. Lois en vingueur dans l'Etat indépendant du Congo. p.162-1
32. J. VAN WING. Evangélisation et problèmes missionnaires in Grands Lacs. Revue générale
‘des missions d'Afrique (Namur). 65. 8-9, 1950. p.12
33. C. Young, oc. p.13
34 P. JOYE et R. LEWIN. o.c…. p.203.
35 C. Young. 0.c.. p.284.
36. ID., ibid, p.257.
37. LAM. PETILLON, o.c.. p.27.
38. Recueil à l'usage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service territoria au Congo belge. p.11
39. C‚ YOUNG, oc. p.16.
40. CARTON de WIART, L'appel. Missionaire d'un grand Roi in Grands Lacs. Revue générale
des missions d'Afrique. 65, R-9, 1950, p.2.
41. P. VAN ROY, Missions, Socictés coloniales, Colons in Grands Lacs. Revue générale des
missions d'Afrique, 65. 8-9, 1950, p.77.
42. C. YOUNG, o.c.… p. 14.
43, P.L. PEETERS, Le Kwango après cinquante ans (1893-1943), Bruxelles. 1943. p.4l
44. ROELENS. Norre Vieux Congo 1891-1917, (Collection Lavigerie) 2. Namur. 1948, p.72
45. D. MOKOLO, Le PSA de la fondation à la scisston, licentiaats-verhandeling. onuitgegeven. Lovanium, 1966, p.75-16.
46, L'agriculture, les fôrets, l'èlevage, la chasse er la pêche de 1885 à 1558, in Bulletin agricole du Congo belge (Bruxelles). volume jubilaire 1910-1960. p.33. 36.
47. de PIERPONT., La Mission du Kwango in Bulletin de la Socièté des Erudes Coloniales
(Bruxelles). januari. 1907. p.205
48. ROELENS, o.c.. p.15, IS
49. K. MARX et F. ENGELS, Correspondance. Moscou. 1971. p.378. 350.
50. Recueil à [usage des foncionnuires er des agents du service verrivorial au Congo belge. pA34
SL. Ibid. p.441
52. H. NICOLAI, 0.c.. p.313.
53, ID, ibid, p.313.
54, ID. ibid. p.IS.
55. P. DEMUNTER, Masses rurale er luttes politiques au Zaïre. Paris. 1975. p.241
56. Recueil à Fusage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service terrivorial au Congo helge.
57. BEZY, J-P. PEEMANS, JM. WAUTELET. o‚c.…. p_25.
58. P_ DEMUNTER. o.c.…. p.24l
59, H. NICOLAI, oe. p.323,
60. Recueil l'usage des fonctionnaires er des agents du service territorial au Congo belge. p.307.
61 P. DEMUNTER. o.c.. p_244
62. C. YOUNG, oc. p.l2.
63. F. BEZY, J-P. PEEMANS, JM. WAUTELET. oc. p.36.
64, Recueil à usage des fonctionnaires et des agents de service territorial au Congo belge.
65. Ibid, p. 355-356.
66. R. BUEL. The native problem in Africa, 2, New-York. 1928, p.466.
67. P. RYCKMANS. Discours prononcé à Léo le S juillet 1946 in Etapes et Jalons. Bruxelles,
1946. p.205-206.
68. L.A.M. PETILLON. oc. p.191
69. Courier hebdomadaire (Bruxelles). 22 mei 1959, p. 10-11
70. H. NICOLAI, o.c.. p. 147
71. Recueil à usage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service verritorial au Congo belge. p.427.
72. P. DEMUNTER. o.c.. p.245.
73, E. LEJEUNE. Les classes sociales au Congo in Remarques Congolaises. 1966. p. 10
74, R. BUEL. o.c.. p-466.
75. Le Courrier d'Afrique, 27 oktober 1944 cité par E. LEJEUNE. oc. p. 102
H.NICILAL, o.c. p.320.
77. Recueil l'usage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service territoríal au Congo helge. p.14.
78. Décret du 3 juin 1906 in Recueil à l'usage des fontionnaires et des agents du service territorial au Congo belge, p.135.
79. Recueil à Fusage des fonctionnaires et des agents du service territorial au Congo belge.
80. P. DEMUNTER, o.c.. p.188.
BL. Arrêté ministériel du 25 octobre 1920 in Recueil à usage des fonctionnaires et des agens du
service territorial au Congo belge, p.158-159,
82. H. NICOLAI, 0.c.…. p.323.
83. ID. ibid, p.326.

triple post

Edited by lenochodek ()

triple post

Edited by lenochodek ()

i have some more stuff ready to post but I recently found out this book was already translated once around 1990 and published by zed books under the title "Pierre Mulele and the Kwilu Peasant Uprising in Zaire". unfortunately cannot seem to snap up a copy online, but im looking for it ebcause its probably easier to just ocr a copy edited translation. whoops